The Role of International Human Rights Law in Bolivia\u27s New Constitution: A Fresh Step in Latin American Constitutional Theory and Practice by Vargas Gamboa, Nataly Viviana
 
581 
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN 
BOLIVIA’S NEW CONSTITUTION:  A FRESH STEP IN LATIN 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 
 
NATALY VIVIANA VARGAS GAMBOA* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article argues that the Bolivian Constitution’s framework 
for human rights marks a fresh and novel development in Latin 
American constitutional theory and practice, moving towards closer 
compliance with internationally recognized human rights 
standards.  First, it discusses the features of the framework of 
Bolivia’s 2009 Constitution for the recognition of human rights.  
Second, it probes several key provisions in the new constitution 
concerning the interpretation of rights that allow for the admission 
of international human rights law into the domestic legal system.  
Third, it explores the hierarchical status granted to international 
human rights treaties at the domestic level and the keys to their 
implementation.  Fourth, on the basis of a discussion on the 
configuration of the system of protection of rights in Bolivia, this 
Article attempts to develop the implications of the Bolivian 
Constitution for integration and respect for international human 
rights law within the larger context of the Inter-American legal 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
From 2005 to 2009, the South American nation of Bolivia 
underwent the most profound political, legal, and constitutional 
transformation in its history, and one of the most radical 
transformations in Latin America in the past fifty years.  Although 
frequently overlooked by international relations specialists and 
legal scholars, Bolivia is the fifth largest nation in South America and 
has the largest proportion of indigenous peoples as a share of its 
population among all countries in the Western hemisphere.1  With 
world-class deposits of lithium and the largest reserves of natural 
gas in Latin America, second only to Venezuela, it is bound to play 
an increasingly strategic role in the global economy.2  The country’s 
new constitution, debated and drafted by a Constituent Assembly 
from 2006-2009 through an extraordinary process of popular 
participation and consultation and subsequently adopted in 2009, 
marks a major departure from traditional Latin American 
constitution-making.3  In particular, it creates a novel framework for 
the incorporation of the norms of international human rights law 
into the country’s legal system.  In essence, the new constitution 
invites and, in some cases, requires, the application of the norms of 
international human rights law to amplify its own protections, and 
even supersede them when the international norms offer a level of 
protection more extensive than that offered by the norms in the 
constitutional text itself.  Bolivia’s constitution thus offers a rich new 
paradigm and case study on both the evolution of Latin American 
constitution-making in the direction of greater openness to 
international human rights law and how domestic constitutional 
 
 1 Joseph Kiprop, The Largest Countries in South America, WORLDATLAS (Dec. 1, 
2020), https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-largest-countries-in-south-
america.html [https://perma.cc/X3T2-DQHK]; Bolivia Country Profile, BBC (Nov. 
12, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-18727507 
[https://perma.cc/CDF5-A2P5]. 
 2 Rick Mills, Bolivia: Where Revolutionaries and Lithium Miners Go to Die, 
MINING[DOT]COM (Dec. 26, 2018, 10:05 AM), 
http://www.mining.com/web/bolivia-revolutionaries-lithium-miners-go-die/ 
[https://perma.cc/J3BQ-45SK]. 
 3 See Almut Schilling-Vacaflor, Bolivia’s New Constitution: Towards Participatory 
Democracy and Political Pluralism?, 90 EUR. REV. LATIN AM. & CARIBBEAN STUD. 3, 3-4, 
7 (2011). 
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norms can be structured to facilitate greater normative interaction 
with the rules and institutions of international law. 
The present Article addresses several issues.  First, it discusses 
the particular features in the new Bolivian constitution’s framework 
that recognize human rights.  Second, it probes several key 
provisions in the new constitution that concern the interpretation of 
rights that allow for the admission of international human rights law 
into the domestic legal system.  Third, it explores the hierarchical 
status granted to international human rights treaties at the domestic 
level and the keys to their implementation.  Fourth, on the basis of a 
discussion on the configuration of the system that protects rights in 
Bolivia, this Article attempts to develop the implications of the 
Bolivian Constitution for the integration of, and respect for, 
international human rights law within the larger context of the Inter-
American legal system. 
“The first of the great tasks that contemporary constitutions are 
set to undertake is to make a distinction between law, as a rule 
established by domestic legislators, and human rights, as absolute 
claims with their own legally independent validity.”4  The main 
consequence thereof is that human rights are no longer seen as being 
at the disposal of a legislator and, therefore, cannot be restrained by 
constitutional law or by any other type of norm, regardless of its 
rank.5 
The protection of rights was one major object of concern to the 
Bolivian Constituent Assembly (2008-2009) during the process of 
developing the new constitution of 2009.6  Under the previous 
constitutional system, human rights protection had degenerated 
into an inadequate body of laws, causing the then-existing 
constitutional order to enjoy no popular support whatsoever.7  The 
 
 4 GUSTAVO ZAGREBELSKY, EL DERECHO DÚCTIL: LEY, DERECHOS, JUSTICIA 47 
(Marina Gascón trans., Giulio Einaudi ed., 10th ed. 2011). 
 5 See generally JUAN ANTONIO CARRILLO SALCEDO, SOBERANÍA DE LOS ESTADOS Y 
DERECHOS HUMANOS EN INTERNACIONAL CONTEMPORÁNEO (2d ed. 2001) (discussing 
the idea that human rights are above both constitutional bodies and constituent 
power). 
 6 See Alex van Schaick, Bolivia’s New Constitution, NACLA (Jan. 21, 2009), 
https://nacla.org/news/bolivias-new-constitution [https://perma.cc/EFU3-
CN9K]. 
 7 See Schilling-Vacaflor, supra note 3, at 7-8; Tom Ginsburg, Svitlana Chernykh 
& Zachary Elkins, Commitment and Diffusion: How and Why National Constitutions 
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years of 2002-2005 saw large-scale social unrest and massive popular 
demonstrations by various social movements whose dissatisfaction 
gave rise to the election of the country’s first indigenous leader, Evo 
Morales, as President in 2005, and a subsequent new constitutional 
project expected to provide better protection for oft-violated rights.  
Attempts were made in the new constitution to protect human rights 
through the effective recognition of internationally recognized 
standards8 that would make it difficult for future Bolivian 
governments to infringe on them.9  Thus began the process of 
restructuring human rights in the newly reformed, and newly 
named, Plurinational State of Bolivia. 
As part of this process of structural reform of the entire Bolivian 
State, cultural pluralism has become a fundamental value as well as 
a protective stipulation attached to the different constitutional 
principles in the new constitution.10  The literature on pluralism in 
the new constitutional text,11 be it general or special, and 
independent of the current literature on the protection of minorities, 
fulfills the function that guarantees the constitution’s openness to 
new rights, making it possible for the constitutional text to 
strengthen its capacity to evolve.12  Bolivian constitutional evolution 
 
Incorporate International Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV.  201, 212 (2008) (explaining that to 
the extent that international law binds States and limits the options of policymakers, 
it can serve as a pre-commitment device, and that the ideal way of doing this is for 
constitutional designers to incorporate specific policies and international 
instruments into the constitutional text). 
 8 NORBERTO BOBBIO, EL TIEMPO DE LOS DERECHOS 14 (Rafael de Asís Roig trans., 
1991) (pointing out “the recognition of human rights is at the root of present-day 
democratic Constitutions, and these rights must be recognized and protected by the 
States and international systems alike”).  Id. 
 9 See ZAGREBELSKY, supra note 4, at 47. 
 10 Antonio-Enrique Pérez Luño, Dogmática de los Derechos Fundamentales y 
Transformaciones del Sistema Constitucional, 20 TEORÍA Y REALIDAD CONSTITUCIONAL 
495, 499 (2007).  “One of the most outstanding signs in the systems of protection of 
fundamental rights in a constitutional democracy is certainly the shift from a ‘center 
of gravity’ deeply rooted in Unitarianism to a pluralist conception.”  Id. 
 11 See René Kuppe, Reflections on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the New 
Venezuelan Constitution and the Establishment of a Participatory, Pluricultural and 
Multiethnic Society, in 12 LAW & ANTHROPOLOGY” INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK FOR 
LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY 152 (René Kuppe & Richard Potz eds., 2005). “Latin 
American countries . . . are composed of a large number of ethnic groups and 
cultural traditions and[, consequently,] [e]ach individual legal system can develop 
various responses to these pluralist realities.”  Id. 
 12 See PETER HÄBERLE, EL ESTADO CONSTITUCIONAL 47 (Héctor Fix-Fierro trans., 
2003). 
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in matters of human rights can be assessed on the basis of its various 
clauses which guarantee the protection of rights from a pluralist 
viewpoint.13  These clauses also make it possible to adopt 
international standards as guides to domestic legislation.14 
Another key issue addressed by the new constitution was the 
creation of a basic structure for the protection of rights, as well as a 
context for interpretive solutions to various problems that may arise 
in cases where rights conflict with one another or where their 
application and enforcement would create conflicts with other 
constitutional norms.15  In this regard, the solutions that the 
Plurinational Constitutional Court has been adopting throughout its 
jurisprudential activity since 2009 on the basis of the new Bolivian 
constitutional norms are particularly interesting for the defense of 
rights and the observance of international standards of protection 
and guarantee.16 
II. RECOGNITION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
The rearrangement of the system of protection of rights in the 
new constitution required going beyond the traditional limitations 
of the Bolivian constitutional tradition to make the new charter more 
open and flexible.  In this respect, it is appropriate to analyze the 
 
 13 See Peter Häberle, El Estado Constitucional Europeo, in LA 
CONSTITUCIONALIZACIÓN DE EUROPA 31 (Miguel Carbonell & Pedro Salazar eds., 
2004) (stating that giving preference to its own identification elements is no longer 
a valid argument to prevent a constitutional State’s opening to the international 
community). 
 14 JAVIER GARCÍA ROCA, EL MARGEN DE APRECIACIÓN NACIONAL EN LA 
INTERPRETACIÓN DEL CONVENIO EUROPEO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS: SOBERANÍA E 
INTEGRACIÓN 37 (2010); see also CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 
179 (Bol.); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 2, 1967 (Bol.); CONSTITUCIÓN 
POLÍTICA DE 1945 Nov. 24, 1945 (Bol.) (demonstrating that the human rights covered 
by constitutional declarations under external jurisdictional controls are very 
important limitations to the exercise of power). 
 15 See KLAUS STERN, DERECHO DEL ESTADO DE LA REPÚBLICA FEDERAL ALEMANA 
230 (1987). 
 16 Héctor Fix-Fierro & Sergio López Ayllón, El Impacto de la Globalización en la 
Reforma del Estado y el Derecho en América Latina, in EL PAPEL DEL DERECHO 
INTERNACIONAL EN AMÉRICA 315, 327-28 (1997) (warning that the “growing influence 
of International law has gone beyond its supplementary and complementary 
application and facilitated the recognition of its prevalence, which begins to be 
obvious in the fields of international trade and human rights”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/2
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construction and treatment of human rights in the Bolivian system 
in order to establish not only the extent of its evolution regarding 
safeguards and guarantees, but also the structural keys of the 
current catalogue of rights with a view to their interpretation and 
implementation according to international standards.17  Throughout 
this first section we start by examining the elements that gave shape 
to the catalogue of rights in constitutional texts prior to the 2009 
constitution.  Then we will discuss particular features of the new 
Bolivian catalogue of rights and, particularly, the keys that play a 
role in adjusting their content to that of the rights established in 
recognizably valid international instruments.  The importance of 
this section lies in the fact that it is impossible to carry out a true 
analysis of the characteristics and implications related to the 
interpretation and hierarchy of such rights if the evolution, 
possibilities and limitations of the current list of rights are not 
properly known. 
a. A Brief Overview of Bolivian Constitutional History 
Before we address the constitutional changes related to the 
protection and guarantee of rights in the Bolivian context, it is 
essential to briefly go over their configuration in the country’s 
constitutional history.  This approach proves to be extremely useful 
not only to verify the historical structure of constitutional rights and 
their protection at the national level, but also to understand the way 
in which they have been defended by international human rights 
instruments and public authorities.  We will start by examining the 
framework of protection provided by Bolivian constitutions since 
1826 and the content of the internal system before the enactment of 
the constitution of 2009.  Secondly, we will discuss the role played 
by international instruments concerning the degree of protection of 
these rights.  Both elements are intended to provide a clearer picture 
of the human rights situation in the Bolivian normative system 
before the enactment of the constitutional text of 2009. 
 
 17 See Pérez Luño, supra note 10, at 502 (stating that “the guarantee of a 
multiplicity of jurisdictional entities for an effective defense of fundamental rights 
is another typical feature of present-day constitutionalism and that jurisdictional 
opening correlates to the surpassing of the State’s field of reference, as results from 
a system immersed into a new order of international relations”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
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i. Fundamental Rights 
From 1825 onward, the fundamental problem of Bolivia’s 
numerous constitutions was that the protection of rights was 
completely inadequate for the indigenous population and the 
overall impoverished masses, given its failure to recognize the 
principle of equality.18  This fact, together with the guarantee of the 
exercise of political rights only on the basis of the individual’s 
citizenship—which was in turn subject to exclusionary 
requirements related to economic and social status—strengthened 
the idea of the existence of first-class Bolivians, as opposed to 
second-class Bolivians who were at the service of the former’s 
interests and had representation or protection.19  Power was 
monopolized by an elite Spanish-based minority which guaranteed 
inferior treatment to anyone who threatened to interfere with their 
economic and class interests.20  Not only were colonial arguments 
employed to deny indigenous peoples citizenship and even human 
status; “the indigenous peoples were also put on a level with minors, 
and under the permanent guardianship of a ‘boss’ who made all 
decisions for them.”21  
The evolution of human rights and of their recognition went 
through a slow and painful process in the country’s history.  The 
Bolivian constitutions of 1826 and 1831 placed rights in their last 
clauses,22 abiding by a criterion that gave preference to the State’s 
 
 18 See generally Schilling-Vacaflor, supra note 3 (analyzing the need for the 
establishment of a constituent assembly). 
 19 See LUIGI FERRAJOLI, DERECHOS Y GARANTÍAS: LA LEY DEL MÁS DÉBIL 127 
(Perfecto Andrés Ibáñez & Andrea Greppi trans., 4th ed. 2004).  Contrary to 
expectations, the fundamental rights in the Bolivian Constitutions did not act as 
limitations of correlative powers, nor used to defend the weakest subjects from the 
principle of survival of the fittest. 
 20 Linda Farthing, Evo’s Bolivia: The Limits of Change, NEXT SYS. PROJECT (Aug. 
7, 2017), https://thenextsystem.org/learn/stories/evos-bolivia-limits-change 
[https://perma.cc/4ZED-D7KE]. 
 21 Juan Carlos Pinto Quintanilla, Aportes a la reflexión política de la Constitución, 
in BOLIVIA: NUEVA CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO: CONCEPTOS ELEMENTALES 
PARA SU DESARROLLO NORMATIVO 57 (2010). 
 22 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1826 Nov. 19, 1826, arts. 149-57 (Bol.); 
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1831 Aug. 14, 1831, arts. 149-65 (Bol.).  See generally 
Antonio-Enrique Pérez Luño, Las Generaciones de Derechos Humanos, 10 REVISTA DEL 
CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS CONSTITUCIONALES 203 (1991) (explaining the succession of 
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structure and powers over the protection of human rights.  This 
order of importance was not just formal in the constitutional text, 
but also the reflection of a society that sought to preserve a given 
order and set of privileges granted to a minority group to the 
detriment of the national majority.23  These early constitutions laid 
down a simple enunciation of rights which, though under the title 
of “guarantees,” did not constitute in themselves a system capable 
of providing adequate mechanisms of protection.  On the contrary, 
they revealed a total absence of measures underpinned by legal 
guarantees.24  Furthermore, these rights could be revoked under the 
terms and circumstances established by the constitution,25 which 
represented an enormous limitation on their enjoyment.  The 
configuration of these constitutional texts supported and passively 
tolerated situations of widespread systematic violence and 
discrimination.26 
Under the constitution of 1861,27 the public authorities could no 
longer vest anyone with powers likely to place human rights at the 
 
“generations” of fundamental rights and the transition from a State subject to the 
rule of law to a “State of rights”).  The late 19th century marked the beginning of a 
modern age in the legal field, when laws took center stage in favor of individual 
rights and gave rise to a generic agreement which praises the idea that rights and 
freedoms are the true foundation of any State subject to the rule of law.  Id. at 203-
04. 
 23 See Raúl Prada Alcoreza, Umbrales y horizontes de la descolonización, in EL 
ESTADO. CAMPO DE LUCHA 43, 58 (2010). 
 24 See Pedro Cruz Villalón, Formación y Evolución de los Derechos Fundamentales, 
25 REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 35, 49-51 (1989) (asserting 
France’s constitutions of the late 1700s did not adequately protect the fundamental 
rights they claimed to guarantee because they did not set forth legal remedies for 
violations of those rights).  Cruz Villalón, following Adhémar Esmein, makes it 
clear that the guarantee of rights are truly positive laws with a force of their own 
and that protect individual rights from the legislators.  Id. at 50-51. 
 25 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1826 Nov. 19, 1826, art. 157 (Bol.). 
 26 See Prada Alcoreza, supra note 23, at 58-59; see also Hervé Do Alto, “Cuando 
el nacionalismo se pone el poncho”: Una mirada retrospectiva a la etnicidad y la clase en el 
movimiento popular boliviano (1952-2007), in BOLIVIA: MEMORIA, INSURGENCIA Y 
MOVIMIENTOS SOCIALES 21, 23-24 (2007) (describing the way in which indigenous 
Bolivians were stripped of their land and stigmatized with the label “indio” after 
the State was established).  
 27 Professor Robert Alexy remarks that “fundamental rights play a twofold 
role as components of a democratic process and as elements to engage legislators, 
thus depriving a democratically-elected majority of any decision-making power.  
Therefore, there cannot be unlimited confidence in a democratic legislator, since the 
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mercy of either the government or another person,28 thus 
introducing, for the first time, the significant criterion of “non-
disposability” of rights in Bolivia.29  However, it was still possible to 
suspend constitutional “guarantees”—rights—in cases of internal 
insurrection,30 revealing that the enjoyment of rights was still subject 
to public authorities.31  Moreover, the enjoyment and exercise of the 
rights of the majorities32 was largely conditioned during the 
constitutional period by extensive property-holding requirements 
that in practice excluded citizenship.33  Between 1880 and 1951 the 
number of people who had citizen status added up to only two to 
 
majority principle stands as a permanent threat over minorities.”  Robert Alexy, La 
Institucionalización de los Derechos Humanos en el Estado Constitucional Democrático, 8 
DERECHOS Y LIBERTADES: REVISTA DEL INSTITUTO BARTOLOMÉ DE LAS CASAS 21, 40 
(2000). 
 28 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1861 Aug. 5, 1861, art. 10 (Bol.). 
 29 See id.  The French Constitution of 1791 was the first to introduce the “non-
disposability” criterion by stating that legislative power could not make any laws 
which infringed upon or obstructed the exercise of natural and civil rights.  
Nonetheless, Pedro Cruz Villalón explains that the purpose of this article failed 
insofar as no remedy was specified for the violation of rights by the legislators.  
Cruz Villalón, supra note 24, at 51. 
 30 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1861 Aug. 5, 1861, art. 11 (Bol.). 
 31 See id.  The disposability of rights in cases of war or insurrection facilitates 
the violation of human rights, even in democracies otherwise deemed consolidated.  
See generally Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942) (ordering 
Japanese Americans into internment camps during World War II regardless of 
whether they were American citizens, which amounted to a serious violation of 
their rights); Korematsu vs. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (ruling Exec. Order No. 
9066 to be constitutional); Yasui vs. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943) (affirming the 
conviction of appellant for violating the curfew issued by this Exec. Order); 
Hirabayashi vs. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (affirming that prescribing this Exec. 
Order was within the constitutional power of Congress and the Executive, and that 
the Exec. Order did not unconstitutionally discriminate against people of Japanese 
ancestry). 
 32 See HUASCAR SALAZAR LOHMAN, LA FORMACIÓN HISTÓRICA DEL MOVIMIENTO 
INDÍGENA CAMPESINO BOLIVIANO. LOS VERICUETOS DE UNA CLASE CONSTRUIDA DESDE LA 
ETNICIDAD  20-21 (2013) (ebook) (estimating that in 1826 Bolivia had a total of 
1,100,000 inhabitants, of which 800,000 were indigenous Bolivians, with ninety 
percent of them living in the countryside, especially in the Andean region). 
 33 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1861 Aug. 5, 1861, art. 13 (Bol.).  “As a result, 
women, the indigenous population, and peasants were not entitled to political and 
judicial rights.  In this context, the indigenous peoples were absolutely nonexistent, 
deprived as they were of any civil and political rights.”  See ÁLVARO GARCÍA LINERA, 
LA POTENCIA PLEBEYA: ACCIÓN COLECTIVA E IDENTIDADES INDÍGENAS, OBRERAS Y 
POPULARES EN BOLIVIA 177-78 (2d ed. 2009). 
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three percent of the overall Bolivian population.34  This unstable 
situation left political decision-making power in the hands of a small 
group of people, exerting a negative influence on the recognition of 
the rights of the excluded population.35 
All the same, the broadening of the catalogue of rights36 in the 
1861 constitution was a positive achievement.  The document made 
it clear that those rights and guarantees it contained were not to be 
understood as a negation of other, not specifically enumerated, 
rights, as long as they were in keeping with the principle of popular 
sovereignty and the republican form of government.37  In other 
words, the constitutional catalogue was open rather than closed or 
strictly narrow.  But it was only with the constitution of 1945 that 
mechanisms aimed specifically at the protection of rights38 became 
noticeable for the first time, with the appearance of procedures to 
request custody in cases of improper detention, prosecution or 
imprisonment.39 
The constitution of 1967 incorporated a number of rules that 
made this text more progressive than the previous ones.  For the first 
time a clause was included which established the principle of 
 
 34 GARCÍA LINERA, supra note 33, at 275. 
 35 See, e.g., Schilling-Vacaflor, supra note 3, at 16 (describing the discrepancy 
between the strengthening of participatory democracy by the new Bolivian 
Constitution and the actual socio-political context).  Since the new country was 
founded on theft and plundering, the indigenous nations were considered the main 
obstacle, taking into account that they were the owners of the riches.  Consequently, 
they were the victims of a legal strategy of permanent aggression designed to 
dominate or exterminate them.  See Félix Cárdenas Aguilar, Mirando indio, in 
BOLIVIA: NUEVA CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO. CONCEPTOS ELEMENTALES PARA 
SU DESARROLLO NORMATIVO 17, 22 (2010). 
 36 The first constitutional text to incorporate a provision stating the 
observance of rights not specifically enumerated in the constitutional text was the 
Constitution of the United States through the Ninth Amendment of the Bill of 
Rights.  U.S. CONST. amend. IX.  EDWARD CORWIN, LA CONSTITUCIÓN DE LOS ESTADOS 
UNIDOS Y SU SIGNIFICADO ACTUAL 587 (1987). 
 37 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1861 Aug. 5, 1861, art. 18 (Bol.). 
 38 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1945 Nov. 24, 1945, art. 8 (Bol.).  Articles 1 to 19 
of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany of May 23, 1949 established 
in an exemplary manner what is known today as the law of fundamental rights: 
general relationship, direct effectiveness, essential content and legal protection. 
Cruz Villalón, supra note 24, at 62. 
 39 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1945 Nov. 24, 1945, art. 8 (Bol.).   
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equality40 among Bolivians.41  Another clause recognized and 
granted citizenship and political rights to all Bolivians of twenty-one 
years of age, regardless of their educational level.42  Both provisions 
granted the Bolivian indigenous nations, workers, and peasants the 
right to participate for the first time as formal actors in the political 
power structure.  Moreover, the key legal concepts of habeas 
corpus43 and constitutional protection,44 two important resources for 
the protection and guarantee of constitutionally established rights, 
were included, and they were to retain almost identical 
characteristics in the subsequent constitutional reforms of 1994, 
2004, and 2005. 
It goes without saying that inequality was still rampant even 
after these important legal principles were adopted45 because, even 
though the constitution established the right to non-discrimination, 
the political system was still under the control of a Criollo-Mestizo 
elite.46  All rights and guarantees notwithstanding, the public 
authorities worked regularly in favor of this minority’s interests.  At 
the very basis of the State there was a built-in disregard for 
indigenous identities and subjects, who were forced to live under an 
 
 40 See FRANCISCO RUBIO LLORENTE, LA FORMA DEL PODER (ESTUDIOS SOBRE LA 
CONSTITUCIÓN) (1993) (on the concept of equality).  Bear in mind that equality is a 
relational concept and not a quality.  At the same time, this relationship must have 
some form of diversity resulting from an assessment of a plurality of elements.  Id. 
at 640.  
 41 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO 1967 Feb. 2, 1967, art. 6 (Bol.); see ALF 
ROSS, SOBRE EL DERECHO Y LA JUSTICIA 278-79 (Eudeba 1963) (explaining that, in this 
case, “the requirement of equality was qualified through a reference to specific 
criteria that gave it a tangible meaning”). 
 42 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO 1967 Feb. 2, 1967, art. 41 (Bol.).   
 43 Id. art. 18. 
 44 Id. art. 19. 
 45 See LIBBET CRANDON-MALAMUD, FROM THE FAT OF OUR SOULS: SOCIAL 
CHANGE, POLITICAL PROCESS, AND MEDICAL PLURALISM IN BOLIVIA 48-50 (1991) 
(discussing that the “equality clause is infringed when the defeat of a legal decision 
is the consequence of a special vulnerability to prejudice, hostility or stereotyping 
and the subject’s situation is disparaged at the level of the community and that the 
purpose of this clause is to guarantee equality of treatment during the political 
process and deliberations”); see also RONALD DWORKIN, VIRTUD SOBERANA: LA TEORÍA 
Y LA PRÁCTICA DE LA IGUALDAD 451 (2003) (discussing the equality principle). 
 46 CRANDON-MALAMUD, supra note 45, at 48-50. 
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institutional system, a body of laws, and a prevailing discourse bent 
on depriving them of their basic rights.47 
To summarize, constitutional recognition and guarantees of 
fundamental rights in Bolivia were largely characterized in practice 
by discrimination against, and exclusion of, the national majorities.  
The evolution of constitutional articles on these issues moved at a 
slow pace and were characterized by three important phases.  The 
first of them took place between the enactment of the constitutional 
texts of 1826 and 1945.  It overlooked the protection of rights, laying 
down instead strong restrictions on the enjoyment of civil and 
political rights by the indigenous population.48  The second phase, 
between the constitutions of l947 and 1961, introduced slight 
variations which gradually reduced the requirements necessary for 
persons to exercise and enjoy their rights.49  The third phase brought 
with it the promulgation of the constitution of 1967—in force before 
the constitution of 2009—and stipulated, for the first time, the 
principle of equality and safeguards for the protection of rights.50  
Even then, however, in view of the Bolivian social, economic and 
political power structures, the infringement of rights remained a 
commonplace practice.51  
 
ii.  International Law 
The violation of rights in Bolivia’s constitutional history was also 
the result of a poor constitutional structure for the implementation 
 
 47 See generally LUIS TAPIA, POLÍTICA SALVAJE (2008) (discussing the systematic 
discrimination of the indigenous people in Bolivia).  
 48 Angus McNelly, The Latest Turn of Bolivia’s Political Merry-Go-Round: The 




 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 See Dieter Grimm, Types of Constitutions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 99, 124-25 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andras Sajó 
eds., 2012) (discussing that a common problem of the constitutions was that, despite 
the enumeration of equal rights, they were applied to unequal conditions, so, 
consequently, this formal equality cemented the status quo). 
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of international human rights law.  There is no denying that the legal 
loopholes in successive Bolivian constitutions—since the first 
constitution of 1826 until the constitutional reform of 1967— 
regarding the integration of international law into the national body 
of laws made it impossible for the treaties on protection of human 
rights to gain a real foothold in the Bolivian judicial culture, placing 
them on a merely declarative level instead.52  As a result, most of the 
international human rights treaties ratified by Bolivia failed to be 
subsequently implemented, with an obviously negative impact on 
their domestic observance and validity.53 
Bolivia ratified a number of important international human 
rights instruments between 1979 and 1982, at a time when the most 
bloodthirsty dictatorships in its history ruled the country.  For 
example, Bolivia ratified the American Convention on Human 
Rights on June 20, 1979, even as the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (IACHR) received numerous communications 
denouncing the violation of rights by Bolivian governments 
between 1970 and 1982 —violations committed in most cases by the 
ruling military juntas.  From 1974 to 1982, the IACHR held the 
Bolivian State responsible for cases of murder54 and illegal detention 
 
 52 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 2, 1967 (Bol.); CONSTITUCIÓN 
POLÍTICA DE 1945 Nov. 24, 1945 (Bol.); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1861 Aug. 5, 1861 
(Bol.); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1826 Nov. 19, 1826, art. 156 (Bol.) (demonstrating 
a deficient structure that does not allow the defense of human rights through 
international treaties). 
 53 ELIZABETH SANTALLA VARGAS, Bolivia, in PERSECUCIÒN PENAL NACIONAL DE 
CRÍMENES INTERNACIONALES EN AMÉRICA LATINA Y ESPAÑA 83, 83 (Kai Ambos & 
Ezequiel Malarino eds., 2003); COMISIÓN ANDINA DE JURISTAS, LA CORTE PENAL 
INTERNACIONAL Y LOS PAISES ANDINOS  44-45 (2001). 
 54 Amalia Rada v. Bol., Case 1757, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.34, doc. 31 rev. 1 (1974);  Benjamín Miguel Harb v. Bol., Case 1798, 
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.37, doc. 20 corr. 1 (1975);  Artemio 
Camargo v. Bol., Case 7739, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 26/81, 
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.54, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1981); Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz v. Bol., Case 
7458, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 27/81, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.54, doc. 9 rev. 
1 (1981); Community of Caracoles v. Bol., Case 7481, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
Report No. 30/82, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.57, doc. 6 rev. 1 (1982). 
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including torture55 and, in some cases, banishment.56  During all 
those years, none of Bolivia’s governments in office cooperated with 
the IACHR.57 
Only on July 27, 199358 did Bolivia recognize the competence of 
the IACHR,59 which on subsequent occasions condemned it and 
 
 55 Rubén Luis Romero Eguino v. Bol., Case 2720, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.47, doc. 13 rev. 1 (1978); Nila Heredia Miranda v. Bol., Case 2721, 
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L./V/II.47, doc. 13 rev. 1 (1978); Maria Cristina 
de Choque v. Bol., Case 2722, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.47, doc. 13 rev. 
1 (1978); Nicanor Cuchallo Orellana v. Bol., Case 2723, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.47, doc. 13 rev. 1 (1978); Abel Ayoroa Argondoña v. Bol., Case 
2756, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.47, doc. 13 rev. 1 (1978); Elsa 
Burgoa v. Bol., Case 2757, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.47, doc. 13 
rev. 1 (1978); Sonia Flores v. Bol., Case 2758, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.47, doc. 13 rev.1 (1978); Edwin Antonio Guachalla Viana v. Bol., 
Case 2759, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.47, doc. 13 rev. 1 (1978); Julio 
Tumiri Javier v. Bol., Case 7472, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 28/81, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1981); Flaviano Unzueta v. Bol., Case 7473, Inter-
Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 29/82, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.57, doc. 6 rev. 1 (1982); 
Guillermina Soria v. Bol., Case 7530, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 31/82, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.57, doc. 6 rev. 1 (1982). 
 56 Ramon Claure Calvi v. Bol., Case 2719, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.47, doc. 13 rev. 1 (1978); Vladimir Sattori Benquique v. Bol., Case 
2760, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.47, doc. 13 rev. 1 (1978); Juan 
Antonio Solano v. Bol., Case 7823, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 32/82, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.57, doc. 6 rev. 1 (1982); Diego Morales Barrera v. Bol., Case 7824, 
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 33/82, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.57, doc. 6 rev. 1 
(1982). 
 57 See cases cited supra notes 54-55. 
 58 Convencion Americana Sobre Derechos Humanos (Pacto de San Jose), 
Declaration of the Bolivian Government, OAS/MI/262/93, July 22, 1993 (declaring 
at the time of deposit of the instrument of recognition of the competence of the 
Inter-American Court on Human Rights (IACHR) in accordance with Article 62, 
stating that “the precepts of unconditionality and an indefinite term shall be 
applied in strict observance of the Political Constitution of the Bolivian State, 
especially of the principles of reciprocity, non-retroactivity and judicial 
autonomy”). 
 59 See, e.g., Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 4, ¶ 166 (July 29, 1988); Olmedo Bustos v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73, ¶ 87 (Feb. 5, 2001) (stating that this entails 
the obligation to prevent, investigate, and punish any violation of the rights 
recognized by the Convention and, if possible, restore the right violated and 
provide compensation as warranted for damages resulting from the violation as 
well as adjustment of its internal legislation to ensure the fulfillment of the said 
obligations); see also Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, ¶ 142 (Jan. 31, 2006) (emphasizing that 
the obligation of guaranteeing the rights protected under the American Convention 
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asked it to redress violations of rights.60  Only in 2005 did Bolivia 
start to show its willingness to cooperate with the Inter-American 
Court and the Inter-American Commission, as evidenced by its 
signature on several agreements seeking a friendly solution in cases 
of violation of rights, thereby acknowledging the truth of the 
denounced violations and committing itself to measures of 
compensation along terms agreed to with both victims and the 
Court.61  Even then, however, not all of these cases (or at least not all 
of those which, because of their nature, deserved to be submitted to 
the Court once the State’s responsibility had been duly established) 
have displayed the same conciliatory attitude on the part of the 
government.62  Since 2009, the jurisprudential activity of the 
Constitutional Court has gradually, albeit slowly, made some 
progress regarding the recognition of the competence of the Inter-
American Court.63  The judgments issued by the Constitutional 
 
on Human Rights is not exhausted by the existence of a normative body designed 
to make the fulfillment of said obligation possible, but it demands conduct by the 
government such that the real existence of effective guarantees is ensured with a 
view to the free and full exercise of the rights recognized by the Convention). 
 60 Salmón v. Bolivia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 330 (Dec. 1, 2016);  I.V. v. Bolivia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 329 (Nov. 30, 2016);  
Pachecho Tineo Family v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, Preliminary Objections, 
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 272 (Nov. 25, 2013);  
Cárdenas and Peña v. Bolivia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 217 (Sep. 1, 2010); Ticona Estrada v. Bolivia, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 199 (Nov. 27, 2008);  Trujillo-Oroza v. Bolivia, 
Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 92 (Feb. 27, 2002). 
 61 Petition 241/04, Friendly Settlement: Malaga v. Bolivia, Inter-Am. Comm’n 
H.R., Report No. 98/05 (2005); Petition 14/04, Friendly Settlement: Bustos v. 
Bolivia, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 97/05 (2005); Petition 269-05, Friendly 
Settlement: Osorio v. Bolivia, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 82/07 (2007); 
Petition 788-06, Friendly Settlement: Chávez v. Bolivia, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
Report 70/07 (2007); MZ v. Bolivia, Case 12.350, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report 
No. 103/14, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.153 (2014). 
 62 I.V. v. Bolivia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 329 (Nov. 30, 2016); Pachecho Tineo Family v. 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Inter Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 272 (Nov. 25, 2013); Cárdenas and Peña v. 
Bolivia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 217 (Sep. 1, 
2010);  Ticona Estrada et al. v. Bolivia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 199 (Nov. 27, 2008). 
 63 Corte Constitucional, Nov. 12, 2001, Sentencia 1190/01-R (Bol.). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/2
2020] The Role of International Human Rights Law 597 
   
 
Court64 testify to the development of fundamental principles related 
to due process based on the competence of the Inter-American Court 
and show advances in the recognition of rights.65 
Failure to comply with international human rights treaties on 
account of their misinterpretation is not the only reason that human 
rights have been so poorly protected in Bolivia.  Bolivia’s 
membership in the World Bank and other international financial 
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund also have led 
to the violation of the Bolivian population’s rights, as the 
government has often overlooked people’s basic needs in its 
eagerness to discharge its financial obligations to these international 
bodies while carrying out restructuring programs.66  The social and 
human rights costs of such programs have been much higher than 
their proponents have admitted.  
All the same, one of the main problems that Bolivian law faced 
throughout the country’s constitutional history between the text of 
1826 and that of 1967 was its minimal concern for the observance of 
international human rights treaties at the domestic level, which 
played a key role in preventing international human rights law from 
being implemented in practice.67  Human rights were subject to 
national standards of protection which proved insufficient to ensure 
real protection and guarantee of the Bolivian population’s rights.68  
 
 64 Corte Constitucional, July 2, 2004, Sentencia 1020/2004-R (Bol.); Corte 
Constitucional, Nov. 7, 2002, Sentencia 1364/2002 (Bol.); Corte Constitucional, Jan. 
20, 2003, Sentencia 0004/2003 (Bol.); Corte Constitucional, Apr. 15, 2003, Sentencia 
0491/2003 (Bol.); Corte Constitucional, Nov. 28, 2003, Setencia 1730/2003 (Bol.); 
Corte Constitucional, Jan. 28, 2004, Setencia 0009/2004 (Bol.). 
 65 Diego García-Sayán, Justicia interamericana y tribunales nacionales, in 
DIALOGO JURISPRUDENCIAL EN DERECHOS HUMANOS: ENTRE TRIBUNALES 
CONSTITUCIONALES Y CORTES INTERNACIONALES 805, 820-29 (2013). 
 66 Lizet Cossio Villarroel, La deuda externa y deuda ecológica, 25 Temas 
Sociales 201, 201-03, http://www.scielo.org.bo/pdf/rts/n25/n25a13.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9EF5-ZBE6]; CAPÍTULO BOLIVIANO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, 
DEMOCRACIA Y DESARROLLO, INFORME ANDINO DE LA DEUDA. MIRADAS A LA DEUDA EN 
LA REGION ANDINA 41 (2010). 
 67 See ANTÔNIO A. CANÇADO TRINDADE, EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL DE LOS 
DERECHOS HUMANOS EN EL SIGLO XXI 276 (2009) (explaining that “the ultimate 
notions related to the protection of human rights go beyond the State law, which 
turns the need for internationalization into a phenomenon agreed by consensus”). 
 68 See Aniza García Morales, La justiciabilidad como garantía de los derechos 
sociales, in LOS DERECHOS SOCIALES COMO DERECHOS JUSTICIABLES: POTENCIALIDADES Y 
LÍMITES 11 (Gerardo Pisarello ed., 2009) (arguing that “since in almost all countries 
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Partly to remedy this existing state of affairs, the Bolivian 
Constituent Assembly sought to change the situation by means of a 
new constitutional text.  
b. Catalogue of Rights 
An examination of the Bolivian Constitution’s provisions 
linking the constitutional text to international human rights law is 
now appropriate.  We draw particular attention to two features:  
first, the extent to which these rights place limits on governmental 
power; and second, the norms laying down positive actions and 
proactive measures that the State is supposed to take to protect 
human rights.69 
i. Rights 
The fundamental rights promoted by the new Bolivian 
Constitution are set out in the Second Chapter of Title II, called 
“Fundamental Rights and Guarantees.”70  The enumeration of these 
 
of the world the social state was not formed as a constitutional state but conceived 
as a legislative and administrative state, people’s rights, and particularly their social 
rights, were pushed into the background and became either principles of a political 
nature or privileges solely granted to those who could access the formal labor 
market”). 
 69 See Pierre Bon, La Protección Constitucional de los Derechos Fundamentales: 
Aspectos de Derecho Comparado Europeo, REVISTA DEL CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS 
CONSTITUCIONALES, Jan.—Apr. 1992, at 43, 43-44.   
These two facets—the proclamation of rights and the establishment of 
clauses that make it possible to guarantee their protection—represent the 
twofold purpose that any constitution must serve in matters of protection 
of human rights.  The guarantee of these rights is precisely the most 
controversial and essential function of a constitutional text.   
Id. 
 70 See generally GREGORIO PECES-BARBA MARTÍNEZ, RAFAEL ASÍS ROIG & MARÍA 
DEL CARMEN BARRANCO AVILÉS, LECCIONES DE DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES (2004) 
(examining the origins, evolution, interpretation, and limits of fundamental rights). 
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rights71 is presented in detail and focuses on elucidations of the 
principles and actions the government must undertake to achieve 
their realization.72  The structure of these fundamental rights rests 
on the recognition of rights deemed essential to the development of 
a life with dignity.  Although some of these rights could be classified 
as “basic,” and are not stipulated in much detail in other present-
day constitutional texts around the world, they have been so 
disregarded throughout Bolivian history that in the new 
constitutional text they have become the State’s main point of 
action.73 
Subsequent chapters of the Bolivian constitutional text set out 
further rights in detail.  Among them we can find first-,74 second-75 
 
 71 See 2 ENCICLOPEDIA HISTÓRICA DOCUMENTAL DEL PROCESO CONSTITUYENTE 
BOLIVIANO 2381-82 (Juan Carlos Pinto Quintanilla ed., 2012) [hereinafter 
ENCICLOPEDIA HISTÓRICA] (explaining that even if the right to water is recognized as 
a fundamental right, further on the constitutional text states that the right to water 
is an “extremely fundamental”right); Nataly Viviana Vargas Gamboa, Los Derechos 
Fundamentales en la Nueva Constitución del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia: un análisis 
indispensable del Derecho Al Agua, in LA PROTECCIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS EN 
LATINOAMÉRICA DESDE UNA PERSPECTIVA COMPARADA. LOS CASOS DE BRASIL, BOLIVIA 
Y CHILE 251 (2013) (discussing the right to water in Bolivia); Nataly Viviana Vargas 
Gamboa, ¿Qué ha Pasado con el Agua en el Nuevo Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia?, 69 
AMÉRICA LATINA HOY 95 (2015) (discussing how, with the inclusion of the right to 
water, it can be said that the most emblematic of the fundamental rights has been 
incorporated into the new Bolivian constitutional text); Pablo Iglesias Turrión & 
Jesús Espasandín López, La Globalización y los Movimientos Sociales Bolivianos, in 
BOLIVIA EN MOVIMIENTO: ACCIÓN COLECTIVA Y PODER POLÍTICO 29, 49 (2007). 
 72 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, arts. 15-20 (Bol.). 
 73 Cf. Ministerial Declaration of The Hague about Water Security in the 21st Century, 
WORLD WATER F. (2000), 
https://www.worldwatercouncil.org/fileadmin/world_water_council/documen
ts/world_water_forum_2/The_Hague_Declaration.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y52H-
JLCM] (including the right to water as a basic right, which had a long way to go 
before it was recognized as a basic requirement for a dignified life). 
 74 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, arts. 21-29 [Civil and 
Political Rights], 56-57 [Right to Property], 73-74 [Rights of Persons Deprived of 
Liberty], 106-107 [Social Communication] (Bol.); see also Domingo García Belaunde, 
El Estado Social Re-visitado, 15 PENSAMIENTO CONSTITUCIONAL 193, 197 (2011) 
(pointing out that the fulfillment of first-generation rights is a relatively simple 
process because they only request the State’s willingness to let, authorize or not 
prevent something to be done). 
 75 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, arts. 35-45 [Right to 
Health and Social Security], 46-55 [Right to Work and Employment], 58-61 [Rights 
of Children, Adolescents and Youth], 62-66 [Rights of the Family], 67-69 [Rights of 
Elderly Adults], 70-72 [Rights of Disabled Persons], 91-97 [Higher Education], 104-
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and third-76 generation rights77 which are now part of the longest 
catalogue of rights that a Bolivian constitution has ever had.78  
Significantly, these latter rights include specific clauses linked to the 
enumeration of specific indigenous rights, complementing the 
important indigenous symbolism found throughout the entire text. 
The new rights stipulated in the text of the Bolivian Constitution 
embrace, without a doubt, the “rights of the indigenous peoples,”79 
also addressed more specifically in another clause related to the 
rights of cultures80—every one of them focused on the recognition 
and protection of the indigenous cultures.  The incorporation of 
these groups of rights into the Bolivian constitutional text is one of 
the most important and significant measures to ensure the 
recognition and protection of the rights of the greater part of the 
country’s population.  Such indigenous-related rights not only had 
been left out of previous Bolivian constitutions, they were also 
 
105 [Sports and Recreation] (Bol.); see also Eugenio Raúl Zaffaroni, La naturaleza como 
persona: Pachamama y Gaia, in BOLIVIA: NUEVA CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO: 
CONCEPTOS ELEMENTARES PARA SU DESARROLLO NORMATIVO 109, 119-20 (2010).  
As far as the configuration of environmental rights is concerned, while 
they are referred to as social and economic rights, the text mentions other 
living beings, which involves recognizing their rights as well.  The 
practical consequence of this fact is that any citizen will be entitled to 
demand the protection of these rights in a court of law even if they are not 
directly affected by their violation, since the legal personhood of the 
Pachamama is recognized in its cultural dimension as Mother Earth. 
Id. 
 76 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, arts. 30-32 [Rights of the 
Nations and Rural Native Indigenous People], 33-34 [Right to the Environment], 35 
[Right to Health and Social Security], 75-76 [Rights of Users and Consumers], 77-90 
[Education], 98-102 [Cultures], 103 [Science, Technology and Research] (Bol.). 
 77 See García Belaunde, supra note 74, at 27 García Belaunde makes it clear that 
“the division of human rights into generations is not due to priority considerations, 
but simply that it was contingent on the specific moment in history where it took 
place.  In this connection, the division is merely chronological and neither good nor 
bad, but simply an unquestionable and chronologically defined event.” 
 78 See LUIS MARÍA DÍEZ-PICAZO, SISTEMA DE DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES 37-48 
(2d ed. 2005) (describing the “inflation” of rights as a very serious problem, since, 
for fundamental rights to be truly effective, there should probably not be too many 
of them).  The recognition of new rights is not a benign operation, but rather a task 
that entails setting new limitations to the State’s performance and, therefore, also 
symbolic ones, because the very idea of fundamental rights ends up damaged as a 
result. 
 79 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, arts. 30-32 (Bol.).  
 80 Id. arts. 98-102. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/2
2020] The Role of International Human Rights Law 601 
   
 
regularly violated regardless of their international protection.81  In 
fact, the inclusion of separate clusters of rights for the benefit of the 
indigenous sectors—rights of the indigenous peoples and “the 
rights of cultures”82—was one of the main grassroots demands that 
came up during the Constituent Assembly.83  These sectors are 
among the most vulnerable population groups in Bolivia’s 
territory.84  Once the Assembly recognized their overall situation, it 
took steps to protect their collective rights, all of them within the 
bounds of the collective defense85 of these groups and their 
identity.86  
 
 81 See Diego Moreno, El Nuevo Constitucionalismo Latinoamericano, en la 
Encrucijada: Cuatro tendencias y algunos desafíos para el futuro, in DERECHOS HUMANOS 
Y ORDEN CONSTITUCIONAL EN IBEROAMÉRICA 147, 153-54 (Juan Manuel López Ulla ed., 
2011).   
Latin American constitutionalism recognizes the universal character of 
human rights and the existence of vulnerable groups who have been 
excluded and marginalized throughout history by incorporating a number 
of rules designed to ensure the recognition of these groups’ specific needs 
of protection, not only with non-discrimination guidelines but also with 
specific provisions for affirmative action measures aligned with the 
“pluralist” character of Latin American constitutionalism.   
Id.  
 82 Latin American constitutionalism, described by Li-Ann Thio as illiberal, is 
characterized by its failure to rely on individual rights, although it does resort to 
separated powers to constrain public power, on the premise that the State is non-
neutral and privileges “a substantive vision of the good, informed by ethnicity, 
religion, or communal morality.”  See Li-Ann Thio, Constitutionalism in Illiberal 
Polities, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 133, 136 
(Michel Rosenfeld & Andras Sajó eds., 2012). 
 83 ENCICLOPEDIA HISTÓRICA, supra note 71, at 129-31. 
 84 See generally Björn-Sören Gigler, Poverty, Inequality and Human Development 
of Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia (Geo. U. Ctr. for Latin Am. Stud., Working Paper No. 
17, 2009), 
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/CLAS%20RESEARCH/Working%20Papers/WP17.
pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5UY-9GNL] (examining the social and economic 
difference between the indigenous and non-indigenous population, and analyzing 
the underlying factors of the economic and social exclusion of these vulnerable 
groups in Bolivia). 
 85 Although the communal ownership of rights entered the debate following 
the recognition of second-generation rights, the most decisive contribution to the 
recognition of communal ownership has been made by third-generation rights.  See 
Pérez Luño, supra note 22, at 216. 
 86 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 135-36 (Bol.). 
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Since the goal of inclusion87 was the main purpose of recognizing 
the rights of indigenous peoples and cultures, special attention was 
paid to the distinct symbolism of these groups.88  The present 
structure of rights enumerated in the constitution centers upon 
fundamental rights, other clusters of rights, obligations and 
jurisdictional guarantees, and actions of protection.89  While the 
structure of these rights responds to the classical one found in most 
constitutional texts, one of its main features is the inclusion of a large 
number of rights with strong cultural associations, accounting for a 
very long list of them.90  
Nevertheless, the recognition of these rights could create 
boundary issues among the different clusters enumerated therein,91 
since the wide range of the Bolivian catalogue of constitutional 
rights also requires a similar level of protection and guarantee to all 
rights.92  The degree of detail vested in constitutional rights may 
 
 87 See generally Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Oct. 21, 2011, Sentencia 
Constitucional, No. 1688/2011-R (Bol.) (describing the diversity and Action of 
Liberty in Bolivia). 
 88 One of the most important elements of Latin American constitutionalism is 
its social component as an imposition to and a need of regions having a high index 
of social and economic inequality and extreme poverty, which brings with it a 
diversity of profound implications for their political systems.  See Moreno, supra 
note 81, at 168-69. 
 89 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, arts. 125-27 [Action of 
Liberty], arts. 128-29 [Action of Constitutional Protection], arts. 130-31 [Action of 
Privacy Protection], arts. 132-33 [Action of Unconstitutionality], art 134 [Action of 
Compliance], arts. 135-36 [Popular Action] (Bol.).  As to the actions of protection 
and guarantee of rights, their extension is also noticeable, at least regarding their 
more specific classification.  Id. 
 90 Moreno, supra note 81, at 153. “It is noticeable that the new Latin American 
constitutions are usually characterized by the recognition of a wide and diverse 
range of fundamental rights.  There are several explanations for this, one of them 
being the strengthening of the “social” nature of those Constitutions.”  Id. 
 91 See generally Juan Irarrázabal Covarrubius, Book Review, 30 REVISTA 
CHILENA DE DERECHO 201 (2003) (reviewing JUAN CIANCIARDO, EL CONFLICTIVISMO 
EN LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES (2003)) (detailing the difficulties courts face in 
resolving conflicts). 
 92 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 109 (Bol.). The 
considerable division and stipulation of rights in the Constitution—especially in 
respect to the distinction between fundamental rights and other groups of rights—
turns out to be somewhat useless, since the Bolivian constitutional text establishes 
that all rights are directly applicable and enjoy equal guarantees.  Id.  The division 
also indicates that the classification of rights does not determine any hierarchy or 
superiority of some rights over others.  See id. art. 13. § III.  Therefore, all the rights 
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seem a little excessive because, instead of acting as a safeguard, the 
details might become real obstacles to the rights’ implementation.  
In such a case, the constitution requires a proportionality-based 
interpretation capable of effectively protecting the different clusters 
of rights.93  
The very characteristics of the Bolivian system of rights give rise 
to another major problem.  The fact that these rights are laid down 
in great detail, and that the specific characteristics of every single 
cluster of rights are supposed to be protected, could lead to 
interpretations intended to safeguard such characteristics at a 
national level while disregarding the more universal interpretations 
established by international law.  In such cases, the interpreting 
bodies are expected to carry out their task with due regard to the 
fact that the universalization94 of rights is precisely one of the 
elements that guarantee cultural pluralism95 at a national level.  
Consequently, the more universal interpretations supplied by 
international law are not at odds with a domestic legal interpretation 
based on multiculturalism.  
ii. Obligations of the State 
Throughout Latin America, human rights are becoming 
increasingly stronger, at least formally if not in actual practice, 
revealing both negative dimensions of freedom and positive 
dimensions of applicability.96  In other words, human rights 
 
enunciated in the Bolivian catalogue are considered to be fundamental, according 
to the constitutional text itself. 
 93 See CARLOS BERNAL PULIDO, EL PRINCIPIO DE PROPORCIONALIDAD Y LOS 
DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES 103 (3d ed. 2007); see also MIGUEL CARBONELL, EL 
PRINCIPIO DE PROPORCIONALIDAD EN EL ESTADO CONSTITUCIONAL (2007). 
 94 Antonio-Enrique Pérez Luño insists that in the case of third-generation 
rights, the universal character is no longer an ideal postulate, becoming instead a 
practical necessity.  Pérez Luño, supra note 22, at 216.  
 95 FERRAJOLI, supra note 19, at 126-27 (remarking that “the constitutional and 
universal nature of these rights is the main guarantee of multiculturality”). 
 96 MAURIZIO FIORAVANTI, LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES: APUNTES DE 
HISTORIA DE LAS CONSTITUCIONES 131 (G. Giappichelli, ed., Manuel Martínez Neira, 
Trans., 1996) (“These duties go beyond the simple defense and guarantee of the 
fundamental rights and freedoms, since the doctrine of modern-day 
constitutionality can no longer be just a guarantee of restrained governance, as it 
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generate positive as well as negative obligations.  This tendency 
seeks to attain a top level of protection for human rights that will 
align with different actions of the State in order to ensure at least 
minimum levels of fulfillment.  These obligations are binding on the 
State, and they prevail over both public authorities and any private 
individuals in a position to violate any right.97 
It is safe to say then that the constitution is not just limited to the 
enunciation of rights in the constitutional text:  its articles also 
establish norms of guarantee that entail specific obligations on the 
State that are highly significant for their observance.98  These 
provisions stipulate parameters of State performance in the 
subsequent regulation of any aspect linked with human rights, as 
well as in the design and implementation of related public policies.  
In this respect, such obligations are exercised primarily in relation 
to the rights enunciated in the new Bolivian constitutional text. 
While it is understood that human rights are potentially capable 
of imposing additional obligations on the State beyond the logical 
assumption—consistent with each of these rights—of the State’s 
duty to take all necessary measures to facilitate the exercise by 
citizens of their rights, the enunciation of specific actions is one of 
the most interesting elements incorporated into the new 
constitution.99  Just as the actions undertaken by the State are 
enforceable and considered constitutional parameters, so are the 
 
should represent the doctrine of government obligations.”); see also FERRAJOLI, supra 
note 19. 
 97 See Organización Internacional para las Migraciones, Séptima Conferencia 
Sudamericana Sobre Migraciones: “Los Estándares Internacionales en Materia de 
Derechos Humanos y Políticas Migratorias” 3 (2007), 
https://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/BDL/2007/5577.pdf?view 
[https://perma.cc/SUJ2-Y7E2] (claiming that human rights are understood as a 
program capable of guiding a State’s public policies and contributing to democratic 
institutionalization). 
 98 See JAVIER JIMÉNEZ CAMPO, DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES: CONCEPTO Y 
GARANTÍAS (1999) (providing the definition and guarantee of fundamental rights); 
see also P. Cruz Villalón, Derechos Fundamentales, in TEMAS BÁSICOS DE DERECHO 
CONSTITUCIONAL 108, 108-09 (Manuel Aragón Reyes ed., 2001) (describing the 
character, evolution, and identity of fundamental rights provided in the 
Constitution). 
 99 Oscar Vega Camacho, Estado Plurinacional: Elementos para el debate, in 
DESCOLINIZACIÓN EN BOLIVIA: CUATRO EJES PARA COMPRENDER EL CAMBIO 109, 126-27 
(2011). 
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rights of citizens.100  The demand of respect for human rights 
established in the constitution involves a requirement for the State 
to implement actions necessary for such purposes.101 
The constitutional recognition of social and group rights as 
complex structures requires public authorities to act upon these 
rights by taking positive actions, that is to say, carrying out specific 
functions as well as negative actions or abstention.102  However, the 
constitution has opted for a solution likely to overburden 
constitutional rights, in the sense that its articles assign a high 
number of actions to the Bolivian State that it cannot possibly fulfill 
nowadays.103  Nevertheless, what the constitution stipulates should 
be understood only as a parameter to be achieved, that is, as the level 
of performance expected from the State for an effective observance 
of the rights enumerated in the constitutional text.104  Although the 
 
 100 Rebeca E. Delgado Burgoa, Algunas reflexiones sobre la Constitución Política 
del Estado, in BOLIVIA: NUEVA CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO: CONCEPTOS 
ELEMENTALES PARA SU DESARROLLO NORMATIVO 39, 47-48 (2010).  No special or 
interpretative laws or regulations are necessary for a large number of the rights 
established in the Constitution.  Id.  However, the delimitation of these rights is 
undeniably necessary and it must be done on the basis of either the rulings made 
by the Plurinational Constitutional Court or, as applicable in this case, specific 
standards, since the degree of detail in their enunciation requires judicial precision.  
Id. 
 101 In this way, an important problem arises that is not intended to be 
addressed in this Article but is no doubt worthy of mention: how to make 
jurisdictional demands about certain rights which depend neither on the parties nor 
the judges, but on the State or the community as a whole.  See García Belaunde, 
supra note 74, at 27-29.  
 102 Ricardo García Manrique, Presentación, in DERECHOS SOCIALES Y 
PONDERACIÓN 13, 29-30 (2d ed. 2009). 
 103 For a discussion on the lack of economic resources as justification for the 
failure to protect human rights, see Alonso Manuel Chacón Mata, Derechos 
económicos, sociales y culturales: Indicadores y justiciabilidad, in CUADERNOS DEUSTO DE 
DERECHOS HUMANOS 51 (2007). 
 104 Id.  Chacón Mata remarks that the doctrine has repeatedly referred to 
economic, social, and collective rights as being subjective rights, thus giving the 
State the expectation of ownership of all the resources needed for development.  Id.  
The power to demand their enforcement from the State turns into guidelines, 
projects or programs that the citizens hope to have with State support rather than 
into subjective rights with specific content that the State is compelled to protect.  Id. 
at 35.  On the other hand, Norberto Bobbio points out, in regard to social rights, that 
“it is mostly about expressing an aspiration to have future legislation which sets 
limits for the defense of the relevant rights, making a distinction between their 
proclamation and their effective fulfillment.”  BOBBIO, supra note 8, at 21-22.  Their 
great practical function is to give impetus to the claims of movements that demand 
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actions formulated by the State for the protection of rights may not 
be immediately enforceable in the desired degree of detail, they still 
dictate what the State should accomplish—or attempt to 
accomplish—with a view to their future fulfillment.105  Meanwhile, 
the minimum standards laid down by international instruments are 
fully enforceable. 
Although the Bolivian Constitution specifies rights in detail, a 
number of leading legal scholars favor interpreting the 
constitutional precepts to focus on achieving their minimum or 
essential content,106 leaving to the legislature the task of developing 
them more specifically.  This course of action would open up space 
for legislators to seek guidance from international law standards 
and establish legal foundations empowering “rights-owners” to file 
claims in cases of violation.107  Ultimately, of course, the key to 
interpreting the State’s positive actions and their enforceability are 
to be found in international human rights bodies, a fact anticipated 
by the Inter-American human rights system, whose main challenge 
has been to guide State actions through standards and principles 
that establish the scope of rights108 and the processes for formulating 
public policies effectively based on minimum standards.109  In the 
case of Bolivia, the Inter-American system has provided the State 
 
for them and the rest of people that their new material and spiritual needs be met.  
The constitutional courts of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, as well as the Supreme 
Court, and the courts of Argentina and Chile, respectively, have gradually 
incorporated IACHR jurisprudence in what has been called a process of 
nationalization of international human rights law.  Id. 
 105 See LUIGI FERRAJOLI, JOSÉ-JUAN MORESO, MANUEL ATIENZA, GERARDO 
PISARELLO, & RICARDO GARCÍA MANRIQUE, LA TEORÍA DEL DERECHO EN EL PARADIGMA 
CONSTITUCIONAL (2d ed. 2009) (discussing rights and their interpretation and 
guarantee). 
 106 See Chacón Mata, supra note 103, at 31 (discussing the minimum content of 
economic, social, and cultural rights). 
 107 For an examination of Latin American constitutional norms since the 
adoption of the most recent Colombian Constitution, see García Morales, supra note 
68, at 16. 
 108 See generally García-Sayán, supra note 65 (supporting that the constitutional 
courts of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, as well as the Supreme Court and the courts 
of Argentina and Chile, respectively, have gradually incorporated IACHR 
jurisprudence in what has been called a process of nationalization of international 
human rights law). 
 109 Víctor Abramovich, Los Estándares Interamericanos de Derechos Humanos 
como Marco para la Formulación y el Control de las Políticas Sociales, 2 ANUARIO DE 
DERECHOS HUMANOS 13, 19 (2006). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/2
2020] The Role of International Human Rights Law 607 
   
 
with valuable guidelines for the protection of human rights and 
constitutional obligations. 
Thus, in accordance with its immediate-effect generic 
obligations, the State ensures that the laws are neither 
discriminatory nor exclusive, and that they are designed to diminish 
inequality among the most disadvantaged sectors.110  Similarly, the 
State shall implement measures for a progressive advance towards 
the provision of adequate levels of protection that makes rights fully 
efficient.111  At the same time, the State shall meet the minimum 
needs of each right established in international instruments112 by 
making prioritized use of all available resources, as long as its 
actions do not entail a regression from the levels of satisfaction and 
guarantee already attained. In this regard, care should be taken to 
ensure that human rights legislation always represents an 
advancement, never a throwback, from current levels of protection 
and guarantee.113  
 
III. INTERPRETATION THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW  
The new process of organizing the system of rights in the 
Bolivian constitutional text had to deal with a number of major 
issues.  The main one was the creation of a system capable of giving 
a new turn to the protection of rights and, at the same time, putting 
an end to a long history of exclusion and discrimination against the 
poor, indigenous, and peasant sectors of society.  The constituent 
assembly addressed this difficult challenge by means of different 
strategies, including the extension of the catalogue of constitutional 
rights, enactment of clear and detailed State obligations, and 
improvement of the mechanisms to guarantee their observance.   
 
 110 GREGORIO PECES-BARBA, REFLEXIONES SOBRE LOS DERECHOS SOCIALES 92 (2d 
ed. 2009). 
 111 Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, June 8, 2012, Sentencia 
Constitucional, No. 0292/2012-R (Bol.) (stating that  the Plurinational 
Constitutional Court has accepted the obligation to pay special attention to the 
party that, compared to the other, is at a disadvantage). 
 112 See García Morales, supra note 68, at 26. 
 113 See Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Dec. 20, 2011, Voto Disidente, 
Sentencia Constitucional, No. 1513/2011-R, at 7 (Bol.). 
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Nevertheless, in light of Bolivia’s historic systematic violation of 
human rights, the constituent assembly realized the need to do more 
about human rights protection and, therefore, clarify the keys to 
their interpretation.  In the following section we discuss, first, the 
clauses that make it possible to extend the catalogue of rights to the 
inclusion of aspects that were yet to be enumerated in the 
constitutional text but already addressed in the international 
system.  Second, we discuss the solutions that made it possible to 
enrich and expand the catalogue on the basis of the contents and 
standards of those rights already provided for in international 
human rights treaties.114  Third, we address the subsequent 
decisions of the Constitutional Court about these issues.   
a. Interpretation of Constitutional Rights 
In the course of its work to provide the best possible protection 
of rights, the Bolivian Constituent Assembly understood that all 
constitutional rights must be capable of going beyond the “barrier” 
of national protection and be interpreted in accordance with 
international human rights law.115  This interpretation proves to be 
all the more necessary when it comes to the extension of the Bolivian 
catalogue of human rights, which lends itself to tensions and 
contradictions among different rights, and requires the definition of 
clear standards of fulfillment.  It is important now to examine both 
the keys allowing for an open catalogue of human rights, and the 
solutions found by the constituent assembly for the interpretation of 
constitutional rights on the basis of the content and standards laid 
down in international human rights treaties.   
 
 114 At the regional level we have seen the emergence of a common human 
rights law capable of providing minimally uniform answers to the problems that 
occur in practice.  See DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 78, at 34-35. 
 115 BOBBIO, supra note 8, at 68.  Bobbio points out that “the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights originated with a dialectical movement that came into 
being with the abstract universality of natural rights, went through specific 
characteristics of national positive rights, and ended up in a concrete, rather than 
abstract, universality of positive rights.”  Id. 
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i. The Open Clause 
Article 13.II of Bolivia’s constitution states:  “The rights declared 
in the Constitution shall not be understood to deny other rights 
hitherto left unmentioned.”116  This is an “open clause” aimed at 
protecting rights not specifically included in the constitutional 
text.117  While this “open clause” was present in the previous 
constitution and thus was part of Bolivian constitutional law prior 
to 2009, its discussion is important as part of an evaluation of the 
newer constitutional provisions dealing with human rights and 
international law.   
The “open-clause” technique has been commonplace in Latin 
American constitutions, albeit in very few instances without any 
conditioning elements, as is the case in Bolivia.118  It is important to 
clarify that in most cases this clause is included with conditions.  
Nonetheless, interpretive bodies, such as courts, that may seek to 
place limits on new rights, can be in a position to accept certain 
rights based on previous court decisions (of either national or 
foreign tribunals within a regional legal system such as the Inter-
American human rights system), and thus update the meaning and 
scope of the constitutional text. 
The “open clause” makes it possible for a number of rights 
inherent to human personality and deprived of extended protection, 
including those contained in international human rights treaties,119 
 
 116 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 13.II (Bol.).   
 117 Pérez Luño, supra note 22, at 217 (“The catalogue of rights can never be a 
closed and finished work, since a democratic society must always be open to the 
emergence of new needs which make it possible to establish new rights.”). 
 118 See, e.g., CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE GUATEMALA Aug., 2002, 
art. 44; CONSTITUCIÓN DEL PARAGUAY June 20, 1992, art. 45; CONSTITUTION OF THE 
ARGENTINE NATION May 1, 1853, § 33; CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE 
COSTA RICA Nov. 7, 1949, tit. V, art. 74; CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1982, Jan. 20, 1982, 
art. 63 (Hon.); POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF PERU Dec. 29, 1993, art. 3; CONSTITUCION 
DE LA REPUBLICA Nov. 27, 1966, sec. I, art. 73 (Uru.).  Noticeable in these 
constitutional articles is the fact that, unlike the case of the Bolivian constitutional 
text, the open clause is contingent on the fulfillment of certain parameters related 
to the acceptance of a new law by the internal system which can be considered to 
be even more restrictive when it comes to the protection of new rights.   
 119 The interpretation of the open clause of the Constitution of Panama made 
by the Supreme Court of Justice extended constitutional guarantees to the rights 
recognized in international instruments.  Salvador Sánchez González, El Derecho 
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to be considered as fundamental rights in various regional systems, 
thereby making room for the incorporation of international human 
rights treaties into domestic legislation.120  It must be underscored, 
however, that in many judicial decisions affirming the recognition 
of international human rights law through the “open clause”121 we 
sometimes find reference to the direct incorporation of international 
human rights treaties.122   
In the Bolivian case, this formula paves the way for the 
construction of solutions for situations in which the status of rights 
not enunciated in the constitutional text is not entirely clear, as in 
the case of norms not stated in the constitution but enunciated in 
non-ratified international texts or adopted from customary 
international law.  In other words, the “open clause” enables these 
rights to be recognized, fully incorporated into the Bolivian 
catalogue of rights, and even granted constitutional rank, ensuring 
their protection through the various “Actions of Protection” 
specified in the constitution.123   
It must be noted that the status of customary international law 
in domestic legislation is not expressly addressed in the new 
 
Internacional de los Derechos Humanos y la Constitución Panameña, 20 REVISTA 
PANAMEÑA DE POLÍTICA 115, 118-19 (2015). 
 120 Allan R. Brewer-Carías, La aplicación de los tratados internacionales sobre 
derechos humanos en el orden interno de los países de América Latina, 46 REVISTA 
IBEROAMERICANA DE DERECHO PROCESAL CONSTITUCIONAL 219 (2006), 
https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/R22024.pdf [https://perma.cc/A644-8AVW]. 
 121 CAROLINA LEÓN BASTOS, LA INTERPRETACIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS 
FUNDAMENTALES SEGÚN LOS TRATADOS INTERNACIONALES SOBRE DERECHOS HUMANOS: 
UN ESTUDIO DE LA JURISPRUDENCIA EN ESPAÑA Y COSTA RICA 48 (2010) (“While most 
fundamental rights are enumerated in national constitutions, any right not 
specifically included in the constitutional text shall be linked to the constitution on 
the basis of international treaties, either in a horizontal relation or one directly 
below in order of importance.  Therefore, we can see that the rights do not 
necessarily have to be stated in a constitution to be considered as fundamental 
rights and granted the same guarantees as those already stated, because they can 
also reach constitutional status through the International Treaties ratified by the 
States.”).   
 122 See, e.g., CONSTITUCIÓN DE 2008 Oct. 20, 2008, tit. VIII, ch. 2, art. 417 
(Ecuador); CONSTITUTION OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA Dec. 1999, art. 
22; CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] July 4, 1991, art. 94. 
 123 Néstor Pedro Sagüés, Los tribunales constitucionales como agentes de cambios 
sociales, 17 ANUARIO DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL LATINOAMERICANO 527, 534-35 
(2011) (describing the open clause as an ideal instrument to carry out social change 
on the basis of constitutional competence and from which rights discovered and 
declared by constitutional judges have emerged). 
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Bolivian constitutional text.124  However, its enforcement is 
understood as a non-written rule.125  On the other hand, the 
comprehensive analysis of international law by the Bolivian 
constituent assembly was truly commendable.  The discussions 
revolved around general international legal norms rather than 
ratified international human rights treaties, but with the clear 
intention to make as much open room as possible for international 
human rights law.126  In this way, by means of a comprehensive 
interpretation of the Bolivian constitutional text, and on the basis of 
respect for the constituent assembly’s will, the “open clause” can 
contribute to welcoming into the Bolivian legal system broader 
rights already recognized in non-formal international human rights 
instruments. 
 
 124 In the case of the United States, customary international law is not 
explicitly included in the supremacy clause, but the U.S. Supreme Court has 
repeatedly indicated that customary international law is to be treated as federal law 
and therefore constitutes the law of the land.  See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 
692, 714-25 (2004); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); Filártiga v. Peña-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880-85 (2d Cir. 1980); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 
U.S. 398 (1964) (holding that as international law does not prescribe use of the 
doctrine, the Act of State doctrine shall be applied even if it is claimed to be in 
violation of international law).  But see Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 
78 (1938) (holding that the interpretations of the federal courts regarding customary 
law are not binding on the States, but also that these courts are compelled to follow 
decisions by the State courts if the State system decides to recognize the standards 
of customary law); but see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Law, 
Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Customary International 
Law Debate, 98 AM. J. INT’L LAW 91, 92-93 (2004) (providing a detailed analysis of the 
applicability of customary law in the U.S. system). 
 125 ARACELI MANGAS MARTÍN, CUESTIONES PRACTICAS DE DERECHO 
INTERNACIONAL PUBLICO Y COOPERACION JURIDICA INTERNACIONAL 516 (1994).  
Mangas Martín points out that  
there is an implicit rule in the constitution demanding that minimum 
standards of international law be respected, since the existence of such an 
implicit regulation of automatic adoption is accepted in the absence of a 
standard stating otherwise.  Id.  Moreover, the rule is based precisely on 
international legal codes, not on the national one.   
Id.  The doctrine of international law has understood that, given the absence of 
formal reception by general international law, an implicit rule for the automatic 
adoption of customary standards into the national legislation is embraced.  MANUEL 
DÍEZ DE VELASCO VALLEJO, INSTITUCIONES DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO 219-
20 (16th ed. 2007). 
 126 See generally Pinto Quintanilla, supra note 21 (analyzing the normative 
development of rights, liberties, and powers involved in the adoption of Bolivia’s 
constitution).   
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While most of the currently recognized human rights can be 
found either explicitly or implied as part of another specific right 
enumerated in the constitution, the Bolivian catalogue of rights is far 
from infallible or a finished product.127  For the most part, human 
rights have been created through the course of history, gradually 
born under certain circumstances, and they have stemmed from an 
evolutionary process that has become one of the main indicators of 
historical progress.128  Considering that new rights will likely be 
established as time goes by, the “open clause” is a remarkable tool 
to update the Bolivian catalogue of rights.   
The extension of rights and the recognition of international 
sources prove to be essential to the interpretive work of the 
Constitutional Court, because the “open clause” contributes to 
keeping the catalogue of rights always open to the inclusion of new 
rights already stipulated in international instruments but yet to be 
incorporated into the catalogue of Bolivian fundamental rights.  
Starting from this premise, not only international human rights 
treaties, but also the norms arising from international judicial bodies 
and many other ordinary international norms are applicable, even if 
they were not considered binding at the constitution’s inception.129  
The placement of the “open clause” in the new constitutional text 
was the outcome of the constituent assembly’s realization that the 
catalogue of rights is essentially incomplete due to historical 
limitations on both the constituent process and the international 
instruments.130  The clause ensures permanent qualification and 
ongoing development of human rights, as it automatically 
 
 127 See BOBBIO supra note 8, at 71 (remarking that “we do not need to let our 
imagination run wild to foresee that technological progress, improved knowledge, 
and the development of mass media will bring about sufficient changes in people’s 
lives and social relations to create new needs and, consequently, new demands for 
more freedoms and powers”). 
 128 Id. at 14-19.  In this respect, Bobbio highlights that “human rights are one 
of the main indicators of historical progress, the same rights which are gradually 
‘born’ under certain circumstances marked by the defense of new freedoms against 
old powers.”  Id. 
 129 JOSÉ JOAQUIM GOMES CANOTILHO & VITAL MOREIRA, FUNDAMENTOS DA 
CONSTITUIÇÃO 116 (1991). 
 130 Following Peter Häberle’s analysis, this clause, given Bolivia’s broad 
catalogue, could even be referred to as an “empathy clause of human rights.”  Peter 
Häberle, Elementos Teóricos de un Modelo General de Recepción Jurídica, in DERECHOS 
HUMANOS Y CONSTITUCIONALISMO ANTE EL TERCER MILENIO 151, 151-86 (Antonio 
Pérez Luño ed., 1996). 
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incorporates into positive constitutional law values and ideas from 
ethics, politics and legal rights that are intrinsic to the concept of 
human dignity and the essence of what it is to be a human being.  
This amounts to a recognition that no right has to be recognized in 
the constitutional text, or even in ratified international treaties, to 
have constitutional rank, and that a new right can be included in the 
category of fundamental rights.131  
ii. Article 13.IV «in fine» 
Article 13.IV in fine of the constitution states:  “The rights and 
obligations enshrined in this Constitution shall be interpreted in 
accordance with the international human rights Treaties ratified by 
Bolivia.”132  One of the greatest concerns about the protection of 
human rights is how to establish normative frameworks that are 
sufficiently strong to allow for such protection as effectively as 
possible.  As stated earlier, in order to be entirely protected, these 
rights need to be efficiently extrapolated to international law.133  The 
new Bolivian constitutional text establishes an unprecedented 
clause that makes it possible to interpret constitutional rights from 
the standpoint of international human rights law.134  Given the lack 
 
 131 MANUEL BARRETO & LIBARDO SARMIENTO, DE LOS DERECHOS, LAS GARANTÍAS 
Y LOS DEBERES 442-44 (Carlos Marín ed., 1997).  For examples of the incorporation of 
rights through the interpretation of Article 94 of the Political Constitution of 
Colombia, see Corte Constitucional, Jan. 31, 1994, Sentencia T-028/94, Gaceta de la 
Corte Constitucional (Colom.); Corte Constitucional, Dec. 15, 1993, Sentencia T-
594/93 Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional (Colom.); Corte Constitucional, June 24, 
1992, Sentencia T-426/92 (Colom.); Corte Constitucional, Feb. 6, 1995, Sentencia T-
032/95 Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional (Colom.). 
 132 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 13.IV (Bol.). 
 133 In the words of Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz, “the contemporary constitutional 
State subject to the rule of Law can only be understood as being internationally 
situated and, for the same reason, limited from the same viewpoint.”  ALEJANDRO 
SAIZ ARNAIZ, LA APERTURA CONSTITUCIONAL AL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL Y EUROPEO 
DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS.  EL ARTÍCULO 10.2 DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA 44 
(1999). 
 134 The role played by domestic courts within the international system does 
not depend only on international legislation.  SHARON WEILL, THE ROLE OF 
NATIONAL COURTS IN APPLYING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 7-8 (André 
Nollkaemper & August Reinisch eds., 2014).  In fact, the activity of such courts 
depends, above all else, on the nationwide empowerment of the domestic courts to 
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of constitutional protection of human rights throughout Bolivia’s 
history, the inclusion of such a clause proves to be essential to give 
these rights effective support.135  Obviously, in this respect, the 
Bolivian catalogue of rights is thus made easier to interpret in a 
much more effective way and endowed with a greater degree of 
interpretative breadth and openness.136  Thanks to this rule, Bolivian 
constitutional rights have found a timely window to usher in 
international human rights law to enrich their content. 
The insertion of this clause into the Bolivian constitutional text 
has quite a few consequences, since it leads the State to put aside its 
omnipotent role and allow the incorporation of international law 
through constitutional interpretation by the judicial branch.137  
Bolivian constitutional regulations about matters of human rights 
have brought about a positive and expected change concerning the 
interpretation of constitutional rights—the recognition by domestic 
courts of international sources of human rights is a constant feature 
 
apply international law through the appropriation of international obligations.  Id.  
These domestic courts shall ensure that both national legislation and State policies 
fulfill their international obligations.  Id.   
 135 The Portuguese Constitution of 1976 includes in Article 16.1 a precedent of 
the constitutional rule of international openness in matters of human rights.  See 
DECRETO DE APROVAÇÃO DA CONSTITUIÇÃO Apr. 10, 1976, art. 16.1 (Port.).  This article 
contains no reference whatsoever to the fact that the applicable international 
standards must necessarily be based on instruments ratified by Portugal.  See id.  It 
thus establishes that the fundamental rights embodied in the Constitution do not 
exclude any other applicable group of laws or provisions stipulated by 
international law.  GOMES CANOTILHO & MOREIRA, supra note 129, at 115. 
 136 Araceli Mangas Martín stresses that  
well-known universal international covenants such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenants on Civil 
and Political Rights and of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are likely 
to shed very little light on the interpretation of incidental obscurities found 
in constitutional rights on account of their too general nature and 
vagueness.   
Araceli Mangas Martín, Cuestiones de Derecho internacional público en la Constitución 
española de 1978, 61 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE LA UNIVERSIDAD 
COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID 143, 151–52 (1980).  Nevertheless, he explains that “there 
are plenty of hardly ambiguous covenants, some of them with a praiseworthy 
degree of precision regarding the content of the rights regulated therein, which play 
a decisive role when it comes to the interpretation of rights.”  Id. 
 137 Matthias Herdegen, La internacionalización del orden constitucional, 16 
ANUARIO DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL LATINOAMERICANO 71, 73 (2010).  The 
tensions related to international norms and the internal legal code can be better 
addressed when there is a Constitution with a flexible interpretation capable of 
endowing the local system of laws with permeability.  Id. 
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in international constitutional development.138  Article 13.IV in fine 
has the highest relevance in the context of the Bolivian constitutional 
system.  This clause stamps the entire constitutional system with an 
exceptional capacity to respond to international human rights law,139 
offering it a position of influence over the entire judicial system.140 
The Bolivian Constitution only makes reference to international 
human rights treaties, so Article 13.IV in fine would seem to overlook 
the interpretative relevance of general or customary international 
law—although, as we have seen, this problem can be solved at least 
partially by resort to the “open clause” discussed earlier.  We also 
must bear in mind that domestic judges enjoy a great margin of 
appreciation when it comes to the interpretation of customary 
law.141  While some human rights-related rules are deemed jus 
 
 138 SAIZ ARNAIZ, supra note 133, at 87.  In the case of Spain, the clause of 
openness to international human rights law is contained in Article 10.2 of the 
Spanish Constitution.  LORENZO MARTÍN-RETORTILLO BAQUER, LOS DERECHOS 
FUNDAMENTALES Y LA CONSTITUCIÓN: Y OTROS ESTUDIOS SOBRE DERECHOS HUMANOS 72 
(2009).  By its interpretation, this clause refers to the fundamental rights included 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, by its general formulation, to 
the International Human Rights Treaties ratified by Spain.  Id.  The commitment to 
take into account the Universal Declaration when it comes to channeling the 
interpretation of fundamental rights and freedoms has found significant echo in 
Spanish constitutional jurisprudence.  See, e.g., JULIO DIEGO GONZÁLEZ CAMPOS, 
ALGUNAS REFERENCIAS A LA COSTUMBRE Y LOS TRATADOS INTERNACIONALES EN LA 
JURISPRUDENCIA DEL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL 513 (Lucius Caflish et al. eds., 2005); 
1 DIEGO J. LIÑÁN NOGUERAS, EL PROYECTO CONSTITUCIONAL EUROPEO Y LA 
INTERPRETACIÓN DE DERECHOS Y LIBERTADES EN LA CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA: ¿UNA 
NUEVA DIMENSIÓN DEL ART. 10.2 CE? 933-46 (2005); Antonio Remiro Brotons, Politica 
de los Derechos Humanos y Politica con los Derechos Humanos, 41 REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE 
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 107 (1989). 
 139 Martín-Retortillo Baquer explains that the guarantee of fundamental rights 
and individual freedoms is a multifaceted enterprise which requires different 
methodologies in the European context.  MARTÍN-RETORTILLO BAQUER, supra note 
138, 125-27. 
 140 MANGAS MARTÍN, supra note 125, at 308.  Nonetheless, in its judgments, the 
Spanish Constitutional Court refuses to accept that Article 10.2 has caused a 
constitutionalizing effect of international human rights instruments; Judgment 
76/1982 of the Spanish Constitutional Court sets this precedent.  See ANTONIO 
FERNÁNDEZ TOMÁS, LA VÁLIDA CELEBRACIÓN Y LA INCORPORACIÓN DE LOS TRATADOS EN 
LA JURISPRUDENCIA CONSTITUCIONAL ESPAÑOLA 353 (Manuel Pérez González ed., 
1993). 
 141 Alfonso J. Iglesias Velasco, Reflexiones sobre la implementación de los tratados 
internacionales por los tribunales domésticos: especial referencia a España, 29 ANUARIO 
ESPAÑOL DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 165, 169 (2013). 
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cogens,142 problems arise when it is necessary to specify the content 
of the obligations that the member States of the international 
community are duty-bound to meet when these obligations go 
beyond the narrow scope of jus cogens.143  But even if these problems 
are not easily solved, the establishment of a criterion of maximum 
openness is a great help, since an adequate interpretation of human 
rights involves having recourse not only to formal international 
instruments such as treaties but also to other types of non-formal 
instruments such as the recommendations of treaty bodies, and 
resolutions of certain international organizations that command 
broad authority.144 
Starting from this assumption, the Plurinational Constitutional 
Court of Bolivia has ruled that the corpus juris of international 
human rights law shall be understood in a comprehensive manner 
and, to that end, even if some international legal instruments are not 
strictly binding, they still serve a purpose by assisting in the 
interpretation of the norms laid down in international treaties.145  
The Court’s predecessor, the Provisional Constitutional Court,146 
has stated that all the norms, principles, and guidelines regarding 
various human rights-related topics are international instruments of 
great significance for the implementation of international human 
 
 142 Accordingly, the judicial contributions of international human rights law 
having jus cogens or customary international law status are especially justifiable.  
Wen-Chen Chang & Jiunn-Rong Yeh, Internationalization of Constitutional Law, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1166, 1168 (Michel 
Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012). 
 143 See Antonio Fernández Tomás, El Jus Cogens y las Obligaciones Derivadas de 
Normas Imperativas: Entre el Mito y la Realidad, in SOBERANÍA DEL ESTADO Y DERECHO 
INTERNACIONAL 619 (Marina Vargas Gómez-Urrutia & Ana Salinas de Frías eds., 
2005). 
 144 SAIZ ARNAIZ, supra note 133, at 89.  Saiz Arnaiz also highlights that, on the 
basis of full openness, “the Spanish Constitutional Court has had recourse not only 
to related international treaties but also to the decisions emanating from their treaty 
bodies, in addition to other texts produced by international organizations to which 
Spain is party but which are, in principle, non-binding.”  Id.; see also ARGELIA 
QUERALT JIMÉNEZ, LA INTERPRETACIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS: DEL TRIBUNAL DE 
ESTRASBURGO AL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL (2008) (discussing the protection of 
human rights from the European supranational structure). 
 145 Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Sept. 6, 2012, Sentencia 
Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 1130/2012, at III.2 (Bol.). 
 146 The Provisional Constitutional Court assumed the protection of the 
Constitution during the process to elect the Plurinational Constitutional Court, 
pursuant to the new rules of the Political Constitution of the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia.  See id.  
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rights treaties and the constitution and, therefore, they constitute 
guidelines for their interpretation.147  Constitutional standards 
should be addressed in a comprehensive way, with resort to various 
international instruments to specify the scope and content of human 
rights and guarantees.148 
The Plurinational Constitutional Court of Bolivia has noted that, 
in accordance with the constitution’s Article 13.IV in fine, the Court 
needs to include in its interpretative guidelines the principles 
developed by international human rights treaties, which expand 
even more the spectrum of relevance of international human rights 
law.149  As far as its scope is concerned, there is no doubt that Article 
13.IV in fine is unparalleled, since it not only refers to the 
interpretation of fundamental rights, but covers all the rights 
enumerated in the Bolivian constitutional text.  On the basis of this 
rule, it is possible to prove that the Plurinational Constitutional 
Court of Bolivia is directly linked to the content of international 
human rights treaties.  The Court uses these treaties to justify the 
open attitude adopted by its judges toward the interpretation of 
constitutional rights, properly completing what we might call the 
irradiation ratio of international human rights law upon the national 
legal system.150  The Constitutional Court’s jurisprudential activity 
is oriented toward the broadest possible interpretation of 
constitutional rights with full respect for international standards, 
endowing the new Bolivian constitutional text with a considerable 
degree of openness.151 
Some scholars and justices on the Court have interpreted Article 
13.IV in fine as a subsidiary clause, holding that a stricter, more 
literal method of constitutional construction is to be preferred with 
regard to human rights.152  Should this method turn out to be 
insufficient to determine the scope of constitutional standards, then 
a subjective but still strict, literal method is to be used, with the scope 
of the constitutional text defined according to the intent of the 
 
 147 See id.  
 148 Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Apr. 27, 2010, Sentencia 
Constitucional, No. 0061/2010-R, at III.4.2 (Bol.). 
 149 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 13.IV (Bol.). 
 150 Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Sept. 6, 2012, Sentencia 
Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 1130/2012, at III.2 (Bol.). 
 151 See id. 
 152 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 13.IV (Bol.). 
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Constituent Assembly, as expressly demonstrated in its working 
documents.153  If these two methods fail to establish clearly the 
meaning of a constitutional text, then the interpretation must be 
carried out in accordance with international human rights treaties.154  
This is a totally restrictive interpretation that most members of the 
Plurinational Constitutional Court have not embraced. 
It is safe to say that Article 13.IV in fine becomes a real window 
that opens onto international human rights law, making it possible 
to choose an interpretation that lends the constitution an open 
quality capable of enriching and reinforcing the rights contained in 
the new constitutional text.155  This window provides the Bolivian 
catalogue of rights with higher standards of protection that turn the 
national constitution into a truly progressive text.  Bolivian domestic 
law can be described accurately as capable of influencing, and being 
influenced by, international law in its struggle for the defense of 
human rights and the search for proper levels of protection for its 
citizens.  
iii. Article 256.II 
In addition to Article 13.IV in fine, another rule must be 
considered which opens a window to the interpretation of 
constitutional rights through international instruments:  Article 
256.II of the constitution governs the interpretation of international 
human rights treaties, and is of crucial importance to the 
Constitutional Court’s jurisprudential activity.156  Article 256.II 
 
 153 Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, June 27, 2013, Sentencia 
Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 1011/2013, at III.1 (Bol.). 
 154 Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Apr. 29, 2011, Voto Disidente, 
Sentencia Constitucional, No. 0547/2011-R, at 2 (Bol.). 
 155 Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, May 24, 2012, Sentencia 
Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 0224/2012, at III.5 (Bol.) (“[A]mong other 
interpretations, the right to defense must be interpreted in accordance with the 
International Human Rights Treaties ratified by the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 
pursuant to the last sentence of Article 13.IV of the Constitution, raising its 
interpretation to related parameters found in international documents.”). 
 156 GOMES CANOTILHO & MOREIRA supra note 129, at 143 (pointing out that the 
introduction of international standards in the internal law of Portugal led to the 
promotion of international law by means of individual references).  A similar 
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establishes that “the rights recognized in the Constitution shall be 
interpreted in accordance with international human rights treaties 
when the latter provide more favorable norms.”157 
In this respect, the Constitutional Court issued an opinion 
centered around the principles of pro homine158 and “progressive 
realization”159 (precisely what is sought to be accomplished with 
“the most favorable interpretation”) regarding the interpretation of 
human rights, opting for the broadest sense of both principles.160  Pro 
homine refers to interpreting norms consistently to give the widest 
possible scope to human dignity and well-being.  “Progressive 
realization” speaks to the objective of achieving the highest possible 
standards of human rights protection over time.  The Court has held 
that its jurisprudential activity must follow the principle of 
“progressive realization” and that, in the presence of various 
 
impression is made by Article 16.2 of the Portuguese Constitution.  According to 
this criterion, the interpretation of Portuguese fundamental rights shall not prevail 
if it fails to lead up to a more favorable interpretation of those rights, which helps 
protect internal law when it is capable of providing the highest level of protection.  
See JOSÉ JOAQUIM GOMES CANOTILHO, DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL 682-83 (6th ed. 1996).   
 157 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO  Feb. 7, 2009, art. 256.II (Bol.).   
 158 See Enforceability of the Right to Reply or Correction (Arts 14(1), 1(1) and 
2, American Convention on Human Rights), Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-
7/85, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 7, ¶ 36 (Aug. 29, 1986) (Escalante, J., dissenting) 
(describing pro homine as “the fundamental criterion which creates the very nature 
of human rights [and] requires that the norms which guarantee or extend human 
rights be broadly interpreted and those that limit or restrict human rights be 
narrowly interpreted”).   
 159 “The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has been said to have 
made a twofold interpretation of the principle of progressive realization: on one 
hand, as an interpretation of the text that takes into account the objective of the term 
at the moment of its application and, on the other, as a method used to update the 
agreement that empowers the judge to revise it according to the current social 
needs.”  Ezequiel Malarino, Activismo Judicial, Punitivización y Nacionalización.  
Tendencias Antidemocráticas y Antiliberales de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos 
Humanos, in SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE PROTECCIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS Y 
DERECHO PENAL INTERNACIONAL 25, 32 (Gisela Elsner, 2010). 
 160 See Julieta Rossi & Víctor Abramovich, La tutela de los derechos económicos, 
sociales y culturales en el artículo 26 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos 
Humanos, 9 ESTUDIOS SOCIO-JURÍDICOS (SPECIAL ISSUE) 34, 48 (2007) (arguing that “the 
principle of pro homine is useful to defining the scope of social rights addressed in 
Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights, but always in accordance 
with the regulations of international law that consecrate rights and not to help the 
interpreter establish beforehand whether a given right is implicit in the Charter of 
the Organization of American States [(“OAS”)] and, for that matter, in Article 26 of 
the American Convention on Human Rights”).   
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possible meanings, the broadest interpretation that least restrains 
the violated right or guarantee must be chosen161 when it comes to 
the recognition of rights.  Meanwhile, the most restrictive 
interpretation must be chosen when it comes to placing limits on the 
exercise of rights.162  All of this ensures the broadest possible 
protection of rights.  The Court’s discussion of Article 256.II, 
however, makes it clear that, while there have been efforts to find a 
way to open constitutional rights to international law,163 there also 
have been attempts to interpret such rights by placing restrictions 
likely to prevent such an opening from being unconditional,164 even 
though this overlooks the fact that the minimum standards 
established by international law and adopted through universally 
recognized instruments should not be ignored.165   
Article 256.II also states that the interpretative opening must be 
respectful of the interpreted text and, therefore, consistent with its 
tradition and context.166  While human rights tend to become 
 
 161 See Mónica Pinto, El principio pro homine.  Criterios de hermenéutica y pautas 
para la regulación de los derechos humanos, in LA APLICACIÓN DE LOS TRATADOS SOBRE 
DERECHOS HUMANOS POR LOS TRIBUNALES LOCALES 163, 163-72 (1997) (describing the 
legitimate restrictions and the principle of pro homine). 
 162 Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Apr. 29, 2011, Voto Disidente, 
Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 0547/2011-R, at 2 (Bol.); Tribunal 
Constitucional Plurinacional, Apr. 6, 2010, Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional, 
No. 0006/2010-R, at III.1.2 (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Apr. 13, 
2010, Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 0023/2010-R, at III.1 (Bol.). 
 163 See Moreno, supra note 81, at 156–57 (noting that opening constitutional 
rights to international human rights law is another typical feature of certain 
contemporary Latin American constitutions, although there are differences 
concerning ways, effects, and purposes, depending on the relevant constitution).   
 164 See LEÓN BASTOS, supra note 121, at 49–57 (noting that, owing to the 
preferential rank of human rights, the whole legal order is interpreted in such a way 
that they become more effective and capable of developing their potential, whether 
they come from a national or an international source).  Such a favorable approach 
must be used to interpret not only the rights, but also the rest of the constitutional 
rules, since the rights are a parameter that the interpreter cannot possibly disregard. 
 165 See Vásquez Vejarano v. Peru, Case 11.166, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
Report No. 48/00, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 3 rev. ¶ 55 (2000) (stating that 
“[a]lthough in general the ‘margin of appreciation’ is left to the states themselves” 
regarding the fulfillment of rights, the IACHR has underscored that such margin is 
not unlimited, as well as that the Commission has the duty to evaluate it and that 
“the margin of appreciation at the internal level goes hand in hand with inter-
American supervision”).   
 166 See HANS PETER SCHNEIDER, DEMOCRACIA Y CONSTITUCIÓN 21 (1991) 
(arguing that it is necessary to update human rights by means of an effective policy 
of realization in addition to any legal definition and interpretation).  
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universal, their content cannot be understood as identical 
throughout all societies, because the protected “legal goods” vary 
from one country to another depending on the characteristics of 
their population.167  This assertion is by no means a negation of the 
universal nature of principles and rights, but an indication that 
whenever the content of a right is not clear, an interpretation is 
preferred which proves to be more in keeping with the 
constitutional system from whence it comes, and, therefore, with the 
traditions and values of the society that protects them.168   
It should be pointed out in this context that the structure of the 
catalogue of rights found in the constitution is vital at the 
international level, given the wide margin for interpretation allowed 
by the constitution’s considerable degree of detail and complexity.  
Article 256.II paves the way for two kinds of interpretation, as a two-
way, dialectical mechanism of protection:  on the one hand, an 
interpretation of constitutional rights as a function of international 
human rights law and, on the other, an interpretation of the latter as 
a function of the former.  This turn towards domestic law in the 
stipulation of standards, however, must be totally in line with the 
minimum standards of protection and guarantee established at the 
 
 167 See  Javier García Roca, Soberanía Estatal Versus Integración Europea Mediante 
Unos Derechos Fundamentales Comunes: ¿Cuál es el Margen de Apreciación Nacional?, in 
INTEGRACIÓN EUROPEA A TRAVÉS DE DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES: DE UN SISTEMA 
BINARIO A OTRO INTEGRADO 15, 16-17 (Javier García Roca & Pablo A. Fernández 
Sánchez eds., 2009) (acknowledging that the European Court of Human Rights 
frequently uses the clause known as “national margin of appreciation,” through 
which “some governments facing accusations expect that absolute understanding 
of national sovereignty will allow the States to avoid European control in certain 
cases”).  But see Roberto Toniatti, Sovereignty Lost, Constitutional Identity Regained, in 
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 49, 67 (Alejandro 
Saiz Arnaiz & Carina Alcoberro Llivina eds., 2013) (noting that the “recognition of 
the national margin of appreciation is invariably conditioned by the contextual 
recognition of its compatibility with the [European Convention on Human Rights] 
as interpreted by the [European Court of Human Rights]”).  
 168 See DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 78, at 49-50.  It is also noticeable that in certain 
cases the European Union’s system for human rights protection grants national 
authorities plenty of liberty to weigh the interests in dispute, recognizing national 
margins of appreciation as capable of invalidating communal norms when 
determining the need for and proportionality of the measure adopted to the 
detriment of communal freedom and in favor of the fundamental right which 
seemed to be better protected by national legislation.  María Díaz Crego, El Márgen 
de Apreciación Nacional en la Jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia de Las Comunidades 
Europeas Referida a Los Derechos Fundamentales, in INTEGRACIÓN EUROPEA A TRAVÉS DE 
DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES: DE UN SISTEMA BINARIO A OTRO INTEGRADO 55, 63-65 
(Javier García Roca & Pablo A. Fernández Sánchez eds., 2009). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
622 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 42:2 
   
 
international level.169  In light of this fact, the Constitutional Court is 
responsible for making an assessment that provides for the efficient 
implementation of both domestic and international norms, 
regardless of the original source of the standard of protection, in 
order to ensure respect for the pro homine and “progressive 
realization” principles.170   
b. Activity of the Constitutional Court 
“Constitutions generally include various material content 
shaped as rights, and drafted in such a way that their wide degree 
of openness gives rise to high levels of uncertainty and ambiguity 
and an obvious measure of subjectivity that makes those contents all 
the more difficult to specify.”171  Although the Bolivian Constitution 
enumerates its catalogue of rights with a wealth of detail, and lays 
out positive actions to guarantee them, there is no denying that the 
whole document is characterized by a high degree of subjectiveness, 
invariably unavoidable no matter how detailed the constitutional 
text was intended to be.  Since anticipating all possible solutions in 
a constitutional text is nothing less than unthinkable and impossible, 
the Constitutional Court will have to overcome this difficulty 
through a careful analysis of rights in the light of each specific 
case.172  To this end, we now examine the activity of the 
 
 169 See, e.g., CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE, Sept. 17, 2005, 
art. 5, ¶ 2 (recognizing limits to its sovereignty with respect to human rights).   
 170 See Pinto, supra note 161, at 166-71.  Thus, the principle of pro homine 
indicates that the customary treaties that explain the content of rights protected by 
international instruments have room in the domestic legal system as long as they 
improve its provisions.   
 171 See Santiago Sastre Ariza, La ciencia jurídica ante el neoconstitucionalismo, in 
NEOCONSTITUCIONALISMO(S) 239, 241 (Miguel Carbonell ed., 2003); see also LEÓN 
BASTOS, supra note 121, at 42 (remarking that “the fundamental rights have a 
number of distinctive features that account for their different interpretation and, as 
a result of the language used to enumerate them in the Constitution and their highly 
emotional punch, their interpretation is open to differentiat explanations from one 
system to another”).   
 172 See generally Roberto L. Blanco Valdés, Vigilar al legislador, vigilar al vigilante 
(legitimidad del control de constitucionalidad y selfrestraint judicial en los orígenes del 
sistema norteamericano: un breve apunte histórico), in LA JUSTICIA CONSTITUCIONAL EN 
EL ESTADO DEMOCRÁTICO 17, 17–39 (Eduardo Espín Templado & F. Javier Díaz 
Revorio eds., 2000) (illustrating that the constitutional interpretation is no less 
marked by limitations).   
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Constitutional Court regarding the open clauses that make it 
possible to update human rights and link their interpretation to 
international instruments.  Special reference will be made as well to 
the interpretation of indigenous people’s rights.   
i. Open Clauses 
As stated earlier, the “open clause” can be used to resolve the 
hierarchical rank of rights not enunciated in either the Bolivian 
constitutional text or those international human rights treaties 
ratified by Bolivia.173  The spirit of the Bolivian Constitution is to 
provide full protection to human rights, whether or not they are 
included in the national constitutional text or the international 
human rights treaties ratified by the country.  Nevertheless, so far, 
the work of the Constitutional Court has not always followed this 
path, developing instead a rather restrictive case law even as it seeks 
to ensure the incorporation of human rights into the Bolivian 
catalogue of rights.174   
 
 173 See Pablo Santolaya, La apertura de las Constituciones a su interpretación 
conforme a los tratados internacionales, in DIÁLOGO JURISPRUDENCIAL EN DERECHOS 
HUMANOS: ENTRE TRIBUNALES CONSTITUCIONALES Y CORTES INTERNACIONALES 447, 
448 (Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor & Alfonso Herrera García eds., 2013) (indicating 
that the open clause is about a dialogue-based system designed to use interpretation 
in order to integrate human rights into the fundamental rights of each instrument).  
The Constitution itself establishes the obligation of domestic courts to ensure the 
interpretative openness of fundamental rights through international treaties.  Id. 
 174 See, e.g., Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Oct. 10, 2011, Sentencia 
Constitucional, No. 1448/2011-R (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Apr. 
25, 2011, Sentencia Constitucional, No. 0511/2011-R (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional 
Plurinacional, Nov. 19, 2010, Sentencia Constitucional, No. 2238/2010-R (Bol.); 
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Nov. 19, 2010, Sentencia Constitucional, 
2189/2010-R (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Aug. 17, 2010, Sentencia 
Constitucional, No. 0922/2010-R (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, 
Aug. 10, 2010, Sentencia Constitucional, No. 0885/2010-R (Bol.); Tribunal 
Constitucional Plurinacional, Aug. 10, 2010, Sentencia Constitucional, No. 
0874/2010-R (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, June 15, 2010, Sentencia 
Constitucional, No. 0334/2010-R (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, June 
15, 2010, Sentencia Constitucional, No. 0325/2010-R (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional 
Plurinacional, June 7, 2010, Sentencia Constitucional, No. 0296/2010-R (Bol.); 
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, June 7, 2010, Sentencia Constitucional, No. 
0295/2010-R (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, June 7, 2010, Sentencia 
Constitucional, No. 0275/2010-R (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, June 
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As far as Articles 13.IV in fine and 256.II of the constitution are 
concerned, however, the Court has used them to effectively make an 
open interpretation of human rights.  Through the Court’s 
interpretation of these articles, international human rights 
instruments have become a jurisprudential canon, by constitutional 
imperative, with a view to the regulation of constitutionally 
enunciated rights and freedoms bound to be an unavoidable 
reference.175  Meanwhile, the international openness of Bolivian 
domestic legislation to international human rights law is beyond 
question.  In this regard, the Court establishes that, in order to avoid 
infringing on the values of justice and equality and, therefore, the 
principle of reasonableness, any interpretation of the requirements 
or conditions to participate in the development of “cooperative 
willingness”176 shall always be extensive, favorable, and in 
accordance with Articles 13.IV and 256 of the constitution.177 
It must be underscored that, as part of the Court’s 
jurisprudential activity, it is mandatory to have recourse to 
international treaties with a view to the interpretation of rights.  The 
interpretative standards stipulated in Articles 13.IV and 256 must 
not be used unrestrainedly, as they compel the Court to interpret the 
rights and duties in the constitution in accordance with those 
 
7, 2010, Sentencia Constitucional, 0268/2010-R (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional 
Plurinacional, June 7, 2010, Sentencia Constitucional, No. 0264/2010-R (Bol.); 
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, May 31, 2010, Sentencia Constitucional, No. 
0259/2010-R (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, May 24, 2010, Sentencia 
Constitucional, No. 0211/2010-R (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, May 
24, 2010, Sentencia Constitucional, No. 0202/2010-R (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional 
Plurinacional, May 24, 2010, Sentencia Constitucional, No. 0197/2010-R (Bol.); 
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, May 4, 2010, Sentencia Constitucional, No. 
0096/2010-R (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, May 4, 2010, Sentencia 
Constitucional, No. 0092/2010-R (Bol.).  The Plurinational Constitutional Court of 
Bolivia, in these cases, did not grant the right to judicial protection for any 
constitutional status on grounds that it is not specifically stipulated as a right, 
refusing to provide the said legal safeguard through a Constitutional effective 
remedy.  Such a decision entailed a restrictive interpretation of human rights, 
because, in accordance with the open clause of the Constitution, these rights 
deserve legal protection even if they are not explicitly defined as such.  However, 
its alleged non-equivalence to be literally considered as a right has been sufficient 
for the Plurinational Constitutional Court of Bolivia to refuse the said protection.   
 175 SAIZ ARNAIZ, supra note 133, at 153.   
 176 “Cooperative willingness” refers to the attitude, or spirit, that should 
characterize the relationship of national judges to international judicial bodies. 
 177 See Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Apr. 16. 2012, Sentencia 
Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 0085/2012, at III.3.d (Bol.).   
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international human rights treaties ratified by Bolivia.  While citing 
the international instrument in a judgment is not formally a 
requirement178 (on the grounds that it is sufficient to adjust the 
content of interpretation to the standards of international human 
rights treaties already incorporated into domestic legislation179), 
their specific inclusion in a given Court decision is an adequate and 
desirable option.  As maintained here, the mandatory nature of 
constitutional articles, and the fact that the judges cannot just put 
aside the interpretation of rights on the basis of international law 
whenever it suits them, means that their interpretation must be 
explicitly articulated in their decisions together with a reference to 
the relevant treaty.  Only after its mention in the Court’s decision 
can the use of one or more normative instruments be properly 
encouraged.180  Therefore, while mentioning such an assessment in 
the judgment is not formally a sine qua non, it is strongly held to be 
extremely desirable in order to achieve a better understanding and 
implementation of the relevant canons of interpretation. 
The interpretations of the Constitutional Court have proved to 
be indispensable in the application of external human rights sources 
to the new Bolivian context.  These interpretations have been 
directed toward the accomplishment of the constitution’s maximum 
 
 178 Steinhardt asserts that an effective protection of rights by domestic courts 
does not always require explicit consideration and application of the international 
treaties.  Ralph Steinhardt, The Role of Domestic Courts in Enforcing International 
Human Rights Law, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 267, 267 
(Hurst Hannum ed., 4th ed. 2004). 
 179 SAIZ ARNAIZ, supra note 133, at 205-06 (interpreting Article 10.2 of the 
Spanish Constitution). 
 180 Javier Roldán Barbero, Jurisprudencia en Materia de Derecho Internacional 
Público, 62 REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 165, 166 (2010).  Professor 
Roldán Barbero concludes, in regard to 
the case of Spain, that the incorporation of international parameters into 
jurisprudence is limited by a number of factors, including the 
terminological inappropriateness and conceptual uncertainty of judicial-
international issues, the poor qualification required in international 
legislation to administer justice at the national level, and a governmental 
conception of foreign policy that forces judges to act with extreme caution 
when making incursions into this field, all of which turn the application 
of international law at the domestic level into a monotonous, repetitive, 
and hardly original task.   
Id. 
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openness to international human rights law.181  The Court has held 
that the constitution shall be mandatorily interpreted in accordance 
with Articles 256 and 13.IV, finding that constitutional rights must 
be interpreted according to international human rights treaties, and 
fully taking into consideration the historic origin of constitutional 
texts long devoted to throwing into relief the permanent struggle for 
the recognition and effectiveness of such rights.182 
The Court also has found that this matter is completely in 
agreement with the intent of the Constituent Assembly, which 
established the guarantee of rights as one of the purposes and 
functions of the State, as stipulated in Article 8.4 of the constitution, 
revealing thereby its willingness to provide the best possible 
protection of rights.183  By means of the dissenting vote cast by one 
of the members of the Constitutional Court—repeatedly used as case 
law—it was established that, in addition to the observance of the 
criteria laid down in Article 196.II of the constitution, that is to say, 
the literal tenor of the text and the intent of the Constituent 
Assembly, other sources which set forth the principle of 
 
 181 SCHNEIDER, supra note 166, at 18 (suggesting that “fundamental rights 
cannot be understood as a simple formal demarcation between certain degrees of 
willingness, since in that case they would waste away and become limits of non-
intervention”). 
 182 IACHR judgments mention the judicial guarantees and effective judicial 
protection of judges in Title III.1.  They also reference the instruments stated in Title 
III.2.2 about the provision of protection in cases of failure to observe the said 
instruments.  See e.g., Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Mar. 6, 2017, Sentencia 
Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 0171/2017-S2, at 19 (Bol.); Tribunal 
Constitucional Plurinacional, Dec. 5, 2016, Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional, 
No. 1268/2016-S2, at 2-17 (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Dec. 5, 2016, 
Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 1264/2016-S2, at 10 (Bol.); Tribunal 
Constitucional Plurinacional, Nov. 7, 2016, Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional, 
No. 1109/2016-S1, at 10 (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Sept. 26, 2016, 
Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 0922/2016-S2, at 4 (Bol.); Tribunal 
Constitucional Plurinacional, Dec. 7, 2015, Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional, 
No. 1226/2015-S1, at 14-15 (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Nov. 16, 
2015, Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 1181/2015-S1, at 2 (Bol.); Tribunal 
Constitucional Plurinacional, Nov. 6, 2015, Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional, 
No. 1149/2015-S1, at 6-7 (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Nov. 5, 2015, 
Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 1101/2015-S3, at 7 (Bol.); Tribunal 
Constitucional Plurinacional, Nov. 5, 2015, Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional, 
No. 1074/2015-S3, at 8-9 (Bol.); Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Aug. 17, 
2015, Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 0832/2015-S3, at 10 (Bol.). 
 183 Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, July 9, 2012, Sentencia 
Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 0510/2012, at III.3.3 (Bol.). 
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interpretation in accordance with international treaties184 must be 
considered.  Among these are Articles 13.IV and 256 of the 
constitution, which entail recognition of the principles of pro homine 
and “progressive realization.”  These criteria are held to be typical 
of a principista (principles-based) and garantista (rights-based) 
Constitutional Court.185 
Even beyond the interpretation criteria stipulated in Article 
196.II of the constitution, the failure to implement Articles 13.IV in 
fine and 256 would bring with it an interpretatio in peius and, 
therefore, create a vacuum in Bolivian constitutional justice, causing 
judicial uncertainty in the Unified Social State of Plurinational 
Communitarian Law.  The latter body of law imposes on 
constitutional interpreters the obligation to safeguard the values and 
principles of the Bolivian State, which in turn are intended to protect 
human dignity and “society’s sensibility.”186  According to the 
Constitutional Court, any interpretation of the constitution must be 
based upon an extendable and favorable criterion, which requires 
the assurance of the best possible protection of constitutional rights 
through an interpretation underpinned by international standards 
in accordance with Articles 13.IV and 256. 187  In this connection, the 
Court also indicated that the interpretation of rights should comply 
with Article 29 of the American Convention on Human Rights to 
preserve the values of justice and equality, as well as to avoid 
jeopardizing the principle of reasonableness, thus giving full effect 
and judicial relevance to the interpretative canons of the American 
Convention.188 
As emphasized by the Constitutional Court, Articles 13.IV and 
256 explicitly stipulate that the rights enshrined in the constitution 
 
 184 See Eyal Benvenisti, Judges and Foreign Affairs: A Comment on the Institut de 
Droit International’s Resolution on ‘The Activities of National Courts and the International 
Relations of their State’, 5 EUR. J. INT’L L. 423, 427-28 (1994). 
 185 Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Oct. 21, 2011, Sentencia 
Constitucional, No. 1688/2011-R, at 4 (Bol.). 
186 Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, July 13, 2011, Voto Disidente, 
Sentencia Constitucional, No. 0406/2011-R, at 5 (Bol.). 
 187 See e.g., Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Aug. 17, 2010, No. 
0980/2010-R, at 5 (Bol.). 
 188 García Roca, supra note 167, at 15-16.  It is worth mentioning that 
“conferring jurisdiction over fundamental rights on international bodies is an 
obvious form of a State’s self-restraint in the exercise of its decision-making, 
jurisdictional, and revising competencies.”  Id. 
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shall be interpreted in accordance with international human rights 
treaties that are similarly observed by other supranational bodies, 
including the Inter-American Court on Human Rights.189  When it 
comes to the interpretation of rights, the Constitutional Court has 
incorporated not only formal but also material international 
instruments which, despite not being mentioned in the 
constitutional text, the Court has ratified and implemented in its 
jurisprudential  activity.  In this manner, the Court has treated non-
formal international norms such as the interpretations made by 
international courts in matters of human rights as essential to the 
interpretation of constitutional rights on account of their axiological 
or principles-based values. 
Thus, the Constitutional Court has embraced and validated 
interpretations of human rights stemming from international courts 
over which it has no jurisdiction.190  This fact is fully consistent with 
the assumption that, in the process of judicial incorporation of 
human rights emanating from international instruments, the rights 
proclaimed by international instruments ensure that they be 
discussed or recognized.  The decisions and interpretations made by 
international courts also have special relevance in the process of 
reinforcing and extending the international character of human 
rights.191 
The Court also has declared unconstitutional the use of 
international instruments out of context, or when the instruments 
are manipulated to justify domestic actions even though such 
actions would constitute a flagrant violation of constitutional 
obligations.192  As the Court sees it, the need to fulfill the 
 
 189 Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, July 14, 2011, Voto Disidente, 
Sentencia Constitucional, No. 0460/2011-R, at 2-3 (Bol.) (establishing that “another 
reason to give the Judgments emanated from the IACHR constitutional 
preeminence over domestic law is the so-called Doctrine of Useful Effect of the 
Judgments in matters of human rights, the same one developed by the IACHR 
itself”). 
 190 See id. 
 191 Chang & Yeh, supra note 142, at 1168.  
 192 See Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Feb. 21, 2014, Sentencia 
Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 0362/2014 (Bol.).  Noticeable in this judgment is 
the declaration of the unconstitutional nature of imposing, as legal standards about 
military interventions in domestic conflicts, principles and regulations that govern 
the control of international armed conflicts, thus denouncing the capricious 
interpretation of the rules from the viewpoint of the State’s intent by pointing out 
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constitution’s normative content demands a jurisprudential activity 
capable of bridging infra-constitutional gaps, solving conflicts, and 
preventing collision of laws, always considering the constitutional 
text as the preeminent source.  The only exception to this 
understanding would be the appearance of international human 
rights law on the scene, in such a manner as established by Articles 
13, 256.II, and 410 of the constitution.193 
The treatment given to human rights through constitutional 
provisions is understood both in a unitary manner, as when rights 
are approached in a comprehensive way, and in a dynamic manner, 
because, according to its norms, the Bolivian catalogue of rights is 
always open and, therefore, in constant evolution.  Another 
consequence of the new interpretative criteria is that the 
constitutional interpreters cannot make an interpretation of rights 
and their guarantees solely from a national standpoint.  They also 
must make sense of their interpretation on the basis of the rules 
contained in international human rights instruments.194 
With the inclusion of Articles 13.IV in fine and 256.II, the 
constitution envisages appropriate keys for the interpretation of 
constitutional rights, since it establishes guidelines intended to 
make it possible for Bolivian domestic law to influence, and be 
influenced by, international human rights law in order to guarantee 
effective protection of rights.195  These provisions are new in 
 
that the instruments used to deal with armed conflicts shall not be taken as being 
similar to those used to solve domestic or social conflicts in the way intended by 
said regulations.  Id.  The Plurinational Constitutional Court indicated that the 
enforcement of international humanitarian law regulations in cases not recognized 
therein entail their normative infringement.  Id.  However, the dissenting vote cast 
by Judge Ligia Mónica Velásquez Castaños on February 21, 2014 said that the 
above-mentioned regulations should have been declared constitutional in light of 
the prevailing climate of conflicts in the country, wrongly putting the concepts of 
armed conflict and internal conflict on a level with occasional occurrences leading 
up to domestic conflicts, the extent and connotations of which are actually quite 
different.  Id.  
 193 Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Aug. 16, 2013, Sentencia 
Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 1357/2013, at III.1 (Bol.). 
 194 Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Dec. 20, 2011, Voto Disidente, 
Sentencia Constitucional, No. 1132/2011-R (Bol.). 
 195 It can be said that international human rights law has not evolved equally 
around the world, with the United States considered a special case.  CURTIS A. 
BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM, at xi–xiii (2013).  On one 
hand, the scope of international law has increased significantly and gained a strong 
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Bolivian constitutional history.  It is the first time that constitutional 
norms are enumerated in such a way that they open themselves up 
to interpretation with reference to international human rights 
instruments.  This fact sets in relief Bolivia’s awareness of the crucial 
relevance of international human rights law.  With a basis on the 
constitution’s interpretation, the Court’s domestic constitutional 
legislation has widened the constitution’s horizons regarding the 
protection of rights from what we might call a multilevel 
perspective.196  
ii. Indigenous Rights 
The content of Bolivian constitutional rights ranges from the 
symbolic consecration of rights and principles to the thorough 
definition of rights and their normatively precise guarantee, always 
on the basis of the defense and promotion of indigenous cultures 
and customs.  Since the content of these rights cannot be expressed 
literally in all their possible dimensions, it is essential to have 
recourse to other normative frameworks.  This, in turn, brings 
international human rights law to the foreground, as part of an 
attempt to make combinations among, and set boundaries between, 
the rights of the indigenous peoples and other types of rights.197 
The appeal to international human rights law must preserve the 
meaning of national norms and the characteristic identity of 
constitutional norms as much as possible, paying particular 
 
presence in domestic legislation, particularly when it comes to human rights, as 
evidenced by the fact that the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled over a 
number of cases on the basis of international human rights law.  Id.  On the other 
hand, however, the U.S. approach can be seen as “selective and pragmatic,” always 
concerned about which international law to incorporate into its legislation, and 
undeniably bent on giving control over the application of international law to 
political organs.  Id. at xiii.  So even if judges play a role in the enforcement of 
international law, they usually abide by the decisions and actions of the U.S. 
executive branch and Congress.  Id. 
 196 See PAOLA BILANCIA & FEDERICO GUSTAVO PIZZETTI, ASPETTI E PROBLEMI DEL 
COSTITUZIONALISMO MULTILIVELLO 259-66 (2004) (discussing the conflicts and 
synergies concerning the protection of rights on various institutional levels). 
 197 HÄBERLE, supra note 12, at 99-104.  “As a result of interpretative openness, 
it is always possible to make lone interpretations of a right contained in different 
findings of the regional Constitutional Courts with a view to enriching the court’s 
own assessments and interpretations.”  Id. 
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attention to the rights of the indigenous peoples.198  The 
circumstances surrounding the activity of legal systems are of 
paramount importance to understanding how to enforce their rules 
because the various interpretations of conflicting rights are 
contingent on their individual features.  All these considerations put 
special obstacles in the path of the interpretation of rights.199  The 
complex nature of the catalogue of rights stipulated in the 
constitution makes it impossible to seek conventional solutions if we 
take into account that it would be highly difficult for such solutions 
to succeed in the vast diversity of dimensions that characterize and 
define Bolivian rights.  The wide-ranging catalogue of rights 
established in the new Bolivian constitutional text can give rise to 
conflicts among them and even to reciprocal relations likely to be 
identified “zero sum.”200  Therefore, the treatment of these rights 
from a constitutional viewpoint is an extremely sensitive matter.201 
 
 198 See Horst Schönbohm, El Pluralismo Jurídico – Una Comparación a Nivel de 
América Latina, in LOS DERECHOS INDIVIDUALES Y DERECHOS COLECTIVOS EN LA 
CONSTRUCCIÓN DEL PLUALISMO JURÍDICO EN AMÉRICA LATINA 35, 37 (Susanne Käss & 
Claudia Heins eds., 2011) (stating that “through the ratification of international 
instruments, Bolivia starts to recognize judicial pluralism and that a comprehensive 
review of international law will contribute to making indigenous rights twice as 
strong, both at the national and international level”). 
 199 See ERNST-WOLFGANG BÖCKENFÖRDE, ESCRITOS SOBRE DERECHOS 
FUNDAMENTALES 67-68 (Juan Luis Requejo Pagés & Ignacio Villaverde Menéndez 
trans., 1993) (stating that in no case would any theories of interpretation be 
excluded, which means that the interpretation of rights can find support in different 
foundations at the interpreters’ discretion). 
 200 Anna Pintore, Derechos insaciables, in LOS FUNDAMENTOS DE LOS DERECHOS 
FUNDAMENTALES 243, 258 (Antonio de Cabo & Gerardo Pisarello eds., Perfecto 
Andres, et al. trans., 2001). 
 201 Rights in Bolivia start by reconstructing judicial logic from a collective 
perspective and transforming individual canons, which does entail an adaptation 
to post-colonial pluralism, according to long-settled accumulated procedures.  Farit 
L. Rojas Tudela, Del Monismo al Pluralismo Jurídico: Interculturalidad en el Estado 
Constitucional, in LOS DERECHOS INDIVIDUALES Y DERECHOS COLECTIVOS EN LA 
CONSTRUCCIÓN DEL PLURALISMO JURÍDICO EN AMÉRICA LATINA 21, 28-31 (Susanne 
Käss & Claudia Heins eds., 2011).  In reference to the problems of compatibility 
between indigenous rights and other rights, Waldo Albarracín Sánchez holds that 
“there is no extrapolation between them, nor do any of those rights subordinate to 
another, since they are not only perfectly compatible, but also mutually dependent 
and capable of complementing one another.”  Waldo Albarracín Sánchez, La 
Protección de los Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas en el Derecho Internacional, in LOS 
DERECHOS INDIVIDUALES Y DERECHOS COLECTIVOS EN LA CONSTRUCCIÓN DEL 
PLURALISMO JURÍDICO EN AMÉRICA LATINA 67, 82 (Susanne Käss & Claudia Heins 
eds., 2011). 
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For these reasons, the main goal in constitutional jurisprudence 
is to encourage an interpretation that prevents the links among 
constitutional instruments from manifesting themselves as a 
relationship based on independence or hierarchy rather than one 
based on continuity and mutual reciprocity.  Weighing the different 
norms202 in this case proves to be the perfect procedure to solve cases 
involving principles that tend to be contradictory but capable, 
theoretically speaking, of coexisting together with the relevant laws 
or regulations that enshrine those principles.  In this respect, rather 
than challenging the constitutional character of a right-protecting 
law, judges interpret it in such a way that the strength of its 
underlying principle is in harmony with that of the conflicting 
principle.203   
In light of Bolivia’s multi-ethnic and pluricultural 
characteristics, it is necessary to consider various solutions vis-à-vis 
the interpretation of the rights of indigenous peoples.204  We must 
bear in mind that a superficial universality of human rights based 
only on Western ontological conceptions can prove to be largely 
incompatible with native models that are not in harmony with them, 
even when those Western conceptions might enjoy international 
acceptance.  The negation of a constructive dialogue about the 
indigenous models would be opposite to the spirit of human rights, 
as it would entail a sort of “ultracriminalization” of the native 
systems.205  Under this premise, the constitution recognizes 
 
 202 For analysis concerning ponderation as a technique to apply instruments 
based on fundamental rights, see DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 78, at 51-54. 
 203 Luis Prieto Sanchís, Neoconstitucionalismo y Ponderación Judicial, 5 ANUARIO 
DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE LA UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE MADRID 201, 205 
(2001). 
 204 See Ley de Deslinde Jurisdiccional [Law of Jurisdictional Demarcation], 
Ley No. 073, art. 12 (2010), Gaceta Oficial de Bolivia (Bol.).  One of the main conflict-
creating aspects has been the stipulation that the decisions related to “Indigenous 
Jurisdiction” shall be mandatory and cannot be revised by other jurisdictions.  Id.  
The Plurinational Constitutional Court has not only made it clear that it is 
important to have different judicial systems to protect Bolivian pluralism, but has 
also emphasized that the systems, just like any other jurisdiction, shall be subject to 
the control of the Plurinational Constitutional Court, which is as much binding on 
formal legislation as it is on the laws of the indigenous peoples, be they enunciated 
or not.  Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, June 18, 2012, Sentencia 
Constitucional Plurinacional, No. 0300/2012, at III.1.2 (Bol.). 
 205 Armin Von Bogdandy, Configurar la Relación entre el Derecho Constitucional 
y el Derecho Internacional Público, 6 INT’L. J. CON. L. 397 (2007). 
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“indigenous jurisdiction”206 as equal in status to the ordinary 
jurisdiction207.  Such jurisdiction is to be exercised by the indigenous 
community authorities, who shall apply their own principles, 
cultural values, norms and procedures, while respecting the rights 
and guarantees established in the constitution.208 
The exercise of “indigenous jurisdiction” is subject to further 
restrictions209 defined by the minimum standards of international 
law.  In this respect, Bolivian legislation has stipulated that 
“indigenous jurisdiction” shall respect and guarantee the exercise of 
women’s rights, participation, presence and permanence, both 
regarding their right to equal and just access to any job or position, 
and to the control of, decisions about, and participation in, the 
 
 206 According to article 191 of the Bolivian Constitution, the Indigenous 
Jurisdiction applies to the members of the indigenous peoples whose relations and 
juridical acts, or the resulting effects thereof, take place within the indigenous 
community.  CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 191 (Bol.).  On the 
other hand, Article 8 of the Law of Jurisdictional Demarcation emphasizes that the 
Indigenous Jurisdiction is exercised in the areas of personal, material, and territorial 
legal effect when these elements concur, which means that only exclusively 
indigenous affairs shall be subject to this jurisdiction, whereas any other matter 
shall be under the ordinary jurisdiction See Ley de Deslinde Jurisdiccional [Law of 
Jurisdictional Demarcation], Ley No. 073, art. 8 (2010), Gaceta Oficial de Bolivia 
(Bol.). 
 207 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 179 (Bol.). 
 208 Id. art. 190. 
 209 Under “Indigenous Jurisdiction” courts shall not hear crimes against 
international law, crimes against humanity, crimes against the internal State and 
external security, terrorism, tax and customs law violations, corruption and any 
other crime against the State, human trafficking and people smuggling, arms 
dealing and crimes related to drug-trafficking, crimes against the physical integrity 
of children and teenagers, rape, murder or homicide, any process to which the State 
is party or interested third party through its central decentralized autonomous 
administration, and all crimes related to copyright law.  See Ley de Deslinde 
Jurisdiccional [Law of Jurisdictional Demarcation], Ley No. 073, art. 10 § II (2010), 
Gaceta Oficial de Bolivia (Bol.).  Nor shall it hear legal matters related to labor, social 
security, taxation, administrative affairs, mining operations, hydrocarbons, 
forestry, computer science, international law and agrarian law, except those 
concerning the internal distribution of lands under legal ownership or collective 
proprietary right.  Id.  Regarding this demarcation of the competence of 
“Indigenous Jurisdiction,” its final scope only addresses peripheral matters, that is, 
whatever can be resolved through legal control systems, which requires that true 
indigenous justice is bound to be structured on the basis of the new Bolivian 
constitutional text.  CARLOS ALBERTO GOITIA, CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA Y JUSTICIA 
INDÍGENA ORIGINARIA CAMPESINA: POTESTADES DE GENERACIÓN NORMATIVA Y DE 
ADMINISTRACIÓN DE JUSTICIA 345 (2012). 
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administration of justice.210  In no case shall the rulings of the 
indigenous courts mandate the loss of land by, or the expulsion of, 
senior citizens or persons with disabilities on grounds of their failure 
to fulfill duties, obligations, contributions or communal 
responsibilities.211  The legislation also categorically prohibits and 
punishes all forms of violence against children, teenagers and 
women, and rules out any form of conciliation related to these 
offenses, declaring that any agreements involving these matters are 
illegal.212 
It is important to highlight the expected interpretation of 
constitutional rights as individually and collectively recognized, since 
both forms of recognition involve a special type of protection.  This 
new approach to understanding human rights in the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia must be carefully followed by the Constitutional 
Court in order to pay attention to, and preserve, the existing 
boundaries between collective and individual rights.  Owing to the 
forms of communal relationships embraced by the indigenous 
peoples, the ways of enforcing legislation are also deemed to 
encompass the overall indigenous population rather than merely the 
individual.213  This is also in line with recognition of indigenous 
rights by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.214 
 
 210 Ley de Deslinde Jurisdiccional [Law of Jurisdictional Demarcation], Ley 
No. 073, art. 5 § II (2010), Gaceta Oficial de Bolivia (Bol.). 
 211 Id. art. 5; see also CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 191 
(Bol.) (establishing that courts exercising rural native indigenous jurisdiction hear 
rural native matters as set out in the Law of Jurisdictional Demarcation). 
 212 Ley de Deslinde Jurisdiccional [Law of Jurisdictional Demarcation], Ley 
No. 073, art. 5 §§ III, IV (2010), Gaceta Oficial de Bolivia (Bol.). 
 213 Vega Camacho, supra note 99, at 257-58 
 214 See Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 149 (Aug. 
31, 2001) (“Among indigenous peoples there is a communitarian tradition 
regarding a communal form of collective property of the land, in the sense that 
ownership of the land is not centered on an individual but rather on the group and 
its community.”).  It is also recognized that that “[i]ndigenous peoples’ customary 
law must be especially taken into account.“  Id. at ¶ 151.  The IACHR also recognizes 
the customary practices of indigenous communities and their communal link with 
their territories.  See, e.g., Comunidad Garífuna Triunfo de la Cruz y sue Miembros 
v. Honduras, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No.  305, ¶ 100 (Oct. 8, 2015); The Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 284, ¶ 129 (Nov. 
25, 2015); The Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and 
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The recognition of rights from a multiethnic and pluricultural 
perspective undoubtedly goes beyond the old conception of rights 
contained in previous constitutional texts.  The inclusion of these 
new rights makes it necessary for the constitution to open itself 
widely to the incorporation of new cultural values and principles 
which have been hitherto systematically disregarded.  While Article 
13.IV in fine paves the way for an interpretation in keeping with 
international law, Article 256.II establishes at the same time that the 
most favorable norms shall have preferential application.  As this 
provision clearly stipulates, the interpretation of rights shall be 
based on the best protection that a norm can provide regardless of 
its source and, therefore, it is imperative to ensure such protection. 
International human rights law is then a strong driving force and 
measure of human rights, but it always must be adjusted to an 
indigenous people’s own system of laws.  Even if the norms related 
to human rights tend to become universal, it is also true that the 
typical characteristics of every culture must be carefully weighed in 
each particular case.  The indeterminate provisions found in the 
constitution can be considered a possible route for bringing in 
international human rights law as a tool to resolve conflicts within 
the indigenous jurisdiction. 
Both the “open clause” and Articles 13.IV in fine and 256.II of the 
constitution represent a significant evolution in regard to the 
interpretation of constitutional rights, because they respectively 
allow for, and mandate, any interpretation to be based on the 
provisions laid down in international human rights treaties.   
The chief purpose of these measures is to safeguard the 
minimum standards or contents of these rights insofar as 
they are recognized in international instruments.  In light of 
the fact that the aforementioned norms, which are binding 
even on legislators, specify non-negotiable standards 
protected by the Constituent Assembly, but are in 
permanent evolution.215 
 
Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 145 (June 27, 2012); 
The Kuna Indigenous People of Madungandí and the Emberá Indigenous People 
of Bayano and their Members v. Panama, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
284, ¶ 111 (Oct. 14, 2014). 
 215 Santolaya, supra note 173, at 449 
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Furthermore, their importance is maximized when they count upon 
legal entities that are in charge of their interpretation and possible 
revision.216 
IV. THE POSITION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE BOLIVIAN LEGAL 
SYSTEM 
As we have discussed, the Bolivian State established that the 
proclamation of rights contained in its constitutional text shall not 
be understood as a negation of other rights not enumerated in the 
constitution.  In addition, the classification of such rights does not 
determine any hierarchy or superiority of some rights over others.217  
As a novelty in the Bolivian constitutional system, the constitution 
incorporates Articles 13.IV in fine and 256.II, which state that the 
rights and obligations recognized in the constitutional text shall be 
interpreted in agreement with international human rights treaties. 
All the above-mentioned provisions are highly relevant and 
extremely important tools for the protection of rights.  As a 
prevailing tendency, Latin American constitutional texts have been 
gradually incorporating articles that make it possible to legitimize 
the privileged position of international law and, therefore, put it into 
practice in a more effective way.218  Pursuant to this tendency, the 
Bolivian Constituent Assembly included a number of provisions 
that give shape to a system of sources that make room for 
international human rights instruments. 
In this section, we examine the position that the Bolivian system 
has assigned to international human rights instruments and their 
impact on the national system of laws.  In particular, we analyze the 
incorporation of international human rights treaties into the “Block 
 
 216 Id. 
 217 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 13.II, 13.III (Bol.). 
 218 See Héctor Fix-Zamudio, El Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos en 
las Constituciones Latinoamericanas y en la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, 
75 BOLETÍN MEXICANO DE DERECHO COMPARADO 749 (1992) (noticing this tendency 
in the 1990s, and remarking that, “generally speaking, the recognition of 
international human rights instruments as a topic was being incorporated into the 
Latin American constitutions in a rather cautious and biased manner”). 
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of Constitutionality,”219 as well as the provisions that might even 
give such treaty norms prevalence over the Bolivian constitutional 
text itself, including details about the effect of specific cases on 
domestic legislation. 
a. Block of Constitutionality 
In previous Bolivian constitutions, the position of international 
human rights treaties was largely relegated to a secondary place.220  
Not so in the new constitutional text.221  The incorporation of 
international human rights treaties into the so-called Block of 
Constitutionality blazes a trail for the protection of rights. 
i. Article 410.II 
The new Bolivian constitutional text is built along a complex 
spectrum of gradations and hierarchies involving international law.  
While the constitution makes it clear that its text enjoys supremacy 
over any other legislation, it opens the door for certain norms of 
international law to be placed on par with its own hierarchical level.  
This landmark in the recognition and protection of international 
instruments would have been unthinkable in previous Bolivian 
constitutions. 
 
 219 In Latin American law, the term “Block of Constitutionality” is used to 
refer to the entire set or “block” or rules, norms, and decisions that enjoy 
constitutional status. 
 220 See CONSTITUCIÓN  POLÍTICA DE 1826 Nov. 19, 1826 (Bol.) (conferring limited 
rights to Bolivian citizens and empowering the legislature to enter into treaties); 
CONSTITUCIÓN  POLÍTICA DE 1861 Aug. 5, 1861 (Bol.) (providing a general framework 
for civil rights, while separately allocating power to approve international treaties 
to the national legislature); CONSTITUCIÓN  POLÍTICA DE 1945 Nov. 24, 1945 (Bol.) 
(granting civil rights to Bolivian citizens, without referrence to international human 
rights treaties and conventions). 
 221 ANTONIO ENRIQUE PÉREZ LUÑO, EL DESBORDAMIENTO DE LAS FUENTES DEL 
DERECHO 76 (1993).  Pérez Luño points out that the displacement of instruments is 
due not only to the emergence of powers above the State, but also to the expansion 
of normative jurisdiction of intermediate entities, all of which is conducive to a 
pluralistic determination of judicial sources.  Id.  
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According to Article 410 of the constitution, “international 
treaties ratified by Bolivia in matters of human rights are part of the 
Block of Constitutionality.”222  This rule provides international 
human rights treaties with the highest possible rank in the internal 
system of laws.223  For all intents and purposes, the norms contained 
in those treaties are standards of constitutionality for the rest of 
Bolivia’s domestic laws.224  In this respect, international human 
rights law goes beyond its usual status in other legal systems as the 
provider of a canon of judicial interpretation, and it acquires a 
constitutional rank that makes it especially strong and ensures its 
protection by domestic legislation. 
To this end, the Constituent Assembly relied on constitutional 
recognition of international human rights treaties to stipulate the 
prioritized protection of human rights.  In the exercise of its power, 
the State shall not restrain these rights, but rather be under their 
control, thus acknowledging the importance of international human 
rights law and other universal standards with a view to enforcing 
them.225  The acceptance of the existence and recognition of 
internationally agreed upon human rights is patently obvious, as is 
the objective obligation to prevent their violation or any diminution 
in their enjoyment and exercise, as an invaluable mainstay to 
 
 222 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 410.II (Bol.). 
 223 See, e.g., Contradicción de Tesis 239/2011. Suscitada entre los tribunales 
colegiados de circuito tercero y cuarto, ambos del centro auxiliar de la tercera región 
con residencia en Guadalajara, Jalisco, y el primer tribunal colegiado en materia de 
trabajo del tercer circuito, Segunda Sala de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la 
Nación [SCJN], Agosto de 2011 (Mex.) (refusing to make a pronouncement on the 
hierarchy of international instruments in matters of human rights, but deciding 
that, pursuant to the interpretation of the constitutional reforms of June 6 and 10, 
2011, the human rights norms were not hierarchically related to domestic legislation 
except when the constitution expressly establishes some kind of restriction 
regarding the exercise of human rights which are otherwise prioritized); see Ramón 
Ortega García, La jerarquía de los tratados internacionales sobre derechos humanos a la 
luz de la reforma constitucional del 10 de junio de 2011, 15 ANUARIO MEXICANO DE 
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 495 (2015). 
 224 See, e.g., CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPUBLICA DEL PARAGUAY June 20, 1992, art. 
142 (providing the international human rights treaties with constitutional status 
through article 142, indicating that they may only be denounced by constitutional 
amendment). 
 225 See Arturo Santiago Pagliari, Derecho Internacional y Derecho Interno.  El 
Sistema Constitutional Argentino, 7 ARS BONI ET AEQUI 17 (2011). 
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guarantee their protection within the country.226  Accordingly, the 
Constitutional Court has recognized that international human rights 
instruments demand that the parties implement effective, prompt, 
and efficient forms of protection against any act that may violate 
these rights.227  This, in turn, is in accordance with the constitutional 
rank granted to international human rights treaties, taking into 
account that one of the most important ways to defend them is to 
incorporate them into the domestic system of laws and give them 
constitutional status.228 
 
 226 See JUAN CARLOS VEGA, MARISA ADRIANA GRAHAM & JUAN PABLO CAFIERO, 
JERARQUÍA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LOS TRATADOS INTERNACIONALES (1996).  Javier 
Armando Lorente points out that, in the case of Argentina, these Treaties shall only 
be denounced after approval of two-thirds of all the members of each House, the 
same majority required for a Constitutional Reform.  JAVIER ARMANDO LORENTE, 
CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA NACIÓN ARGENTINA Y TRATADOS INTERNACIONALES CON 
JERARQUÍA CONSTITUCIONAL  77-78 (1994).  In Armando Lorente’s opinion, the 
denouncement of the international treaties will involve a sui generis constitutional 
reform with practical and judicial consequences which are likely to be very difficult 
to appreciate.  Id.  He also underscored that, in order to attain constitutional 
hierarchy, any other international treaty shall also need the vote of two thirds of all 
the members of each House.  
 227 Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Apr. 7, 2011, Sentencia 
Constitucional, No. 0375/2011-R (Bol.). 
 228 A different conclusion has been reached, for instance, by the Constitutional 
Court of Chile, which stated that it is impossible to hold that the Constitution can 
be amended by a treaty in matters of essential rights derived from human nature.  
By handing down such a ruling, the Chilean court has categorically established that, 
if the said treaty contains norms in disagreement with the Constitution, it can only 
be rightfully incorporated into the domestic system of laws through a previous 
constitutional reform.  Tribunal Constitucional [T.C.] [Constitutional Court], 8 abril 
2002, “Requerimiento Formulado por Diversos Diputados con el Objeto de que el 
Tribunal Declare la Inconstitucionalidad del Estatuto de Roma de la Corte Penal 
Internacional, Adoptado en Dicha Ciudad el 17 de Julio de 1998, de Acuerdo al 
Artículo 82, N°2, de la Constitución Política de la República,” Rol de la causa: 346 
(Chile).  The majority also affirmed the preeminence of the Constitution over 
international treaties on grounds that the latter attain the legal status required to 
become part of domestic legislation.  It is worth mentioning that there is no 
consensus regarding its hierarchy.  Raúl Bertelsen Repetto, Rango Juridico de los 
Tratados Internacionales en el Derecho Chileno, 23 REVISTA CHILENA DE DERECHO 211, 
221 (1996); Teodoro Ribera Neumann, Los Tratados Internacionales y su Control a 
Posteriori por el Tribunal Constitucional, 5 ESTUDIOS CONSTITUCIONALES 89, 99 (2007).  
Ribera Neumann says no international treaty capable of challenging constitutional 
supremacy has ever been approved, in accordance with Article 54.1 of the Chilean 
Constitution.  Id.  He has also remarked that the final part of the second item of 
Article 5 of the Constitution does not turn the Human Rights Treaties ratified by 
Chile into a “material Constitution,” nor does it ensure a tacit amendment of the 
Constitution or its incorporation into what is understood as the Block of 
Constitutionality.  Id. 
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In addition to giving international human rights treaties the 
highest possible rank at the domestic level, the Constitutional Court 
has established that the Block of Constitutionality includes the 
jurisprudence229 emanating from the IACHR.230  Therefore, since all 
the judgments issued by the IACHR shall prevail over, and be the 
basis of, the whole domestic system of laws, all the norms and 
decisions originating from the inter-American human rights system 
govern the interpretation and implementation of human rights.231  It 
is difficult to imagine a more comprehensive protection at a 
domestic level of the judgments issued by the IACHR than the one 
offered by the Bolivian Constitutional Court.232  Through its 
decision, the Constitutional Court has set in relief an integrated and 
essential understanding of itself as the prime defender of rights in 
 
 229 Regarding the recognition of jurisprudence, the Spanish Constitutional 
Court offers a highly relevant example by stating that in accordance with its 
Constitution’s Article 10.2, not only shall the jurisprudence originating from the 
European Court of Human Rights be used as an interpretative criterion, it shall also 
take immediate effect in Spanish legislation.  S.T.C., Oct. 25, 1993 (F.J., No. 
303/1993, p. 8) (Spain); see also Eugeni Gay Montalvo, El diálogo del Tribunal 
Constitucional Español con la doctrina de otros Tribunales, in DIÁLOGO JURISPRUDENCIAL 
EN DERECHOS HUMANOS: ENTRE TRIBUNALES CONSTITUCIONALES Y CORTES 
INTERNACIONALES 243, 252-53 (Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor & Alfonso Herrera 
García eds., 2013). 
 230 Contradicción de Tesis 239/2011. Suscitada entre los tribunales colegiados 
de circuito tercero y cuarto, ambos del centro auxiliar de la tercera región con 
residencia en Guadalajara, Jalisco, y el primer tribunal colegiado en materia de 
trabajo del tercer circuito, Segunda Sala de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la 
Nación [SCJN], Agosto de 2011 (Mex.).  In the Mexican case, and following the 
denunciation in June 24, 2011, the nation's Supreme Court decided that the 
precedents established by the IACHR resolutions are binding, regardless of 
whether Mexico has been involved in the relevant conflict, because they are an 
extension of the international treaties being interpreted, giving full consideration to 
the fact that it is on the basis of these criteria that the content of the human rights 
stipulated by them will be determined.  Id. 
 231 See Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, May 10, 2010, Sentencia 
Constitucional, No. 0110/2010-R (Bol.).  This judgment also establishes that 
constitutional interpreters have abided by IACHR jurisprudence, that is to say, 
because of their expansionary influence, their rulings become directly effective in 
the States parties, regardless of whether the said jurisprudence emanated from a 
case in which the said States are facing charges.  Cabrera García v. Mexico, 
Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 220, ¶ 79 (Nov. 26, 2010). 
 232 For an analysis concerning the political implications of the supranational 
courts, see Mary L. Volcansek, Supranational Courts in a Political Context, in LAW 
ABOVE NATIONS: SUPRANATIONAL COURTS AND THE LEGALIZATION OF POLITICS 1 
(1997). 
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the inter-American context, revealing its far-reaching vocation as 
protector of human rights and highlighting its progressive nature.233 
The will to provide full protection for IACHR judgments 
becomes patently obvious with the Constitutional Court’s 
pronouncement that one of the reasons to sustain its constitutional 
hierarchy at the domestic level can be explained through “the useful 
effect doctrine” as applied to judgments related to human rights.234  
Developed by the IACHR,235 this doctrine stipulates that the 
judgments delivered upon confirmation that a human right has been 
violated shall generate international responsibilities for the State 
violator, thereby placing on that State inescapable and inexcusable 
duties vis-à-vis the international community.236  Through this 
“useful effect doctrine,” IACHR jurisprudence is fulfilled and 
receives full recognition at the domestic level.237 
 
 233 In this regard, some authors point out that national courts’ cooperation 
with an international tribunal can play a critical role in developing review powers 
vis-à-vis the executive operating at the level of an international organization.  They 
also hold that these courts have undertaken collective action as a response to the 
prevailing international needs.  Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, National 
Courts, Domestic Democracy, and the Evolution of International Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
59, 61-62 (2009); Tom Ginsburg, National Courts, Domestic Democracy, and the 
Evolution of International Law: A Reply to Eyal Benvenisti and George Downs, 20 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 1021, 1021-26 (2010). 
 234 Rafael Bustos Gisbert, XV Proposiciones Generales para una Teoría de los 
Diálogos Judiciales, 95 REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 13, 39-40 
(2012) (“[I]f the decisions of other courts are appropriated by a nation for 
incorporation into its own constitutional rule, we can talk about comprehensive 
summaries, which takes place when dialogue leads to the inclusion of external case 
law on rights in the domestic case law.”). 
 235 See Dismissed Congressional Employees v. Peru, Preliminary Objections, 
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 158, ¶ 128 
(Nov. 24, 2006); Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 186, ¶ 180 (Aug. 
12, 2008). 
 236 Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, July 14, 2011, Voto Disidente, 
Sentencia Constitucional, No. 0406/2011-R (Bol.). 
 237 The recognition of IACHR jurisprudence as part of the Block of 
Constitutionality is extremely important.  States have usually been reluctant to 
recognize the binding character of the jurisprudence established by supranational 
courts, even in cases that those States themselves have been party to.  It has 
happened with the United States, which stated in the famous case, Medellín v. 
Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008), that, in order to reject the court’s decision, “[n]othing in 
the text, background, negotiating and drafting history, or practice among signatory 
nations suggests that the” judgments of an international tribunal should be given a 
higher status than that enjoyed by the country’s most fundamental constitutional 
 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
642 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 42:2 
   
 
Regardless of whether Bolivia is party to a legal proceeding 
before the IACHR, its Constitutional Court incorporates the 
arguments of IACHR judgments into the Block of 
Constitutionality.238  The Constitutional Court has pointed out that 
the norms originating from international constitutional systems are 
fully integrated into the Bolivian Block of Constitutionality, and thus 
has endorsed the “constitutionalization” and dissemination of 
axiomatic and dogmatic guarantees-based international legal 
instruments.239  This is an open and comprehensive interpretation, 
with the Constitutional Court offering innovative solutions in 
harmony with the principle of a State that is subject to the rule of 
law and seeks maximum protection of human rights.240 
Article 410.II of the Bolivian Constitution is not limited to 
creating a closed catalogue of international instruments with 
constitutional rank.  On the contrary, it leaves it open to all 
international human rights treaties already ratified or that may be 
ratified by the Plurinational State of Bolivia in the future.  On the 
basis of this article, new types and concepts of rights never before 
enumerated as such have been qualified and introduced into the 
new constitutional text.  In this manner, for example, Bolivian 
constitutional law incorporates international human rights law, the 
right to peace, international humanitarian law, the right to 
integration, and other international norms designed to protect 
human rights, both as a fundamental part of the national 
 
protections.  LOUIS HENKIN, SARAH H. CLEVELAND, LAURENCE R. HELFER, GERALD L. 
NEUMAN & DIANE F. ORENTLICHER, HUMAN RIGHTS 944-45 (2d ed. 2009). 
 238 Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Sept. 20, 2012, Sentencia 
Constitucional, No. 1250/2012 (Bol.). 
 239 Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Aug. 17, 2010, Sentencia 
Constitucional, No. 0980/2010-R (Bol.). 
 240 Héctor Masnatta, Argentina: verso una Costituzione «integrazionista», in IL 
CONSTITUZIONALISMO «PARALLELO» DELLE NUOVE DEMOCRAZIE: AFRICA E AMERICA 
LATINA 191 (1999).  One of the international sources geographically closest to this 
regulation has been included in Argentina’s Constitution of 1994.  Argentina’s 
constitutional debate has led to the implementation of Article 75.22 about the 
hierarchical level of international treaties and concordats in general, both of which 
have been granted supralegal hierarchy.  However, this Article takes things further 
and makes particular reference to certain international human rights instruments.  
This decision is based upon the understanding that the international instruments 
contained in this regulation complement the rights and guarantees recognized in 
Argentina’s National Constitution.  Id. 
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constitutional system and as a secondary source.241  By giving special 
judicial recognition to rights contained in different international 
instruments but not enumerated in the Bolivian catalogue of 
constitutional rights, Article 410.II prevents any right not yet 
recognized by the Bolivian constitutional norm from being granted 
lower status than a right already proclaimed in the constitutional 
text.  To this end, subsequent judicial decisions have emphasized 
that the rights that are not recognized in the constitution but are 
included in international treaties ratified by Bolivia shall be 
considered part of constitutional norms.242  All of the above makes it 
possible to develop new rights in addition to those already 
enumerated in the constitution, as stipulated by the “open-clause 
formula,” as well as to keep the catalogue of constitutional rights 
permanently open and in constant evolution.  In this connection, it 
is possible to use international human rights treaties to incorporate 
new rights having constitutional merits.  These new rights are then 
protected by the same mechanisms of protection as those specifically 
designed for the rights enumerated in the constitutional text. 
ii. Implications 
The recognition of international human rights law in the 
constitution’s text is beyond question, as is its usefulness as a 
platform to ensure full respect for its contents through constitutional 
provisions.  The importance attached to international law became 
manifest in the debates and discussions held throughout the 
deliberations of the Constituent Assembly, in which various 
commissions stated their willingness to reach and respect 
international agreements on the protection of certain rights and 
undertake a number of actions to guarantee their effectiveness. 
The constitution has developed a new structure of constitutional 
rights distinguished by the recognition of a wide range of rights 
considered to be “inviolable, universal, interdependent, indivisible 
and progressive” and which, moreover, goes hand in hand with the 
 
 241 Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Sept. 20, 2012, Sentencia 
Constitucional, No. 1250/2012, at III.2 (Bol.). 
 242 Código Procesal Constitucional [Constitutional Procedural Code], art. 
2(II)(2) (Bol.). 
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Bolivian State’s obligation to “promote, protect and respect” those 
rights.243  For this reason, all Bolivian constitutional rights are 
deemed to be fundamental rights244 in practice,245 taking into 
account that the treatment they receive has identical connotations 
both in the case of rights referred to as fundamental in the 
constitutional text itself and with regard to any other kind of right 
incorporated into it.246  In this connection, the rights enunciated in 
international sources can have full protection, since the 
 
 243 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 13.I (Bol.). 
 244  
The fundamental character of the rights enshrined in the Constitution is 
contingent on the Constituent Assembly’s perspective.  Consequently, 
some rights will be established as fundamental and others will not, 
depending on the intended type of society.  The rights are classified as 
fundamental when they contribute to the Constitution’s own fundamental 
nature.  It is by virtue of the Constitution itself that they can become 
readily available to their holder and unavailable and defendable to the 
legislator.   
Francisco J. Bastida, ¿Son los derechos sociales derechos fundamentales? Por una 
concepción normativa de la fundamentalidad de los derechos, in ESTUDIOS SOBRE LA 
CONSTITUCIÓN 1083, 1096 (2008); see also RICCARDO GUASTINI, TEORÍA E IDEOLOGÍA DE 
LA INTERPRETACIÓN CONSTITUCIONAL 97-98 (Miguel Carbonell & Pedro Salazar trans., 
2008) (explaining the difference between rights created by the constitution and 
those that preceded its creation). 
 245  
When it comes to the formal conception of fundamental rights, the most 
important aspect is not their content but the rank in which they are 
recognized.  Only those rights enshrined in constitutional or, at least, 
supralegal norms can be considered as fundamental rights from the 
viewpoint of their formal definition, because what makes them truly 
characteristic is their resistance to the law.  In other words, they bring 
together all public authorities, including the democratic legislator.  The 
formal conception of fundamental rights can only become feasible through 
inflexible constitutional provisions and mechanisms to control the 
constitutionality of the laws.  
Only on these terms can any right be invoked before the legislator.  See DÍEZ-PICAZO, 
supra note 78, at 37. 
 246 Rodolfo Arango, Constitucionalismo social latinoamericano y derecho a la salud, 
in INTERAMERICANIZACIÓN DEL DERECHO A LA SALUD PERSPECTIVAS A LA LUZ DEL CASO 
POBLETE DE LA CORTE IDH 27, 29-31 (Mariela Morales Antoniazzi & Laura Clérico 
eds., 2019).  An extension of fundamental rights is clearly noticeable in the Latin 
American constitutions.  Social and cultural rights, as any other kind of rights, 
appear in the Latin American constitutions as potentially fundamental rights.  Id.  
The recognition of social and collective rights in another kind of society is rather of 
a minimalist nature and marked by restrictions in their jurisdictional function when 
it comes to providing social benefits stipulated by the law.  Id. 
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constitutional supremacy that international human rights treaties 
enjoy over domestic legislation places the rights recognized in those 
treaties on the same level as the constitutional rights enumerated in 
the constitution.247  Taking into account that the harmony between 
the rights consecrated in international norms and constitutional 
rights is specifically stated in the constitution, as well as the fact that 
both of these rights are considered to be fundamental in practice, 
they can all be protected by the legal instruments designed to defend 
the rights enshrined in the nation’s “organic law.”  
The incorporation of rights contained in internationally 
recognized instruments, customary international law, and the 
judgments of the IAHCR in the Block of Constitutionality brings 
with it the assumption that any law that is lower in rank, and at 
variance with such rights, is in fact unconstitutional and therefore 
inapplicable in the domestic legal system.248  Through the 
incorporation of the Inter-American Court’s jurisprudence into the 
Block of Constitutionality, not only that court’s case law but also its 
methods of interpretation become part of the Bolivian domestic legal 
system with constitutional status.  Hence, the Bolivian domestic 
system embraces an evolutionary, dynamic, pro personae, 
progressive and weighted form of interpretation that gives 
extraordinary impetus to its law-making power and promotes a 
highly desirable and necessary cooperation and coordination 
between domestic and international judges.249 
 
 247 A strong impact of international human rights law can be observed in Latin 
America, where it is locally supported by the principles of constitutional law as part 
of a process of nationalization of universal rights. See Arminda Balbuena, Alexéi 
Julio & Gerardo Pisarello, Estado de Derecho y crisis de la soberanía en América Latina: 
algunas notas entre la pesadilla y la esperanza, in CONSTITUCIONALISMO, 
MUNDIALIZACIÓN Y CRISIS DEL CONCEPTO DE SOBERANÍA: ALGUNOS EFECTOS EN 
AMÉRICA LATINA Y EN EUROPA 65, 68-69 (Antonio del Cabo & Gerardo Pisarello eds., 
2000). 
 248 See Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, ¶¶ 145, 146, 
151 (Sept. 26, 2006); Gelman v. Uruguay, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 221, ¶ 223 (Feb. 24, 2011); La Cantuta v. Peru, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶ 162(a)-(b) 
(Nov. 29, 2006); Palamara-Iribarne v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 135 ¶ 228 (Nov. 22, 2005);  
 249 Humberto Nogueira Alcalá, El Control de Convencionalidad y el Díalogo 
Interjurisdiccional entre Tribunales Nacionales y Corte Interamericana de Derechos 
Humanos, 19 REVISTA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL EUROPEO 221, 234 (2013). 
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The constitution’s “direct applicability” clause250 is closely 
related to the previously discussed “open clause” of rights.  They are 
both essential to the enforcement of rights springing from 
international sources.  In this respect, the direct applicability of 
rights enshrined in international human rights treaties is totally 
consistent—if not redundant—with the inclusion of international 
human rights treaties in the Block of Constitutionality, since such a 
hierarchy bestows immediate protection on them.  Nevertheless, 
much like with the rest of the constitutional rights enunciated in the 
constitution, their immediate enforcement depends on the existence 
of suitable means for their protection.251 
As far as the guarantee of constitutional rights is concerned,252 
the constitution establishes that all the rights stipulated in the 
constitutional text are directly applicable and enjoy equal 
guarantees for their protection.253  In this connection, it is more than 
obvious that all rights receive similar fundamental status, taking 
into account that their defense and protection enjoy equal rights 
 
 250 Wen-Chen Chang and Jiunn-Rong Yeh point out that recent constitutional 
texts such as the Constitution of South Africa and others in Central and Eastern 
Europe have incorporated chapters of rights in compliance with international 
human rights law, including the introduction of one or two articles related to the 
direct applicability and hierarchy of the rights contained in international 
instruments, as evidenced by Article 39.1 of the Constitution of South Africa, Article 
9.1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, and Article 6.1 of the 
Constitution of South Korea.  Chang & Yeh, supra note 142, at 1168. 
 251 RICCARDO GUASTINI, DISTINGUIENDO: ESTUDIOS DE TEORÍA Y METATEORÍA DEL 
DERECHO 185-89 (1999) (“The problem here lies in how to make a distinction 
between fundamental rights and their guarantees, taking into account that the 
existence of the latter is what makes it possible to distinguish the former from the 
so-called ‘rights that exist only on paper.’  Given that more is needed to guarantee 
a right than just its conferment, suitable means must be established with a view to 
its protection, being understood that the said guarantee cannot be enunciated in the 
same norm that stipulates the right.  This guarantee can only be ensured by means 
of a secondary norm that includes provisions designed to prevent the violation of a 
right or, at any rate, seek redress for the violation in question.  The content of the 
written right must be precise and capable of being exercised or claimed before a 
subject.  Consequently, true rights are those that can be protected by the law and 
exercised or claimed before a given subject, and their content entails the obligation 
to practice a certain code of conduct.”). 
 252 See, e.g., DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 78, at 74-76 (discussing the protection of 
fundamental rights against the legislator). 
 253 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 109 (Bol.). 
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under due process of law.254  The eagerness to guarantee an effective 
protection of rights, which was the Constituent Assembly’s primary 
incentive, led to the establishment of equal guarantees for all rights 
enshrined in the constitution, no matter what their original source 
might be.  Regarding the protection of rights, there is complete 
equivalence between the rights that stem from international law and 
those rights specifically mentioned in the constitutional text.255  
The extension of the catalogue of constitutional rights comprises 
both the constitutional rights enumerated in the constitutional text 
and the rights recognized by international human rights treaties.  
The recognition of the importance of international human rights law 
in domestic legislation is evidenced by their inclusion in the Bolivian 
constitutional text, not just through the mere stipulation of this 
integration of rights into the Bolivian constitutional catalogue.  The 
guarantee of protection of these rights is also ensured by the 
observance provided in the constitutional instruments, which 
means that they can enjoy the maximum possible protection within 
the framework of the domestic legal system.256 
Along these lines, the articles of the constitution provide that 
“[t]he State guarantees every person and all collectives, without 
discrimination, the free and effective exercise of the rights 
established in this Constitution, the laws and international human 
 
 254 See generally id. (stating the constitutional provisions of Bolivia); Código 
Procesal Constitutional [Constitutional Procedural Code] (Bol.) (detailing 
procedure for undertaking such actions). 
 255 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 128 (Bol.); Jorge 
Rodríguez Zapata, Tutela interna e internacional de derechos fundamentales: ¿Cabe 
recurso de amparo por la vulneración de derechos dimanantes de convenios internacionales?, 
42 REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO DEL TRABAJO 373, 373-76 (1990).  It is worth 
remarking that Spanish jurisprudence has drawn a different line by deciding to not 
give the rights emanated from international instruments the same treatment as 
those enunciated in the Spanish constitutional rule, pointing out that the 
international normative must be based on the constitutional provision related to the 
relevant violated right, which has a precedent in S.T.C., Dec. 14, 1982 (R.G.D., No. 
13) (Spain) and, accordingly, an appeal on the grounds of unconstitutionality would 
be inapplicable in the case of these rights.  Id. 
 256 Anja Seibert-Fohr, The Potentials of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties with Respect to Reservations to Human Rights Treaties, in RESERVATIONS TO 
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION REGIME: CONFLICT, HARMONY 
OR RECONCILIATION 183, 210 (Ineta Ziemele ed., 2004) (“[H]uman rights do not only 
concern the relationship between States and individuals but also the relationship 
among the States parties.  International human rights treaties entail obligations erga 
omnes.”). 
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rights treaties.”257  Furthermore, this guarantee goes beyond its 
simple enunciation, inasmuch as it is not just laid down in the 
constitution as a desirable goal bound to be reached at some point.  
Its incorporation into the Block of Constitutionality together with 
the rest of the provisions discussed here involves the inclusion of 
standards designed to ensure the full integration of rights derived 
from international human rights instruments on equal terms with 
the rights established in the constitutional text. 
The Bolivian Constitution provides for a complex normative 
structure that allows for a full-scale structuring of international law 
in the system of domestic legal instruments.  The hierarchical 
position of international human rights treaties in the constitution is 
settled through their inclusion in the Block of Constitutionality.  
Nonetheless, the Constitutional Court has even gone beyond this 
provision by incorporating other non-formal international human 
rights instruments into the Block of Constitutionality, thus 
expanding the constitutional spectrum of norms intended to protect 
people’s rights and guarantees.  Similarly, the problem of rights not 
specifically enumerated in the constitution but recognized in 
international treaties ratified by the country is solved through the 
definition of the Block of Constitutionality, despite the fact that the 
“open-clause” formula also could have been used to this end. 
What is more, the Block of Constitutionality allows for the 
incorporation into the Bolivian constitutional text not only of 
international human rights treaties in their formal conception and 
with a status on a level with the constitution, but also the whole set 
of international norms that have emerged from those treaties’ 
interpretation, even if they have not been conceived as formally 
binding on domestic legislation.  The sole requirement to be met for 
this inclusion is the assumption of an effective reinforcement of 
constitutional rights based on the interpretations of the 
Constitutional Court.  Upon their assumption by international and 
domestic courts alike, all these solutions become part of the Block of 
Constitutionality and, at the same time, a potential source to create 
new rights bound to be validly included in the Bolivian catalogue.258 
 
 257 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 14.III (Bol.). 
 258 Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Sept. 20, 2012, Sentencia 
Constitucional, No. 1250/2012, at III.2  (Bol.). 
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Since coming into force in 1978, the IACHR and its norms have 
been gradually seeping into the normative fabric of the individual 
legal systems of many Latin American countries.  A part of the 
process through which this has happened has been the development 
of “conventionality control.”  “Conventionality control” is the 
practice by which domestic courts in states that have ratified the 
IACHR assess whether a particular domestic law or administrative 
procedure complies with the IACHR’s norms.  In situations where 
the law or procedure in question is found to be in violation of the 
IACHR, the relevant court often will issue a finding to that effect, 
declaring it to be in violation of existing law.  The “conventionality 
control” doctrine has been an effective tool for the realization of 
rights, and an indispensable instrument for the slow building of an 
inter-American259 jus commune,260 a Latin American common law 
centered on human rights, the rule of law, and democracy. 
In the case of Bolivia, we are witnessing the merging at the 
domestic level of both “constitutionality control” and 
“conventionality control.”261  The Bolivian constitutional text 
incorporates “conventionality control”262 as part of 
 
 259  
The two characteristics that Maurizio Fioravanti ascribes to European 
constitutionalism, from which the supranational dimension of modern-
day constitutionalism has emerged, are precisely the ability to define 
boundaries and guarantees vis-à-vis sovereign power on the internal level 
and the capacity to participate in the development of that power through 
the instrument of consensus that gives rise to the vocation of universality 
and the creation of rights as prius, which shows an obvious twofold 
tendency: one of resistance and one of participation.   
MAURIZIO FIORAVANTI, CONSTITUCIONALISMO: EXPERIENCIAS HISTÓRICAS Y TENDENCIAS 
ACTUALES 142-44 (2014). 
 260 Néstor Pedro Sagüés, Obligaciones Internacionales y Control de 
Convencionalidad, 8 ESTUDIOS CONSTITUCIONALES 117, 118-19 (2010). 
 261 INSTITUTO DE DERECHO PARLAMENTARIO, UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE 
MADRID, PAUTAS PARA UNA REFORMA DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN: UN INFORME PARA EL 
DEBATE 33-36 (Javier García Roca ed., 2014). 
 262 The conventionality control doctrine appears for the first time in the 
IACHR jurisprudence in the case of Almonacid-Arellano et al v. Chile, Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 154, ¶ 124 (Sept. 26, 2006), through which its main provisions are defined.  
Previously, however, and based on the cases of Myrna Mack v. Guatemala, Case 
10.636, Report No. 10/96, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91 doc. 9 
(1996) and Tibi v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
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“constitutionality control”263 through recognition of the attributes 
and guarantees of convention-based rights as part of the Block of 
Constitutionality.264  Upon its incorporation into “constitutionality 
control,” “conventionality control” is efficiently configured as a 
guarantee intended to facilitate the enforcement of current rights in 
accordance with domestic and international sources.265  Unlike 
“constitutionality” control, “conventionality” control also can be 
exercised at the international level.  Nonetheless, there is 
widespread recognition that domestic judges266 are the natural 
judges of the American Convention on Human Rights, since they are 
the ones in charge of forwarding and implementing the 
 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 114 (Sept. 7 2004), Judge Sergio Ramírez 
made a conceptual approach to the said doctrine.  Regarding conventionality 
control, the IACHR decided in the case of Ibsen Cárdenas v. Bolivia that the parameter 
governing the diffuse conventionality control doctrine is found not only in the 
ACHR itself but also in its protocols and other instruments forming part of its corpus 
iuris, thus clarifying the elements of the said kind of control.  Ibsen Cárdenas v. 
Bolivia, Merits, Reparation, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
217, ¶ 202 (Sept. 1, 2010).  The inter-American jurisprudence has held that the 
IACHR is the ultimate interpreter of the American Convention on Human Rights.  
Atala Riffo v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 239, ¶¶ 282, 284 (Feb. 24, 2012). 
 263 The IACHR also explains that domestic judicial bodies should exercise 
constitutionality control in conjunction with conventionality control.  Boyce et al. v. 
Barbados, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 169, ¶ 77-80 (Nov. 20, 2007). 
 264 See Humberto Nogueira Alcalá, Los desafíos del control de convencionalidad 
del corpus iuris interamericano para los tribunales nacionales, en especial, para los 
tribunales constitucionales, 45 BOLETÍN MEXICANO DE DERECHO COMPARADO 1167, 
1183-84, 1205-17 (2012). 
 265 Susana Albanese, La internacionalización del derecho constitucional y la 
constitucionalización del derecho internacional, in EL CONTROL DE CONVENCIONALIDAD 
13, 15 (Susana Albanese ed., 2008). 
 266 The IACHR emphasizes that all judges and organs involved in the 
administration of justice at all levels are obliged to exercise conventionality control.  
Cabrera García v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 220, ¶ 225 (Nov. 26, 2010).  See also Liakat 
Ali Alibux v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 276, ¶ 151 (Jan. 30, 2014); Expelled 
Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 282, ¶ 311 (Aug. 
28, 2014); Gudiel Álvarez et al. v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 253, ¶ 330 (Nov. 20, 2012) (stressing that 
the conventionality control doctrine extends to other international human rights 
treaties). 
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interpretations267 on which the IACHR finds support for its own 
judgments, through permanent dialogue268 and what we might 
describe as “loyal cooperation.”269 
b. Supraconstitutionality 
The rights enumerated in international instruments take a 
position within the Block of Constitutionality, a fact that, as we have 
seen, has significant impact on domestic legislation.  The Bolivian 
Constituent Assembly, however, has gone beyond this solution by 
recognizing the crucial importance of the protection of rights 
regardless of their original sources, and managing to give the norms 
capable of providing the best protection priority even over 
constitutional norms.  At this point we will discuss another set of 
articles that make it possible to give preference to international 
human rights law over the constitutional text, as well as what this 
means for the Bolivian domestic legal system. 
i. Articles 13.IV ab initio and 256.I 
There is no doubt that the supraconstitutional nature of the 
rights contained in international treaties already accounts for the 
 
 267 In this regard, it is established that the IACHR does not impose a given 
model of conventionality control.  Liakat Ali Alibux v. Suriname, Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 276, ¶ 124 (Jan. 30, 2014). 
 268 Javier García Roca remarks that  
the idea of a legal dialogue as judicial fiction sometimes imposed by the 
law proves useful to explain how rights are developed worldwide through 
a persuasive interpretation based on the written judgments of various 
courts that take on a dialogue-oriented, rather than an isolationist and 
nationalistic, stance as they cooperate in the context of a network of 
subjects that seek solutions to problems considered to be of a similar 
nature.   
Javier García Roca, El diálogo entre el Tribunal de Derechos Humanos, los Tribunales 
Constitucionales y otros organos jurisdiccionales en el espacio convencional europeo, in 
DIÁLOGO JURISPRUDENCIAL EN DERECHOS HUMANOS ENTRE TRIBUNALES 
CONSTITUCIONALES Y CORTES INTERNACIONALES 219, 228 (Eduardo Ferrer Mac-
Gregor & Alfonso Herrera García eds., 2013). 
 269 See Alcalá, supra note 249, at 233. 
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highest degree of protection that any constitutional text could 
provide to international human rights law.  Throughout history, 
national constituent assemblies all over the world have shown 
reluctance to grant supraconstitutional hierarchy to international 
instruments.  Over time, however, Latin America has witnessed a 
trend towards the creation of modern-day constitutional texts 
capable of ensuring greater and more effective human rights 
protection.270  The new Bolivian constitutional text addresses this 
issue, creating what turns out to be a sophisticated and useful 
framework for giving international human rights treaties priority 
over the constitution. 
It is important in this regard to pay particular attention to Article 
13.IV ab initio:  “International treaties and conventions ratified by 
the Pluri-National Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa), 
which recognize human rights and prohibit their limitation in States 
of Emergency, shall prevail over internal law.”271  With this 
declaration, the Bolivian State does not shy away from the express 
proclamation of the supremacy of international human rights law 
over domestic legislation.272  Equally significant, this statement273 
 
 270 See CLAUDIA ESCOBAR GARCÍA, TRANSCONSTITUCIONALISMO Y DIÁLOGO 
JURÍDICO 61 (2011) (stating that Article 424 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Ecuador includes a guideline with a similar structure, which stipulates that the 
Constitution and international human rights treaties ratified by the Ecuadorian 
State that recognize rights that are more favorable than those enshrined in the 
Constitution shall prevail over any other legal regulatory system or action by public 
power and that this interpretation is left to the discretion of the Ecuadorian 
constitutional interpreter). 
 271 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 13.IV (Bol.). 
 272 According to Antonio Remiro Brotons, “seldom do constitutional texts 
stipulate the preeminence of international treaties in cases of contradiction, since 
they take the Constitution’s supremacy for granted.”  Antonio Remiro Brotons, 
Controles Preventivos y Reparadores de la Constitucionalidad Intrínseca de los Tratados 
Internacionales, 16 REVISTA DE DERECHO POLÍTICO 109, 110 (1982-1983). 
 273 The Constitutional Court of Colombia, for example, has understood by 
“domestic legislation” not only the normative scope of the laws but also that of the 
Constitution itself, thus allowing its supranational implementation.  The 
Colombian constitutional text has given the enforcement of international human 
rights treaties priority over domestic provisions as far as its judicial opinions are 
concerned, which has made it possible to provide superb protection of rights.  See, 
e.g., Corte Constitucional, October 23, 1995, Sentencia No. T-477/95, Gaceta de la 
Corte Constitucional (Colom.). 
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paves the way for the recognition of the supraconstitutional 
hierarchy of international human rights treaties.274 
Judging by the above, the Constitutional Court could apply 
international human rights law above its own constitutional 
norms.275  This situation would be entirely in agreement with both 
the spirit of the new constitutional text and the line followed by the 
Constitutional Court, since it aims at providing a maximum level of 
human rights protection.  What is more, the Constitutional Court 
has to bear in mind that the declaration of supraconstitutionality of 
international human rights treaties is not uncommon in other Latin 
American constitutional systems.276  Indeed, it is on the basis of 
 
 274 Judgment C-401/05 of April 14, 2005 of the Constitutional Court of 
Colombia, for example, establishes that the incorporation of an instrument into the 
Block of Constitutionality has its rationale in the Constitution, pointing out that it 
is precisely the same procedure adopted in the case of international human rights 
treaties, which, for constitutional purposes, were expressly incorporated into the 
Block of Constitutionality on grounds that its norms have domestic priority.  Corte 
Constitucional, Apr. 14, 2005, Sentencia No. C-401/05, Gaceta de la Corte 
Constitucional (Colom.); see also Brewer-Carías, supra note 120; LEÓN BASTOS, supra 
note 121, at 231-33. 
 275 See, e.g., Sala Constitucional, Nov. 11, 1992, Sentencia No. 0343 (Costa Rica) 
(noting that, despite the recognition of the constitutional hierarchy of international 
human rights instruments in Costa Rica, the Constitutional Chamber in that 
country had recourse to Article 48 of its Constitution to recognize not only that the 
human rights instruments currently in force have a similar status as the 
Constitution, but also that, as they accord people more rights or guarantees, they 
are in a position of supremacy with regard to the Constitution).  The Constitutional 
Court has stated that its rulings cover not only the violation of constitutional rights 
but also the whole universe of fundamental rights contained in international human 
rights instruments ratified by the country.  Sala Constitucional, Nov. 10, 1993, 
Sentencia de Clarificación No. 5759 (Costa Rica).  The aforementioned Costa Rican 
Article was modified through Act 7128 and, therefore, it also incorporates now the 
instruction to recognize fundamental rights, including those enunciated in the 
relevant international instruments.  Following the enactment of this legislation and 
the subsequent promulgation of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction of 1989, the 
international human rights treaties ratified by the country achieved supranational 
status, including not only international treaties duly authorized by the Legislative 
Assembly but also those yet to be authorized by it, which entails a significant 
extension of the catalogue of fundamental rights.  Hence, the rights emanated from 
international treaties shall have the same effect, scope, and guarantees as the 
fundamental rights contained in the Costa Rican Constitution, and only the way of 
incorporating them into the domestic legislation will change.  See LEÓN BASTOS, 
supra note 121, at 231-33. 
 276 See, e.g., CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE GUATEMALA May 31, 
1985, art. 46 (establishing in matters of human rights the principle of “preeminence” 
in favor of international human rights treaties, indicating that the latter have 
precedence over domestic laws). 
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similar interpretations that some Latin American systems have 
managed to include in their domestic legal order new rights drawn 
from international law.277  Even if it is true that such interpretations 
have not been free of problems,278 in almost every case these 
problems are solved through the recognition of the constitutional 
status of international human rights instruments.279 
From the above, we can infer that the potential scope of Article 
13.IV ab initio is contingent on the way in which the Constitutional 
Court will interpret its content.280  Considering that, in line with the 
standards governing the interpretation of constitutional rights, the 
Court has tried to make Bolivia’s domestic law as open as possible 
in order to facilitate the illumination of international human rights 
law, it is not preposterous to say that the Constitutional Court can 
 
 277 See, e.g., Corte de Constitucionalidad, May 27, 1997, Expediente No. 1281-
96, Gaceta Jurisprudencial no. 44 (Guat.) (ruling on the basis of Article 45 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights with the aim of protecting rights not 
expressly enumerated in its constitutional text). 
 278 Article 4.II of the Constitution of the Brazil, for example, stipulates that its 
international relations shall be governed by the prevalence of human rights.  
Constituição Federal [C.F.] [Constitution] art. 4.II (Braz.).  Starting from this 
premise, a supranational protection of human rights can also be inferred.  
Nevertheless, in its interpretations, the Brazilian Court of Justice has been reluctant 
to even grant constitutional rank to the rights emanating from international treaties.  
In this respect, it has been argued that the recognition of this position is not a 
determining factor for the proper fulfillment of Brazil’s international obligations, 
since the most important is the interpretation of rights on the basis of international 
canons.  See Antonio Moreira Maués, Supralegalidad de los Tratados Internacionales de 
Derechos Humanos e Interpretación Constitucional, 18 SUR-REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE 
DERECHOS HUMANOS 217, 230-31 (2013). 
 279 See Pablo Luis Manili, La Recepción del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos 
Humanos por el Derecho Constitucional Iberoamericano, in DERECHO INTERNACIONAL DE 
LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS 371, 381 (Ricardo Méndez Silva ed., 2002). 
 280 See Francisco José Eguiguren Praeli, Aplicación de los Tratados Internacionales 
Sobre Derechos Humanos en la Jurisprudencia Constitucional Peruana, 9 REVISTA IUS ET 
PRAXIS 157 (2003) (“It has been suggested that the fourth of the Final and Transitory 
Provisions of the Peruvian Constitution of 1993, for example, might pave the way 
for an interpretation conducive to the granting of constitutional status to 
international human rights treaties, inasmuch as they are thus conferred a function 
as a parameter or a limitation regarding the content of the rights and their 
interpretation.  None of this would be possible if the said norms were lower in rank 
than the Constitution.  It has even been said that these articles could raise the 
international human rights norms to a supraconstitutional level.  This interpretation 
has not been literally expressed by the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal, which has 
nevertheless drawn sustenance from International human rights law in order to 
establish criteria and define the content and scope of these rights.”).  
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deliver its judgments by granting international human rights law 
supraconstitutional hierarchy.  
On the other hand, Article 256.I of the constitution stipulates:  
“[I]nternational treaties and instruments in matters of human rights 
that have been signed and ratified, or those that have been joined by 
the State, which declare rights more favorable than those contained 
in the Constitution, shall have preferential application over those in 
this Constitution.”281  Here, one notices a much more specific 
provision about the supraconstitutional character of the norms 
contained in international treaties.  Although the first part of Article 
13.IV of the constitution may be interpreted in a restrictive manner 
by the Court, on the assumption that the application of domestic law 
might be exclusively making reference to regulations having lesser 
rank than the constitution,282 Article 256.I leaves no room for doubt, 
explicitly stating the possibility of preeminence over the Bolivian 
constitutional text.283 
 
 281 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 256.I. (Bol.). 
 282 The Supreme Court of Justice of Argentina concluded, in the case of 
Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich, that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties grants an 
International Treaty right of way in cases of conflict with any domestic law, 
including the Constitution. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] 
[National Supreme Court of Justice], 7/7/1992, “Ekmekdjian, Miguel Angel c. 
Sofovich, Gerardo y otros,” Fallos (1992-315-1492) (Arg.).  Later on, however, in the 
Fibraca case, the Supreme Court changed the precedent and stated that the said 
priority depends on its degree of compliance with the Constitution.  Corte Suprema 
de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 7/7/1993, 
“Fibraca Constructora S.C.A. c. Comisión Técnica Mixta de Salto Grande,” Fallos 
(1993-316-1669) (Arg.).  For a discussion of the Court’s interpretation of the above 
cases, see Néstor Pedro Sagües, Mecanismos de Incorporación de los Tratados 
Internacionales Sobre Derechos Humanos, al Derecho Interno, 61 DERECHOS HUMANOS: 
ÓRGANO INFORMATIVO DE LA COMISIÓN DE DERECHOS HUMANOS DEL ESTADO DE 
MÉXICO 45, 46-47 (2003). 
 283 In contrast, this stipulation, suggesting the existence of a more favorable 
universal law, has not taken hold in the practical reality of the States.  Notably, each 
time that the United States has ratified a major human rights treaty, it has included 
a package of conditions known as “RUDs” (Reservations, Understandings and 
Declarations).  The intention is to decline to agree to treaty provisions to the extent 
that they violate individual rights provisions of the constitution or to certain other 
provisions on policy grounds.  These RUDs also announce that they purport to 
interpret some provisions that are undefined in the treaties and the text in general 
in a manner consistent with its federal system of government and declare as well 
that the terms of the international treaties are not self-executing.  See BRADLEY, supra 
note 195, at 36-38.  For more on RUDs, see HENKIN, CLEVELAND, HELFER, NEUMAN & 
ORENTLICHER., supra note 237, at 784-87.  However, customary international law is 
indeed directly applicable to the States.  See CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. 
GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 605-22 (4th ed. 2011). 
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While the preferential observance of human rights is always 
subject to the recognition and application of domestic laws that 
ensure the effective integration of those rights’ characteristics, this 
rule cannot be argued as a pretext to restrict internationally 
proclaimed human rights.  No restriction or alteration of the rights 
contained in international treaties can be allowed if that turns out to 
entail an inadequate protection of human rights.284  Some legal 
 
 284 Article 23 of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
stipulates that the international instruments relating human rights which have been 
executed and ratified by Venezuela have a constitutional rank and prevail over 
internal legislation, insofar as they contain provisions concerning the enjoyment 
and exercise of such rights that are more favorable than those established by the 
Constitution and the laws of the Republic and shall be immediately and directly 
applied by the courts and other organs of the public power.  CONSTITUTION OF THE 
BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA Dec. 1999, art. 23.  This rule allows for the direct 
application of international human rights treaties, to the point of granting them 
supranational status when they provide more favorable norms, just like in the new 
Bolivian constitutional text.  However, the Constitutional Court of the Supreme 
Tribunal of Justice of Venezuela has interpreted the aforementioned Article in a 
clearly restrictive manner, stating that it makes reference to rights-making 
instruments rather than to the judgments delivered by institutions or bodies 
prescribed in international treaties.  See Sala Constitucional, July 15, 2003, Judgment 
No. 1942 (Venez.).  It also found that the interpretation of this constitutional rule 
only concerns human rights-making norms, stating that prevalence is limited to the 
norms of international treaties in matters of human rights, without including the 
reports and opinions issued by international bodies intended to interpret the scope 
of the international instruments.  Id.  The court continues its interpretation saying 
that the constitutional hierarchy of international treaties is related to those 
standards which, once they are incorporated into the constitution, have as their sole 
interpreter—with a view to their adjustment to the Venezuelan Internal 
Legislation—the Venezuelan constitutional judge and, particularly, the 
Constitutional Court.  Id.  The Venezuelan Constitutional Court has emphasized its 
exclusive competence to determine which international instruments in matters of 
human rights will prevail at internal level as well as which human rights not 
enumerated in those international instruments have legal effect in Venezuela.  Id.  
The Court safeguards its competence by stipulating that these powers cannot be 
diminished by objective standards contained in international human rights 
instruments ratified by the country that make it possible for the States parties to 
consult international bodies about their interpretation, highlighting the fact that, 
should such consults be allowed, the outcome would be a form of constitutional 
reform without the proper arrangements for it.  Id.  The competence of the 
Constitutional Court would be undermined and the supranational organs would 
be entrusted with such competence as to make binding interpretations.  Id.  At a 
later date, following Sala Constitucional, Dec. 18, 2008, Judgment No. 1939 (Venez.), 
this tendency was confirmed, to the extent that the judgment of the IACHR of 
August 5, 2008 became non-enforceable and a denouncement was filed with the 
IACHR.  See Carlos Ayala Corao, La Doctrina de la “Inejecución” de las Sentencias 
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scholars have argued that, despite the existence of different 
provisions in other regional constitutional systems which seem to 
favor the thesis of supraconstitutionality, such status has been 
“diminished by a corrective and, at times, ‘denaturalizing’ kind of 
jurisprudence on the part of national courts.”285  Even in the 
experience of some supranational courts, there have been attempts 
from a protectionist and nationalistic perspective286 to put obstacles 
in the way of international rights-protective instruments,287 
resulting in violations of disadvantaged groups’ rights.  “For this 
reason alone, democratic legitimacy should not be used as a 
justification to evade international human rights protections.”288  In 
this respect, and despite the extent to which the constitutional norms 
are open to international human rights law, the interpretations to be 
made by the Constitutional Court are of paramount importance to 
ensure an effective protection of human rights.  Just as certain 
constitutional formulas can be used to ensure an effective openness 
to international law, so too can they cause serious problems 
regarding the protection of rights based on a staunch defense of 
 
Internacionales en la Jurisprudencia Constitucional de Venezuela (1999-2009), in Diálogo 
jurisprudencial en derechos humanos entre tribunales constitucionales y cortes 
internacionales 503, 568 (2013). 
 285 Néstor Pedro Sagües, El “control de convencionalidad” en el sistema 
interamericano, y sus anticipos en el ámbito de los derechos económico-sociales, in DIÁLOGO 
JURISPRUDENCIAL EN DERECHOS HUMANOS ENTRE TRIBUNALES CONSTITUCIONALES Y 
CORTES INTERNACIONALES 993, 1003 (Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor & Alfonso Herrera 
García eds., 2013). 
 286 A nationalistic discourse and a lack of identity are still present in the 
process of European integration construction.  See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, LA INCLUSIÓN 
DEL OTRO (1999); CAS MUDDE, POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES IN EUROPE (2007) 
(discussing the impact of radical right parties on democracies in Europe); Margarita 
Gómez-Reino & Iván Llamazares, The Populist Radical Right and European Integration: 
A Comparative Analysis of Party-Voter Links, 36 WEST EUR. POL. 789 (2013). 
 287 It has also been stated that domestic judges sometimes use international 
law to protect the national interests from external pressures.  Eyal Benvenisti, 
Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by National 
Courts, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 241, 245 (2008). 
 288 Javier García Roca, Humberto Nogueira Alcalá & Rafael Bustos Gisbert, La 
comunicación entre ambos sistemas y las características del diálogo, in EL DIÁLOGO ENTRE 
LOS SISTEMAS EUROPEO Y AMERICANO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 65, 69-70 (Javier García 
Roca et al. eds., 2012). 
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national sovereignty,289 leading to flagrant violations of 
international law.290 
International human rights law gives a high status to the 
principles of favorability and pro homine as judicial standards for 
courts to interpret and enforce rights so as best to favor the 
individual, his freedom, and his rights.291  Favorability refers to 
giving preference to the expansion of human rights.  Pro homine is 
the emphasis on outcomes that promote the dignity and welfare of 
human beings.  The Bolivian constitutional text recognizes both of 
these principles by establishing the preferred application of 
whatever norm is most favorable to human rights.  Under this 
framework, judgments based on international human rights treaties 
can have supraconstitutional status,292 taking into account the 
express provision in the constitution that such a judgment can 
prevail even over the constitutional text itself.  Accordingly, the 
Constitutional Court can rely on significant support to make an 
interpretation that places an international human rights treaty above 
a narrower constitutional norm, as far as that treaty’s enforcement 
is concerned.293 
The Bolivian Constituent Assembly managed to set up a system 
of mutual improvement between international human rights law 
 
 289 Kathryn Sikkink argues that sovereignty is a long way from disappearing, 
since the sovereign State is still the prevailing force to protect, as well as violate, 
human rights.  Kathryn Sikkink, Reconceptualizing Sovereignty in the Americas: 
Historical Precursors and Current Practices 19 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 705, 706 (1997). 
 290 See W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary 
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 874 (1990). 
 291 Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Dec. 20, 2011, Voto Disidente, 
Sentencia Constitucional, No. 1360/2011-R (Bol.). 
 292 MICHEL TROPER, ENSAYOS DE TEORÍA CONSTITUCIONAL 84 (2004) (pointing 
out that a provision cannot be considered supraconstitutional if it is enshrined in 
the Constitution, except when it is thought to be exempt from any form of 
constitutional review).  Indeed, by peremptory constitutional decision, human 
rights contained in international instruments are part of the Block of 
Constitutionality, but they are not subject to the same constitutional review to 
which the constitutional norms themselves are submitted, their scope and meaning 
cannot be altered through a constitutional reform, and their content is international 
law matter.  Id. 
 293 Roca, Alcalá & Gisbert, supra note 288, at 68 (“[E]ven if they are not 
expressly enunciated in the Constitution, there is an identical mandate in force.  
These authors hold that the constitutional clauses open to International human 
rights law are an exceptional resource of constitutional pedagogy for the 
interpreters that is deemed to be very useful and convenient from many points of 
view, but in no case are they unfailing.”). 
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and the country’s new constitutional text.  The solution suggested, 
and required, for this end focuses on giving priority to the system 
that is capable of providing the best possible protection for 
ultimately conflicting rights, regardless of whether those rights have 
their source in the domestic or the international legal system.294  This 
measure turns out to be an effective solution and a guarantee of 
human rights protection in a general sense, making the new Bolivian 
constitutional standard an advanced legal text in line with the need 
to protect human rights.295 
The new Bolivian Constitution gives to international human 
rights instruments sufficient hierarchy—of a potentially 
supraconstitutional nature—to ensure their observance, thus 
catapulting the Bolivian constitutional system into international 
human rights law with a view to an effective protection of rights.  
The Constitutional Court has declared itself explicitly to be in favor 
of the supraconstitutional character of international human rights 
treaties.296  The line that its judgments have followed starts an 
interpretation in the direction of supraconstitutionality, as befits its 
tendency to grant human rights the highest possible protection. 
 
 294 Bustos Gisbert, supra note 234, at 187 (”[A] dialogue requires not only 
formal recognition by judicial organs but also realization that the actor involved has 
something to say from the viewpoint of his/her competence about a matter that 
another court is claiming for itself; therefore, the key is that both courts agree that 
they each have a role to play in the relevant matter.”)  The author stresses that the 
degree of recognition by the other court depends on the intensity of the said 
dialogue.  Id. 
 295 Jure Vidmar, Norm Conflicts and Hierarchy in International Law: Towards a 
Vertical International Legal System?, in HIERARCHY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE PLACE 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 13, 16 (Erika De Wet & Jure Vidmar eds., 2012) (stating that from 
the preamble of the United Nations Charter itself we can infer the recognition that 
all human beings share interests and values that transcend the interests of sovereign 
States). 
 296 Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Nov. 28, 2017, Declaración 
Plurinacional, No. 0084/2017 (Bol.) (claiming the preferred application of Article 23 
of the American Convention on Human Rights over the Bolivian Constitution, 
which entailed the inapplicability of constitutional articles that reduce the number 
of requirements to be elected for government positions by popular vote and 
declared as unconstitutional those articles and laws containing the aforesaid 
limitation, thus allowing for the possibility of indefinite reelection.)  This judgment, 
as controversial as it was, could be implemented to improve the scope of the rights 
of vulnerable groups. 
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ii. Implications 
The constituent process carried out in Bolivia laid the 
foundations for the recognition and protection of basic principles of 
international law.  The old conceptions of sovereignty have been 
forced to yield to the search for new constitutional solutions to the 
problems of building human rights-protecting projects.   
The expansion of expectations attached to the quest for 
human rights has gradually weakened the hopes of 
“jurisdictional exclusivity,” especially in view of the opening 
of constitutional standards to international law, which allow 
for the development of new possibilities regarding both the 
defense and the consecration of human rights in various 
constitutional texts.297 
The constitutional hierarchy of domestic law regarding the 
applicability of international human rights law remains an issue of 
heated debate.  Nevertheless, when it comes to international human 
rights law, it is noteworthy that a number of norms have been 
gradually recognized and even interpreted as having higher status, 
which is conducive to a privileged status that contributes to the 
solution of conflicts among competing rights or powers.  The 
recognition of obligations owed between States under international 
law also reveals a change; previously, this law only recognized 
norms to which States had explicitly consented.  Nowadays, 
however, many scholars and even policymakers recognize the 
existence and validity of inviolable standards irrespective of State 
consent, as in the case of jus cogens norms.298  In this respect, these 
 
 297 Antonio del Cabo, Introducción, in CONSTITUCIONALISMO, MUNDIALIZACIÓN 
Y CRISIS DEL CONCEPTO DE SOBERANÍA: ALGUNOS EFECTOS EN AMÉRICA LATINA Y EN 
EUROPA 17, 19 (Antonio del Cabo & Gerardo Pisarello eds., 2000). 
 298 Erika de Wet & Jure Vidmar, Introduction, in HIERARCHY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: THE PLACE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 3 (Erika De Wet & Jure Vidmar eds., 2012).  Jus 
cogens, according to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is 
“accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a 
norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”  Id.  In 
fact, jus cogens is frequently invoked as hierarchically preeminent by the parties to 
judicial processes, but the courts have been reluctant to accept an extended 
interpretation of the hierarchical prevalence of this kind of norm.  Nevertheless, 
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latter norms can be considered to have supraconstitutional status, 
because they undermine the States’ sovereign capacity to choose 
whether to be bound by certain fundamental international legal 
obligations.299 
Universal human rights treaties that recognize internationally 
accepted rights have erga omnes effect.300  The obligations and rights 
created by those treaties are owed to all.  This is because the 
importance of the rights protected through such instruments gives 
rise to a legal interest in their protection, an obligation applicable to 
all States.301  Not only are these norms applicable to international 
legal systems, but they also engage domestic judges at the local and 
 
there is an obvious intention to defend the superiority of these norms even over 
international law.  LISA YARWOOD, STATES ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: HOLDING STATES ACCOUNTABLE FOR A BREACH OF JUS COGENS NORMS 67 
(Routledge, 2011).  Still, some also say that there is no solid evidence whatsoever of 
accountability regarding the failure to fulfill the jus cogens and, therefore, it is 
possible to say that in fact there is no such obligation, that there is universal State 
practice contrary to that obligation, or that there is some limitation that exists in 
relation to exercising the obligation.  See Stefan Kadelbach, Jus Cogens, Obligations 
Erga Omnes and Other Rules – The Identification of Fundamental Norms, in THE 
FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 21 (Cristian Tomuschat 
& Jean-Marc Thouvenin eds., 2006) (discussing the disagreement on the content 
make up of jus cogens).  It is worth pointing out that when a State makes a 
reservation to an international treaty, and the reservation is in conflict with a norm 
of jus cogens, the said reservation will not have effect.  Ulf Linderfalk, Reservations 
to Treaties and Norms of Jus Cogens—A Comment on Human Rights Committee General 
Comment No24, in RESERVATIONS TO HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE VIENNA 
CONVENTION REGIME 213, 216 (Ineta Ziemele ed., 2004).  See generally Władysław 
Czaplinski, Jus Cogens and the Law of Treaties, in THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 83, 87-93 (Cristian Tomuschat & Jean-Marc 
Thouvenin eds., 2006) (discussing the criticism of the concept of peremptory norms 
and its indetermination). 
 299 See Vidmar, supra note 295, at 28-29 (stating that these limitations are 
construed on the respect of the customary obligations laid down in Article 53 of the 
Vienna Convention). 
 300 Id. 293, at 23-25 (stating that the erga omnes obligations reveal the existence 
of core values shared by the international community of States).  Even if, according 
to theory, these obligations can extend beyond jus cogens, their entire scope is still 
unclear and, as they overlap with jus cogens norms, they may be seen as mechanism 
to apply the said norms.  It is worth pointing out that, as a rule, the erga omnes 
obligations are not accepted as an expression of the normative hierarchy of 
International law, as it happens in the case of jus cogens. 
 301 See id. at 23. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
662 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 42:2 
   
 
national level.302  Domestic courts are State organs, so their 
performance counts as State practice, and, consequently, these 
courts become relevant to customary international law.303  In the 
absence of a centralized international law, courts at both the 
domestic and regional level are playing a gradually increasing role 
in the interpretation and implementation of international legal 
obligations.304  
It is perhaps easy to think of constitutional acceptance as being 
restricted to international instruments in matters of human rights-
protection only, and any implications derived strictly therefrom.  
But the Bolivian fundamental standard may yet be capable of 
expressly proclaiming the supremacy of international human rights 
law even over the country’s own constitutional text.  From the 
Constitutional Court’s practice thus far, we can infer Bolivia’s 
constitutional vocation to take its constitutional system to a 
maximum level of rights protection,305 irrespective of the source of 
the relevant instruments of protection.306  
 
 302 See Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International 
Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 38 (2003).  The resolution of conflicting 
standards in a decentralized international legal system is not an exclusive 
prerogative of the international tribunals, since the domestic courts are capable of 
solving these problems.  In fact, Article 38.1.d of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice is held to imply that the judicial decisions are subsidiary means for 
the determination of rules of law, leaving this configuration open to the judgments 
delivered by domestic courts.  For a discussion on subsidiarity in international 
human rights law, see Id. 
 303 See André Nollkaemper, Inside or Out: Two Types of International Legal 
Pluralism, in NORMATIVE PLURALISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: EXPLORING GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 94, 96 (Jan Klabbers & Touko Piiparinen eds., 2013) (noting that many 
legal systems deal with their international obligations by giving priority to those 
values and rights of their legislation deemed to be incompatible with international 
law, which sets in relief the fact that there may be a form of pluralism that would 
not do justice to legitimate political and social differences between States and 
communities within States). 
 304 See Vidmar, supra note 295, at 4. 
 305 This vocation fits perfectly into the proclamation of the Bolivian 
Plurinational Constitutional Court, recognizing that, since the country has IACHR 
Member State status, it cannot let its domestic law become an obstacle to the 
fulfillment of its international obligations.  Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, 
May 10, 2010, Sentencia Constitucional, No. 0110/2010-R, at 11, 13 (Bol.).  
 306 See LAURENCE BURGORGUE-LARSEN, EL DIÁLOGO JUDICIAL: MÁXIMO DESAFÍO 
DE LOS TIEMPOS JURÍDICOS MODERNOS 211-17 (2013).  In this respect, it is particularly 
interesting to mention that the process of internationalization in Latin America is 
notable for being extremely protective of human rights.  For a discussion about this 
internationalization that takes shape through a humanization process, see id. 
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Given that universally valid human rights instruments enjoy a 
special rank within the domestic legal system, they become 
translated into direct individual rights in cases in which the content 
of their mandate is defined in sufficient detail, that is, in a precise, 
integral, and unconditional manner.307  These rights rise above 
constitutional standards once the State consents to fulfill its 
obligations.  The recognition of this condition in the Bolivian 
Constitution merely reinforces a form of protection already 
stipulated in international human rights law.  Aware of this fact, the 
Constituent Assembly went beyond its intentions of incorporating 
constitutional provisions to govern the interpretation of Bolivian 
constitutional rights in compliance with the norms contained in 
different international human rights instruments.  The Assembly 
decided to go a step further and give strong support to international 
human rights law by issuing criteria at once immovable and 
impossible to be reduced to the individual interpreter’s opinion.  To 
this end, the Assembly laid down a system in an attempt to facilitate 
the full integration of the rights recognized by international 
instruments,308 and to give practical effect to international human 
rights norms in Bolivia’s domestic legislation.309  The Constituent 
Assembly found it necessary to further guarantee and observe 
international law in its domestic legislation.  It concluded that the 
rights conferred upon individuals on the basis of legitimately 
recognized international instruments needed to be made effective 
 
 307 See Ramón Paniagua Redondo, La recepción, publicación y rango normativo de 
los tratados internacionales en el ordenamiento jurídico español, 90 Revista Jurídica de 
Catalunya 921, 925 (1991).  
 308 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 256 (Bol.) (asserting 
Bolivia will apply the rules of treaties and related international instruments it “has 
signed and/or ratified, or those that have been joined by the State” when those 
instruments “declare rights more favorable than those contained in the 
Constitution,” and that interpretation of rights contained in the Constitution should 
similarly comport with more favorable treaty norms). 
 309 See La ASAMBLEA CONSTITUYENTE, INFORMES POR COMISIONES: LA 
CONSTRUCCION DEL TEXTO CONSTITUCIONAL (Tomo III).  The Bolivian constitutional 
provisions are justified in the minutes and documents of the Constituent Assembly.  
The Minority Report of Commission No. 3 of the Constituent Assembly remarks 
that neither the State’s situation nor its root causes can remain aloof from the 
universal principles that justify the existence the international constitutional 
doctrine in its midst.  Id.  The actuality that the international treaties entail is thereby 
recognized.  Likewise, this Commission points out that instruments issued from 
both the United Nations and the OAS provide for the said international recognition.  
Id. 
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immediately at all levels of the Bolivian legal system, in the same 
manner as the rights recognized in the new constitutional text itself, 
without depending on particular jurisdictional or jurisprudential 
constructions.310  That is how the Assembly established that the 
supremacy of international law in matters of human rights must be 
on a par with the fundamental rights and values contained in the 
national legislation.311 
With this inclusion of norms drawn from international human 
rights law, the domestic court or interpreting body must evaluate 
and put into practice the principles that grant the protection of rights 
a higher regulatory role.  In this context, the openness afforded by 
the Constitutional Court serves the country’s purpose of 
guaranteeing such protection.  However, it must be kept in mind 
that the Constitutional Court is not the only organ expected to 
implement the higher standard, for any other domestic judge or 
tribunal is also empowered to choose the highest jurisdictional or 
regulatory norm, as provided for in the new Bolivian constitutional 
text.312 
The primacy rule stipulated in Article 13.IV ab initio and Article 
256.I have different implications from those of articles 13.IV in fine 
and 256.II.  Articles 13.IV ab initio and 256.I also complement the 
purpose of incorporating international human rights treaties into 
the Block of Constitutionality.  In cases where Article 13.IV in fine 
and Article 256.II apply, their interpretation is governed by 
international standards.  This entails an interpretation exercise in 
accordance with the internationally recognized principle of 
“conforming interpretation.”  Nevertheless, such an exercise proves 
to be impossible in situations of unsolvable contradictions.  When a 
contradiction cannot be settled by means of a “conforming 
 
 310 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 14.III. (Bol.) (“The 
State guarantees to all people and communities, without any discrimination, the 
free and effective exercise of the rights established in this Constitution, the laws and 
international human rights treaties.”). 
 311 ANTONIO LA PÉRGOLA, PODER EXTERIOR Y ESTADO DE DERECHO 29 (1987) 
(“The treaty . . . is always subordinate to the principles sanctioned in the 
fundamental text; that is to say, to the inalienable and non-derogable values of the 
constitutional order.”).  
 312 See, e.g., Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Aug. 16, 2011, Sentencia 
Constitucional, No. 1109/2011-R, at 8 (Bol.) (noting various international 
instruments’ provisions against curtailing the human rights contained in member 
States’ laws). 
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interpretation,” Article 13.IV ab initio and Article 256.I authorize 
judges to give international law priority over the constitution 
itself.313 
One must remember that validly concluded international 
treaties must undergo constitutional control successfully in 
accordance with the constitution’s requirements before becoming 
part of the Block of Constitutionality.314  Nevertheless, there are 
occasions in which, subsequent to this process, a serious 
contradiction may become apparent between the treaty in question 
and the constitutional text.  In such cases, the Court is obligated to 
exercise what is known as a posteriori constitutional control, which 
could lead to the serious consequence of the treaty being denounced 
as violating the constitution.  Precisely because a situation of a 
posteriori constitutional control could arise, with all of the serious 
risks that this entails, the judge has an obligation to harmonize the 
international treaty with the constitutional text if at all possible.  The 
judge must search through all possible means for a way to find a 
reconciliation between the constitutional text and the treaty, 
including by looking at the treaty text and its underlying rationale, 
in order to find a constitutional interpretation compatible with, 
rather than opposed to, the treaty.  If, ultimately, the treaty and the 
domestic norm prove to be incompatible, then the constitutional rule 
that gives primacy to international treaties prevails.315 
The main difference between Articles 13.IV in fine and 256.II, on 
one hand, and Articles 13.IV ab initio and 256.I on the other, lies in 
 
 313 See BARRY E. CARTER & ALLEN S. WEINER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 154-63 (6th 
ed. 2011).  In the case of the United States, even if both the Constitution and the 
international treaties comprise the supreme law of the land, it has become clear that 
in cases of contradictions between both norms, the high courts have chosen  not to 
apply international law, recognizing that the Constitution prevails over it as far as 
its applicability is concerned.  Id.  Thus, it is held that an international treaty cannot 
be validated if it is in violation of the Constitution.  See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 
252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) (upholding international treaty protecting migratory birds 
because it did not “contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the 
Constitution,” nor violate the Tenth Amendment); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 
(1957) (finding, with respect to the U.S. Constitution’s Article VI, “[t]here is nothing 
in this language which intimates that treaties and laws enacted pursuant to them 
do not have to comply with the provisions of the Constitution.”).  
 314 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 259 (Bol.).  
 315 See Pedro Sagües, supra note 282, at 49 (referring to the “increasingly 
preferred rule in contemporary doctrine” that dictates, between a constitution and 
a conflicting treaty, priority is given to that which “better protects the personal right 
in question.”). 
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their judicial consequences.  While the first set of articles mandates 
“conforming interpretations,” the second set might declare the norm 
in the constitutional text inapplicable.  It must be emphasized that, 
in cases of inapplicability, we are talking about norms that are totally 
conflicting, and not about norms that could be reconciled.  The legal 
consequence of inapplicability can only come into force in cases of 
insuperable contradictions.  Taking into account the seriousness of 
the resulting effect, that is, a finding that the constitutional text is 
inapplicable and at odds with the international treaty, the judge 
always must leave the door open to the possibility of harmonization. 
Now, as to the exercise of judicial oversight over 
supraconstitutional rights, once their standing in the constitutional 
instrument is understood, there are two possible scenarios.  In the 
first of them, the domestic judge is the one who could resort to 
supraconstitutional norms to exercise oversight over the 
constitutional norms.  In the second scenario, the national laws in 
disagreement with the supraconstitutional norms can be reviewed 
by international judges who have been declared competent to do 
so.316  The judicial outcome in domestic law would be identical in 
both cases. 
In line with these standards, supraconstitutionality means that 
international human rights instruments enjoy a higher legal status 
than the rest of the national laws, including the constitutional text, 
leading to the conclusion that international human rights law can be 
opposed to the constitution itself and even require the latter’s 
reform.317  This is the greatest and most serious consequence that the 
constitutional text may have to endure.  In cases where, as a 
consequence of the constitutional status given to the norms of 
international human rights law, a provision in the constitutional text 
may be inapplicable, the best solution to this contradiction becomes 
a revision or reform of the constitutional text itself. 
While in cases of contradiction nothing prevents the 
constitutional norms from being modified, we must take into 
 
 316 See, e.g., Louis Favoreu, El problema de la supraconstitucionalidad en Francia y 
Europa, in PROBLEMAS ACTUALES DEL DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL: ESTUDIOS EN 
HOMENAJE A JORGE CARPIZO 107, 114-15 (1994)  (revisiting the Open Door case as an 
example in which tension arises between two fundamental rights, and where, 
without any statement on the merits, the European Court of Human Rights gave 
conventional law priority over the constitutional rule).  
 317 See Pedro Sagües, supra note 282, at 46.  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/2
2020] The Role of International Human Rights Law 667 
   
 
account that those norms related to human rights demand a more 
complex process of modification.318  The provisions having to do 
with the basic or essential content of these norms—their intangible 
part—cannot be changed.  Any constitutional regulation in violation 
of these norms would be inadmissible, and the norm of international 
law that stands above such a regulation would offer better 
protection.  Thus, the necessity of limits and boundaries to national 
interpretation or judicial construction, as well as the need to adapt 
such limits and boundaries, on the basis of strategies provided by 
comparative law, become plain to see.319 
This outcome, which is a matter of great seriousness to domestic 
law, proves to be an extremely important element in efforts to 
protect global legal goods.  The success of such a project is made 
possible by the role played by domestic judges in conjunction with 
international law.  Taking into account the great impact that 
international human rights law has made on the Bolivian 
constitution, it is imperative to hold a permanent dialogue that 
favors a two-way continual improvement between domestic 
constitutional rights and the rights contained in the instruments of 
international human rights law.320 
 
 318 See JAMES BRYCE, CONSTITUCIONES FLEXIBLES Y CONSTITUCIONES RÍGIDAS 31-
100 (1988) (considering it “a mistake to accuse flexible Constitutions of being 
unstable, since stability is a distinctive merit claimed for them, insofar as they can 
be extended or adapted according to the circumstances without detriment to its 
structure and, therefore, a well-drawn rigid Constitution will confine itself to 
essentials, and leave many details to be filled in subsequently by ordinary 
legislation and by usage”). 
 319 See Favoreu, supra note 316, at 116.  
 320 See Bustos Gisbert, supra note 234, at 23-27  
The communication between courts of law is a consequence of both the 
search for solutions to similar problems occurring within identical 
decision-making processes and the need to guarantee the coexistence of 
dissimilar legal codes, which involves, among other measures, the actions 
to achieve integration on the basis of human rights with a view to using 
the judgments delivered by different judicial organs to avoid obstructions 
brought forth by total inconsistency.  In this context, however, it is 
necessary to distinguish the kind of communication that is so typical of 
the field of comparative law and takes place between high courts of justice 
and the one that is sufficiently intense to compel the courts to make 
decisions more in keeping with those delivered by external judicial organs.  
The latter form of communication matches what constitutes a dialogue 
proper. 
Id. 
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In these cases, “the search for consensus among courts of law 
which are intent on protecting human rights but whose 
interpretations contradict one another translates into a 
constitutional demand, because the creation of scenarios based on 
constitutional pluralism can be carried through precisely by the 
constitutional norms themselves.”321  This is the reason that 
constitutional dialogue is the only possible way to find suitable 
solutions in a plural constitutional setting that works on various 
levels—domestic, regional, and international.322  It is worth 
mentioning in this regard that the articles of the Bolivian 
Constitution stand out plainly as an exceptional source of 
international law.323  The impact of international human rights law 
on it is reinforced through the opening of unrestricted cooperation 
between national and international jurisdictions,324 which is 
particularly convenient at the present time, when the supranational 
 
 321 See Miguel Poiares Maduro, Courts and Pluralism: Essay on a Theory of 
Judicial Adjudication in the Context of Legal and Constitutional Pluralism, in RULING THE 
WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 356, 
371 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009)  
There is nothing fundamentally new about constitutional pluralism: 
pluralism is inherent in constitutionalism because its ideals authorize, if 
not promote, equally normatively valid and competing constitutional 
claims.  There can be no monopoly for constitutional claims, and often 
competing constitutional claims are expressed by different institutions all 
empowered to give meaning to the Constitution.  Id.  What the current 
forms of constitutional pluralism have done is multiply these institutions, 
notably, courts from competing jurisdictions and different sites of power, 
even within a State.   
Id. 
 322 See, e.g., Bustos Gisbert, supra note 234, at 54 (suggesting that while not 
always possible, if “solutions of synthesis” are to be reached, they will be reached 
through judicial dialogue). 
 323 See generally Gonzalo M. Quintero Saravia, Las Relaciones entre el Derecho 
Internacional y el Derecho Interno: El Caso de la Constitución. La Constitución Como 
Fuente de Derecho Internacional, 45 REVISTA DE DERECHO POLÍTICO 69 (1999) 
(discussing constitutions as a source of rights and obligations not only for their own 
State but also for other States within the international community). 
 324 Nevertheless, it must be mentioned that there has been some friction with 
international bodies.  Consequently, following the complaints of Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Venezuela, Colombia, and El Salvador about the severity of the precautionary 
measures dictated by the IACHR, the Permanent Council of the OAS established a 
Working and Reflection Group in 2011, which in May of 2013 issued a reform of the 
Commission’s Rules of Procedure and in March of 2013 issued a report aiming to 
strengthen the inter-American human rights system.  A.G. Res. 1/13 (XLIV-E/13), 
Inter-Am Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.P. (Mar. 22, 2013). 
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and domestic constitutional courts need flexibility and resilience for 
the benefit of the maximum protection of rights.325 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
a. The Bolivian Catalogue of Rights Inevitably Requires the Minimum 
Standards of International Law 
Although the new Bolivian Constitution contains an expanded 
catalogue of rights, it should be kept in mind that, given the limited 
resources available to the State, most of the rights and guarantees set 
forth in the constitution are “orientative” or “guiding” purposes to 
which the government should direct public policy.  This means that 
the Bolivian catalogue of rights needs to be complemented and 
configured based on compliance with the minimum standards 
provided by international human rights law and institutions.  Even 
though the configuration of such human rights responds to the need 
to provide symbolic arguments for the fight against inequality and 
discrimination, it is recognized that it is international law that 
should serve as a guide to the legislator through its standards.  
International law also establishes the ultimate legal bases that enable 
claimholders to seek redress in cases of violations.  In this sense, no 
matter how developed rights are in the constitution, the keys to their 
interpretation, especially in relation to the positive actions which the 
State is obligated to carry out to enforce rights, must be found in 
international norms and institutions. 
The immediate consequence of all this is to emphasize the value 
and importance of the inter-American human rights system.  Its 
main challenge has been precisely to generate the capacity to guide 
the actions of its member States through common standards and 
principles, both for the determination of the processes of 
formulating public policy, as well as for overseeing the effective 
establishment of minimum standards of mandatory compliance for 
all member States.  The use of international standards to give 
meaning to constitutional rights is especially necessary in the case of 
 
 325 Roca, Alcalá & Gisbert, supra note 288, at 70 (noting that judicial 
understanding of fundamental rights constantly changes in response to 
contemporary circumstances and cultural and social norms).  
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the rights of indigenous peoples, in which international human 
rights law plays a leading role to build limits and amalgams between 
the rights of indigenous peoples and the rest of the body of 
constitutional rights.  For this purpose, it is fundamental that 
jurisdictional dialogues should take place at multiple levels and be 
structured through relations of continuity and reciprocal effect 
among different legal decision-makers, from local judges and courts 
to regional and international ones. 
b. When Interpreting the Constitution, the Relevant Court is Obligated 
to Justify its Use of Whatever Interpretative Canon to which it 
Resorts 
The Bolivian Constitution contains the obligation to go beyond 
the national protection barrier, to allow the interpretation of rights 
based on international normative frameworks protecting human 
rights.  Interpretation from international sources is especially 
important because of the extensive nature of the constitution’s 
catalogue of rights, which is susceptible to possible collisions or 
conflicts, requiring the definition of clear standards of compliance.  
On the basis of Articles 13.IV in fine and 256.II, the constitution opens 
the way to the interpretation of constitutional rights through the 
norms established in ratified human rights treaties.  However, the 
Constitutional Court has gone beyond these provisions and has 
included as an interpretative canon those norms and practices 
developed by international human rights bodies, thus recognizing 
that the corpus juris of international human rights law must be 
understood in an integral manner.  In this way, not only the rights 
proclaimed by international instruments such as treaties, but also 
the decisions and interpretations made by international courts, are 
of special relevance in the process of expanding the 
internationalization and domestic application of human rights. 
Article 256.II, however, also serves as a limit, determining that 
the interpretative opening to international human rights law is not 
unrestricted or unconditional.  This formulation creates an 
important bridge for the interpretation of rights in a pluralistic way, 
since it facilitates that interpretative canon which ensures the best 
protection of human rights, regardless of where the standard comes 
from.  In this way, on the one hand, the interpretation of 
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constitutional rights is mandated in terms of international human 
rights law and, on the other hand, the interpretation of international 
human rights law in terms of constitutional rights is also available, 
allowing for the application of that norm which gives better 
protection to the rights in question. 
Articles 13.IV in fine and 256.II are configured as clauses to which 
the Constitutional Court must make mandatory resort for the 
interpretation of constitutional rights.  At this point, it is important 
to emphasize emphatically that the Constitutional Court invariably 
must resort to these articles.  These articles are not merely optional 
to use; they obligate the Constitutional Court, as well as all domestic 
judges, to interpret the content of constitutional rights in accordance 
with the norms that integrate human rights treaties and the rights 
guaranteed in the Constitution.  Because of the fundamental 
importance of this activity, its expression as judicially binding is 
irrefutable. 
Under this understanding, judges cannot ignore the legal 
interpretation based on international law simply when it seems 
appropriate or timely.  The application and interpretation of 
international law must be explicitly included in the decisions, 
substantiating the specific standard or standards used for the 
protection of rights.  Only from its expression in a legal opinion is it 
possible to establish the legitimacy of the court’s use of one standard 
over another one.  Therefore, although the expression in a legal 
opinion of such an assessment is not a sine qua non requirement, it is 
highly desirable in order to achieve a better understanding and 
application of the interpretative canons, ensuring that the important 
constitutionalization of these clauses has a real effect.  In fact, were 
the court not to resort to Articles 13.IV and 256 in its analysis or legal 
opinion, this would amount to “an interpretation prejudicial to one’s 
rights,” also known as an interpretatio in peius. 
c. The New Bolivian Constitution is Directed Towards a Pluralistic 
System of Rights 
The constitution establishes a “Block of Constitutionality” that is 
constructed by Article 410.II, integrating all human rights treaties 
duly ratified.  The article is very broad, since it does not limit itself 
to stating a traditionally closed catalogue of international 
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instruments.  This clause, being open, is capable of including all the 
human rights instruments ratified by the State. 
However, the Constitutional Court has included both the 
judgements of the Inter American Court of Human Rights and its 
methods of interpretation, as well as some non-formal human rights 
instruments.  This has made it possible to incorporate new rights 
from international sources into the domestic catalogue of human 
rights.  These new rights are incorporated with constitutional value 
and, therefore, offer the same protection as those recognized 
textually as constitutional rights.  This brings with it an important 
effect:  infra-constitutional norms that are in contradiction with the 
international instruments that make up the Block of 
Constitutionality are themselves unconstitutional. 
A very important characteristic of this framework is that, as 
mentioned earlier, it facilitates the fusion, in the domestic system, of 
“conventionality control” (the review of a norm to insure its 
compliance with an international treaty or convention) with 
“constitutionality control” (the review of a norm to insure its 
compliance with the constitutional text).  This fusion is an effective 
tool for the realization of rights, as well as an ideal instrument for 
the construction of an inter-American jus commune or regional 
common law of human rights.  In this process, “constitutionality 
control” subsumes or includes “conventionality control” in the 
domestic system, the only difference being that “conventionality 
control” can also be exercised by international courts.  This effect 
constitutes an unquestionable requirement for constant cooperation 
and loyal dialogue between national and international judges.  
Articles 13.IV ab initio and 256.I complete the Bolivian constitutional 
regulation on human rights, since they do not limit rights from 
international sources to a question of hierarchy but establish that 
rights from international sources may apply over the constitution 
itself when they produce better protection of rights than that set 
forth in the constitutional text. 
The indicated relation, apart from supposing, in terms of 
hierarchy, a “supraconstitutionality” in the application of rights, 
implies the highest possible level of sophistication in the Bolivian 
constitutional system.  The system facilitates the application of 
norms that offer better protection of rights regardless of the 
constitutional or jurisprudential source from which they come, 
whether national or international.  This effect is in accordance with 
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the guaranteeing will of the Bolivian constitutional text.  It forms a 
pluralistic scenario for the protection of rights in which the last 
answer is not found in only one constitutional place, nor based only 
in one constitutional rule, but instead recognizes different 
constitutional spaces or “places” to find the answer under various 
constitutional standards for better and more consistent protection of 
rights. 
The Bolivian constitutional system allows us to think also of 
different solutions, according to every specific case, without fearing 
that the international norm will be applied over the constitutional 
norm itself.  In cases in which international law is applied in 
preference to the constitutional norm, the latter remains inapplicable 
only in that specific case.  Such case-specific application does not 
necessarily affect reform of the constitutional text but brings about 
a transformation derived from the conjugation of constitutional 
sources from different traditions and national as well as 
transnational legal systems.  
These dynamics of constitutional interpretation reflect the 
existence of an effective plurality embracing both international and 
constitutional norms.  The latter norms are no longer intended to 
solve all the problems raised in a specific case but seek to do so 
through a coordinated exercise of constitutional and jurisdictional 
dialogue, in which both the domestic and international systems 
claim the highest decision authority.  There is no ultimate authority 
in the Bolivian constitutional system.  On the contrary, the Bolivian 
Constitution recognizes the existence of a network of ultimate 
authorities and, in turn, a network of ultimate standards. 
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